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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political 
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest 
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is 
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to 
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the 
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political 
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and 
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry 
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal 
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries 
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness), 
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification 
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in 
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most 
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the 
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal 
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case 
against  the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the 
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the 
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal 
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal 
polities. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Main Problem and Aims 
 
This thesis is about the normative foundations of political authority. More precisely, 
it is about the philosophical problem of legitimacy. That is the problem of what 
reasons—if any—there are to justify the exercise of political authority, i.e. of the 
systematic use of the coercive power of states or state-like institutions.  
 It is sometimes observed how philosophical problems tend to take a 
paradoxical form, at least in a rather broad sense of the term. The problem of 
legitimacy is no exception: in a way that has famously and effectively been captured 
by Rousseau’s statement that “man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains”,1 
two rather intuitive premises cannot seem to be reconcilable in a way that will 
generate acceptable conclusions. The intuitive, prima facie case for individual 
autonomy and freedom from external authorities is at odds with the equally intuitive 
idea that some form of political authority is desirable, if only because of the sheer 
prevalence of one form of such authority or other. Philosophical theories of 
legitimacy, then, aim to offer a way out of that impasse. 
 More specifically, this thesis is about whether one particular sort of political 
authority, liberal political authority, can break free of the paradox. It thus concerns 
what reasons there might or might not be for valuing and supporting liberal political 
institutions and practices, i.e. institutions that protect and promote maximal 
individual equal liberty (so I understand liberalism as a tradition of political practice, 
rather than as an account of the normative foundations of certain practices). More 
specifically still, this thesis is a critique of a prominent strand of contemporary 
liberal political theory, which I shall call the liberal legitimacy view. The liberal 
legitimacy view maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on 
the free consent of those subjected to it. The paradigmatic and most influential 
formulation of this approach is John Rawls’: 
                                                
1 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 181. 
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Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal 
principle of legitimacy.2  
 
 For reasons that shall be explored in the following chapters, when 
understood in its wider context that view can be restated in a somewhat more 
precise fashion by saying that it comprises two normative requirements: a polity 
needs to instantiate liberal political institutions and practices, and it must enjoy the 
free consent of its citizenry, which is achieved hypothetically when the polity’s 
fundamental structure can be shown to be acceptable to those subjected to its 
authority. Roughly then, a polity is legitimate when both requirements are satisfied.  
 Throughout this thesis I shall argue that that approach is fundamentally 
flawed. The liberal legitimacy view cannot provide a viable foundation for political 
authority, for the consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and sustained without 
either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the populace or commanding a 
consent that is less than free. That is brought into an especially sharp focus by the 
relatively high level of persistent ethical diversity present in modern liberal-
democratic societies. Moreover, I will argue that the very idea of tying an account of 
hypothetical consent to a particular object of consent (namely liberal policies and 
institutions) is structurally problematic: the liberal legitimacy view attempts to 
eschew the task of justifying its preference for liberal political arrangements by 
stressing how those arrangements need to be freely consented to. Yet the view does 
not in and by itself account for why—through the content of the particular form of 
hypothetical consent through public justifiability it envisages—it only sanctions 
consent to liberal polities (for doing so would require an appeal to the values and 
virtues of liberalism that would make the consent requirement redundant); thus it 
falls in a form of self-referentiality (if not circularity) that makes it unappealing to 
those not already committed to liberalism. To approach that point from a different 
angle, we may say that the liberal legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a 
form of consent that carries free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force 
                                                
2 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. 
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generated by voluntariness), but the particular form of hypothetical consent 
envisaged by the view, through its built-in bias in favour of liberalism, fails to meet 
that requirement.      
 Interestingly enough, Rousseau—to go back to where we started from—has 
something to say about those worries, as he notes that, in order to solve the 
problem of legitimacy, we need to take “men […] as they are, laws as they might 
be”.3 The liberal legitimacy view, however, seems to do the opposite: in order to 
lend support to a given set of laws (i.e. liberalism), it places constraints on what 
citizens might consent to.  
 The main aim of the thesis, then, is a negative or critical one. Yet my 
arguments for the demise of the liberal legitimacy view (and thus of the currently 
predominant consent- or contract-based way of thinking about the foundations of 
liberal political authority) will also contribute to the revitalisation of an alternative 
approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely one that legitimates 
liberal political authority through an appeal to the substantive values and virtues 
instantiated and promoted by the liberal polity. That, in turn, should also change our 
approach to the normative analysis of liberal political practice, as a renewed 
understanding of the source of a political system’s legitimacy naturally leads to the 
individuation and pursuit of different aims when designing and assessing policies 
and institutions. 
 
 
Research Context and Relevance 
 
Some of the points touched upon above should already have provided some 
indication as to the broader significance of this study. The immediate research 
context of my critique of the liberal legitimacy view is the  current literature on the 
foundations of liberalism and, more precisely, on the related and widely debated 
issues of public reason or public justification and of the accommodation of ethical 
diversity in a liberal polity. Yet if we zoom out—as it were—of that immediate 
context we can see that the analysis of the liberal legitimacy view bears on broader 
and arguably more significant issues. As anticipated, on the one hand it has to do 
with assessing the prospects of one out of two main traditions of liberal thinking, 
                                                
3 Rousseau, ibid. 
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namely the contract-based tradition, of which the liberal legitimacy view is the latest 
incarnation. On the other hand, revising our view of what grounds liberal political 
authority changes our understanding of the purposes of liberal political practice, 
thus offering new argumentative resources for or against particular policies and 
institutions. I shall discuss some of the lines of inquiry opened by the results of my 
critique in the concluding chapter; for the moment, let us just briefly get a sense of 
the issues they concern and of their significance. 
 What exactly should we understand by contract-based liberal tradition? 
Moreover, how does the liberal legitimacy view fit in this tradition, and what exactly 
is the alternative tradition? By contract-based liberal tradition I refer to those 
accounts of liberal political authority constructed on the basis of the idea that the 
legitimacy of liberal political arrangements descends from an agreement (usually a 
hypothetical one) among citizens. The liberal polity is legitimate because it is the 
object of such a consensus—so it is not just the case that the norms and values 
instantiated by the liberal polity also require being consented to, otherwise the idea 
of contract would lose its central role and legitimating force. The main exponents of 
this tradition are Locke, Kant, and of course Rawls, who is indeed the main 
proponent of the liberal legitimacy view. Contract-based liberalism stands in sharp 
opposition to an alternative line of liberal thought that runs through the works of 
Hume, Mill, and—more recently—Joseph Raz. Call this tradition substantivist. The 
main idea here is that liberal polities owe their legitimacy to the virtues, goods and 
interests they embody, protect, and promote. Our reasons for complying with liberal 
political authority, then, are generated by those values, and not by an agreement to 
uphold the authority.  
 Those familiar with recent debates on the foundations of liberalism will 
have noticed how the dichotomy between contract-based and substantivist 
liberalism runs perhaps not parallel to but certainly side by side with some familiar 
theoretical fault lines: neutralism vs perfectionism, and deontologism vs teleologism. 
Indeed, all three distinctions are closely related in familiar and important ways, yet 
they do not entirely map on to each other. Very roughly, we may note how the ideas 
of consent and contract are tied to deontology because of the intuitive duty-
generating force of promises (a force which, of course, decreases or even disappears 
if the contract is a hypothetical one). Moreover, deontology and contract are 
connected to the idea of neutrality in so far as a duty or—more generally—a reason 
Introduction 
 5 
for action generated by a contract between various parties can in a sense be 
understood as occupying neutral ground between the various substantive normative 
commitments of those parties. The connections between teleology, perfectionism 
and substantivism are even tighter: an account of legitimacy based on a polity’s 
protection and promotion of certain substantive normative commitments is ipso facto 
teleological; it may also be cashed out as perfectionist, in the (broad and loose) 
sense that it promotes a particular set of normative commitments without worrying 
about taking sides between the various competing normative commitments held by 
different social groups.  
 So, because of those connections, the vocabulary and the conceptual 
apparatus of contemporary debates on the foundations of liberalism will indeed 
feature throughout the thesis, yet engaging with those controversies will not 
constitute my main focus—at least not directly. Indeed, I would like to show how 
those debates are best understood as manifestations of an arguably broader, 
certainly older and hopefully more revealing confrontation between two alternative 
ways of thinking about the foundations of liberal political authority, namely 
contract-based and substantivist liberalism. That in turn will be instrumental to the 
main aim of thesis, namely to argue against the nowadays dominant contract-based 
tradition, in order to revive the substantivist tradition.  
 What, then, would be the significance of such a project? That question has 
a number of different yet compatible and related answers. First, there is an issue of 
historical interest, namely re-mapping the fault lines between the main exponents of 
the liberal tradition,4 which in turn may lead to a renewed understanding of their 
individual contributions to the tradition. Second, abandoning a contract-based 
account of the foundations of liberalism will lead to a change of our understanding 
of the role of consent in liberal-democratic politics: it will become clear that consent 
should be sought and valued not because it conveys the will of the governed and 
thus confers legitimacy, but rather because of the (variously conceivable) value of 
                                                
4 Some, for example, maintain that the fundamental faultline in liberal theories of the foundations 
of political authority puts Locke and Kant in opposing camps, as only Locke is a genuine consent 
theorist (see Simmons, ‘Justification and Legitimacy’, especially pp. 122-123n).  
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democratic political practices.5 That will in turn enable a re-assessment of the value 
and purpose of liberal democracy, with important consequences in terms of policy 
recommendations and institutional design. Finally, whilst—as I shall argue—the 
liberal legitimacy view (at least in its most convincing versions) only applies to 
already entrenched liberal political systems, a renewed understanding of how 
liberalism can ground political authority will give us new tools for evaluating the 
legitimacy of both liberal and non-liberal societies, and both existing and 
prospective polities.  
 
 
Thesis Outline 
 
I will construct my argument as follows. First, I offer an account of the liberal 
legitimacy view, and advance a worry regarding its structure. I then move on to 
analyse the view’s core, namely its account of hypothetical consent through public 
justification, and argue that some potential problems with securing a consensus such 
as that envisaged by the view map on to the structural worries advanced earlier. To 
test this critical hypothesis, then, I analyse the spectrum of versions of the liberal 
legitimacy view, focussing on what I take to be its three main variants. Finally, in the 
light of this analysis, I make my final case against the view. More precisely, I 
develop this argument over six chapters: 
  
CHAPTER I - LIBERAL LEGITIMACY 
I offer an initial characterisation of the liberal legitimacy view, providing an account of 
its two prescriptive requirements, consent and justification. I then explore the question 
of what exactly the view is a theory of. That is to say, I place it in the context of the 
broader political-philosophical issues it addresses (i.e. the issues of political authority, 
power, obligation, and legitimacy), and explain its relation to the social-scientific notion 
of legitimacy. That, in turn, will help me formulating a worry about how the view’s two 
requirements might not fit together in a satisfactory account of the foundations of 
liberal political authority: either the consent requirement is redundant, or the two 
                                                
5 That is in line with some prominent recent defences of liberal democracy (see, for example, 
Amartya K. Sen, Development as Freedom; Sen defends liberal democracy for its virtuous outcomes 
rather than on the basis of the normative legitimatory force of electoral politics.)  
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requirements stand in a relation of vicious circularity.  
 
CHAPTER II – PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION 
I explain in some detail the structure of the liberal legitimacy view, with particular 
attention to the consent requirement and the public justification-based account of 
consent. I then put forward an account of what the view’s desiderata are, which I in 
turn use to formulate a further worry: under conditions of persistent ethical diversity, 
theories of liberal legitimacy will fail to meet at least one of their two main desiderata. 
Moreover, I show how that worry is connected to the structural worries advanced in 
Chapter I. The combination of the worries advanced in this and in the previous chapter 
forms a critical hypothesis that will be tested in the remaining chapters. 
 
CHAPTER III – POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
Rawlsian ‘political’ liberalism constitutes the paradigm of contemporary liberal 
legitimacy theory. In this chapter I analyse the structure of political liberalism and 
unpack the Rawlsian theory of liberal legitimacy. I argue that Rawls’ theory fails to 
satisfy the pragmatic desideratum of the liberal legitimacy view, because it only 
commands the hypothetical consent of arbitrarily idealised citizens. That conclusion, in 
turn, supports the worry (raised in Chapter I) about the structural deficiencies of the 
liberal legitimacy view.  
 
CHAPTER IV - MODUS VIVENDI  
In this chapter I show how the idea of modus vivendi can be deployed to formulate a 
theory of legitimacy through a theory of public reason. I explain the appeal of such a 
move as a response to some of the difficulties of the Rawlsian approach discussed in 
Chapter III. I argue that a modus vivendi-based theory of legitimacy, however, cannot 
satisfy the moralistic desideratum of liberal legitimacy theory, for it does not guarantee 
that the agreements it sanctions will preserve the citizens’ personal autonomy. That 
problem is of course the mirror image of the one identified in Chapter III. 
 
CHAPTER V - JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM 
I discuss Gaus’ critique of Rawlsian political liberalism, and his alternative version of 
the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that where his arguments against Rawls do succeed, 
they support the conclusions of Chapter III, thus undermining the paradigmatic 
formulation of the liberal legitimacy view in a way that has repercussions for all other 
derivative versions of the view. I then discuss Gaus’ own proposal, and argue that in 
Introduction 
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Gaus’ theory the consent requirement is effectively indistinguishable from a justification 
requirement. Hence justificatory liberalism cannot satisfy the pragmatic desideratum of 
the liberal legitimacy view, and thus is not a viable alternative to either political 
liberalism or modus vivendi.  
 
CHAPTER VI - LIBERAL LEGITIMACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
I review the main arguments of the previous chapters and summarise their conclusions. I 
thus argue that, in the light of the analysis of the spectrum of theories considered in 
chapters III-V, the liberal legitimacy view is not a feasible normative foundation of 
political authority in a society characterised by persistent ethical diversity, and hence the 
critical hypothesis set out in Chapters I and II is confirmed. I also broadly canvass an 
alternative, substantivist approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, which 
constitutes a departure from the distinctively modern, consent-based approach to 
legitimacy inaugurated by social contract theory. I close with an overview of further 
research questions prompted by the thesis’ results. 
 
APPENDIX  - SOME DEFINITIONS 
As an aide-mémoire I restate the definitions of the key terms that occur throughout the 
thesis. The terms are ordered by conceptual progression, in the sense that they are 
presented as the building blocks of the argument I construct in the thesis.  
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CHAPTER I 
Liberal Legitimacy 
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
 
0.1 The development of liberal normative political theory over the last two or three 
decades has seen the rise of a distinctive brand of liberalism, one of whose most prominent 
features is perhaps the idea that, in order for a liberal polity to be legitimate, its basic 
structure must in some sense be consented to by the citizenry. I call this now largely 
dominant approach to the normative foundations of liberal political authority ‘the liberal 
legitimacy view’. As I shall show throughout this thesis, it is this approach, combined with 
a concern for some degree of accommodation of the vast and persistent ethical diversity 
characterising modern liberal-democratic societies, that motivates many of the main trends 
(drifts?) of contemporary liberalism: neutrality about the good, proceduralism, public 
justification and public reason, and the like. In fact, all those conceptual devices can be 
seen as strategies to achieve and sustain a consensus on a liberal political framework in an 
ethically diverse society. As briefly touched upon in the Introduction, I maintain that this 
(largely Rawls-driven) neo-Kantian and contract-based drift does a deep disservice to the 
cause of establishing sound philosophical foundations for liberal political practice, for it 
precludes the possibility of making what I believe is the best case for liberalism, namely 
one openly based on the substantive goods, values and interests protected and promoted 
by a liberal political system. 
The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to set the stage for offering a critique of 
the liberal legitimacy view, and of contract-based accounts of the foundations of liberalism 
in general. More generally still, I intend to criticise the contract-based stream of the liberal 
tradition, a stream which runs from Locke to Kant to Rawls, and of which the liberal 
legitimacy view is the most recent instantiation. In order to set out on this task, in this 
chapter I shall provide an initial, working characterisation of the view, which will include 
I – Liberal Legitimacy 
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an account of its contents, aims, and conceptual surroundings. More precisely, I will ask 
what exactly the view’s prescriptive content is, i.e. what political behaviour it requires, and 
what exactly it is a theory of, i.e. what the theoretical and/or political problems it is meant 
to solve are. As I proceed in the characterisation, I shall also begin to flag some of the 
issues around which my critique of the view—which I carry out over the remaining 
chapters—will revolve. Let me anticipate that those issues will mainly regard the type of 
consent, or consensus, envisaged by the liberal legitimacy view, and the lack of 
argumentative support for the view’s preference for liberal political institutions and 
practices; a preference which, I shall argue, cannot be satisfactorily defended simply by 
invoking a consensus on it.  
 
0.2 The chapter is structured in the following way. In the first section I present the 
prescriptive content of the liberal legitimacy view: I offer an initial characterisation of the 
view as consisting of the conjunction of two requirements for the normative validation of 
liberal political authority, namely consent and justification. I then briefly discuss what the 
scope, or the sphere of application of the view is, before moving on to an initial account of 
each of the two requirements. The second section, then, is devoted to an analysis of the 
justification and of the consent requirement respectively. The former will require a brief 
account of what I take the liberal political tradition to be; the latter will consist in a 
preliminary exploration of the idea of hypothetical consent through public justification. 
The third section concerns what the liberal legitimacy view is a theory of. I thus provide an 
account of the relevant aspects of the key terms that are used in characterising the view’s 
content: political power, authority, legitimacy, consent and justification. In so doing I shall 
analyse the relationship between normative and descriptive senses of those terms, thus 
putting in dialogue debates in political philosophy on what constitutes morally legitimate 
authority with social-scientific accounts of legitimacy. In the final section I briefly review 
the points covered throughout the chapter, and set the stage for the tasks to be carried out 
in the rest of the thesis. 
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1. Liberalism, Consent and Liberal Legitimacy 
 
1.1 Let us begin by fleshing out the basic conceptual structure of the liberal legitimacy view 
in some more detail.1 I stated above that the view revolves around the idea that, in some 
sense, liberal political authority must rest on the consent of those subjected to it. So 
consent is a condition that the liberal legitimacy view posits on the exercise of political 
authority. More precisely, it is a necessary and not sufficient condition. The idea, quite 
simply, is that while not any polity that is consented to will thereby count as legitimate, 
even the best polity will not count as legitimate unless it enjoys the consent of those 
subject to its authority. So, (i) free consent and (ii) the polity instantiating certain virtues 
are each a necessary condition, and jointly they become a necessary and sufficient 
condition for liberal legitimacy. More precisely, their conjunction is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for liberal legitimacy. Let us call those two conditions the consent 
requirement and the justification requirement respectively.2 
That formulation of the liberal legitimacy view, of course, leaves at least three 
important questions unanswered: (i) What counts as a polity? In other words, what is the 
subject of application, or the scope of liberal legitimacy theory? (ii) What virtues should the 
political framework possess? (iii) What counts as consent? As we shall see shortly, in liberal 
legitimacy theory consent and virtuousness of the political framework work together in 
order to ensure the safeguard of the core liberal foundational commitments, i.e. the values 
that motivate the adoption of the liberal legitimacy view in the first place. That is to say, 
the core foundational commitments are not adequately safeguarded unless they are 
safeguarded through both consent and liberal institutions and practices. But what are those 
foundational commitments, and why do we need such a joint requirement of legitimacy in 
                                                
1 This is still a preliminary account of the structure of the liberal legitimacy view, which will be discussed at 
greater length in Chapter II (particularly as regards its account of hypothetical consent) and Chapter VI 
(with special attention to the interplay between the view’s two requirements). 
2 The reasons behind this terminological choice will become clearer in 2.2 below. 
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order to safeguard them? I shall tackle those questions throughout this section; before that, 
however, let us first briefly get clear about what the scope of the liberal legitimacy view is.  
 
1.2 In order to correctly identify the scope of the liberal legitimacy view we need to 
consider the question of what features of a polity need comply with the requirements of 
the liberal legitimacy view. In other words, we need to ask what features of a polity the 
citizens need to consent to, and what features of a polity need be liberal. The answer to 
both questions is that they are the features that characterise a polity’s fundamental norms 
(i.e. the constitution or its functional equivalents) and institutions. Hereinafter I shall refer 
to those features, i.e. to the scope of application of liberal legitimacy theory, as the political 
framework. 
What are the reasons, however, for taking the political framework as the scope of 
the liberal legitimacy view? The main reason is to do with viability:3 the view need apply to 
the narrowest set of norms and institutions possible (the narrower the more viable, as one 
would expect), compatibly with that set being such that it confers indirect legitimacy on all 
of the polity’s exercises of political power. So the constitutional features of a polity are a 
natural choice for liberal legitimacy theory, the familiar idea here being that the legitimacy 
of a set of fundamental norms confers indirect legitimacy onto lower-level norms arrived at 
and applied in accordance with the fundamental norms. Of course the idea of a set of 
fundamental norms should not be understood in a narrow and legalistic sense: depending 
on the context, this role may be performed by a written constitution, or by some 
entrenched practices, or by a combination of the two, and the like. Hence the idea of the 
set of fundamental norms being the constitution and only the constitution should be 
considered simply a Weberian idealtyp. 
As one would expect, the literature is mostly in line with that approach. So, to take 
the most prominent example once again, Rawls identifies “constitutional essentials and 
basic questions of justice”4 as the appropriate scope for his theory of legitimacy—a scope 
                                                
3 For a discussion of the precise meaning of ‘viable’ see Chapter II, footnote 47. 
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10. 
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that is roughly co-extensional with what I am calling ‘political framework’. To be sure, 
Rawls’ reasons for holding this view go beyond the viability considerations I briefly 
mentioned above. Indeed, he maintains that the fundamental norms in need of being 
propped up through an account of their legitimacy must take the form of a theory of 
justice, and he has independent arguments for the conclusion that the appropriate subject 
for such a theory is what he terms the ‘basic structure’ of society,5 i.e. (as mentioned 
above) “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” or, more profusely, “a 
society’s main political, social and economic institutions, and how they fit together into 
one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next”.6 Moreover, 
Rawls maintains that there is a very strong link between justice and legitimacy, for in his 
view the duty to comply with political authority stems from the justness of it (or, more 
precisely, from citizens recognising its justness).7 Those arguments are beyond our remit 
here (but we shall return to them in Chapter III); however it is worth pointing out that, in 
order to show that a polity is in compliance with the liberal legitimacy view, we need not 
characterise its political framework through a theory of justice—yet of course we may very 
well do so, as Rawls and others do. So, on Rawls’ view the political framework enjoys the 
citizens’ consent indirectly, through (hypothetical) consent to the theory of justice that 
underpins it.8 In my account of the liberal legitimacy view, however, this further 
                                                
5 See Political Liberalism, pp. 11, 35, and especially 257ff. 
6 Ibid., p. 11 
7 “There is quite clearly no difficulty in explaining why we are to comply with just laws enacted under a just 
constitution. In this case the principles of natural duty and the principles of fairness establish the requisite 
duties and obligations.” (A Theory of Justice, p. 350). For a discussion of this account of political obligation, 
see John Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 102ff. This idea is carried over by Rawls in Political Liberalism and, as 
I will show in Chapter III, the liberal legitimacy view is introduced there precisely to make sure that the 
conception of justice regulating the ‘basic structure of society’ can indeed be recognised as just by the 
citizenry.    
8 As we shall see in Chapter III, Rawls’ reason for this move is that his theory of legitimacy is set against the 
wider background of the (loosely Kantian) idea that we have a natural duty to obey just institutions. Thus 
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intermediate level is not necessary (though it can of course be accommodated): any 
characterisation of the political framework (or of the normative principles underpinning it) 
will do, so longs as it can be shown to uphold liberal practices and institutions, and to 
enjoy the free consent of the citizenry. I shall spell out those two requirements in the 
following two sub-sections respectively. 
Before that, however, we need to ask a further and perhaps somewhat deeper 
question about the scope of the liberal legitimacy view. It may appear that, so far, I have 
characterised the scope of the view working under the (more or less explicit) assumption 
that a polity equals a state; however, that need not be the case, even though there are some 
reasons to take the modern state as the paradigmatic polity. Those reasons are mostly 
historical ones: the genesis (though, of course, not the genealogy) of the array of concepts 
that inform or indeed constitute the cornerstones of contemporary theories of political 
authority, obligation and legitimacy—and in particular those which make use of some 
notion of consent—roughly coincided with the phase of European history which saw the 
rise and the consolidation of the modern state as the paradigmatic locus for the exercise of 
political power and authority.9 That is a story too long and too familiar to be discussed at 
any length here. Let us just remind ourselves of how what is arguably the most influential 
work of political philosophy ever published in English, namely Hobbes’ Leviathan, both 
sets a benchmark—as it were—for modern discussions of authority and legitimacy (in such 
a way that most subsequent influential works on these subject more or less explicitly 
discuss the central ideas of Leviathan), and situates modern discourse on political power, 
authority and legitimacy firmly within the conceptual borders of the modern state. At 
present, of course, there are a number of international and supranational political bodies, 
such as the European Union or the United Nations, or even organisations that present 
themselves as non-political (e.g. large corporations), which wield a measure of political 
                                                                                                                                                  
only our recognising the justness of the basic structure of society can ground its political authority. My 
characterization of the liberal legitimacy view, however, is wider, i.e. it is not tied to this background 
assumption.  
9 See, for example, Sabine and Thorson, A History of Political Theory, Part III. 
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power and can be seen as more or less legitimate and authoritative, yet clearly their modus 
operandi has been characterised and is widely viewed as an extension of that of a state, 
mutatis mutandis. Whether that is appropriate or desirable is a matter of intense debate 
(though of course one that would take us far away from our current focus), but it does 
nonetheless seem fair to say that the mainstream conceptual apparatus found in discourse 
on authority and legitimacy has not exhausted its currency yet. Perhaps more interestingly, 
since this thesis is a critique of what is arguably the most influential contemporary product 
of that conceptual apparatus, in the following chapters, and especially in the final one, in a 
sense we shall be assessing the currency of the dominant paradigm of discourse on 
authority and legitimacy. 
 
1.3 As envisaged above, we now turn to an account of the liberal legitimacy view’s 
requirements. What features need a political framework exhibit in order to satisfy the 
justification requirement? In other words, when does a political framework count as a liberal 
political framework in the eyes of the liberal legitimacy view? The short answer is that 
liberalism is to be identified at the level of political practice rather than at the level of 
philosophical foundations. A polity is liberal if it features certain institutions and enacts 
certain policies, not if its policies and institutions are supported by certain normative 
commitments. In my view, that is both the best way to understand the liberal legitimacy 
view’s notion of liberalism, and the best way to account for the existence of a unified 
liberal tradition. 
Indeed, while it is fairly uncontroversial to identify a given polity as liberal or 
illiberal, there is very little agreement about what sort of considerations count in favour of 
the establishment and preservation of liberal polities. In other words, there is a broad (if 
blurred at the margins) consensus about what normative political prescriptions are 
characteristic of liberalism (‘grant equal liberty to grown up individuals’, ‘do not 
discriminate for or against people on the basis of race’, and so on); but there is pervasive 
disagreement about what are the philosophical foundations of such prescriptions 
(‘individual liberty should be safeguarded because it makes people happy’, ‘toleration is 
grounded in respect for rational autonomy’, etc.). In other words, despite rather different 
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philosophical commitments, many theories happen to converge on a broad range of 
prescriptions for political action. On what sort of policies do they converge? In a very 
vague way, it is possible to note that liberals tend to converge towards a commitment to 
maximal individual equal liberty, i.e. towards political norms safeguarding maximal 
individual equal liberty.10 That claim is often repeated or taken for granted; what is 
important to bear in mind, though, and what is brought up clearly by the distinction 
between the foundational and the prescriptive level, is that the only way to make sense of 
such a claim is to understand it as applying just to the prescriptive level. Liberals are 
committed to maximal individual equal liberty in the sense that they are committed to 
policies that safeguard maximal individual equal liberty (e.g. the rule of law, human rights, 
constitutional democracy, and so on). In my view, it is just in this way that it is useful to 
talk about something like a unified liberal tradition. 
Clearly that suggestion would gain quite substantially in plausibility were it backed 
up by historical considerations, which however cannot be provided here, if not in the form 
of a very bare and conjectural outline. A historical argument, for example, might point out 
that while both Locke and Mill are uncontroversially liberal, the foundations of their 
political philosophies draw on very different ideas and traditions: jusnaturalism in the case 
of Locke, utilitarianism and elements of German romanticism for Mill. Yet their preferred 
forms of government, or political prescriptions, bear striking similarities. Thus it seems fair 
to say that they belong to the same (liberal) tradition, but only in my qualified sense. 
Moreover, referring to the liberal tradition just in my sense of the term has the advantage 
of enabling us to ignore the endless and not very illuminating debates as to what 
                                                
10 ‘Maximal individual equal liberty’ should not be understood as implying a commitment to the view that 
the freedom afforded by a political system is best understood as ‘freedom tout court’, as opposed to a set of 
specific freedoms (such as freedom of speech, religious freedom, and so on). Rather, it is meant to be 
neutral between these positions: depending on the concept of freedom endorsed by each liberal theorist, 
then, maximising individual equal freedom could mean either maximising the overall level of freedom, or 
bringing about the best combination of specific freedoms (thus the term ‘optimal’ could perhaps also be 
used instead of ‘maximal’). On these issues, see Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom, pp. 11-17. 
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foundational commitments are the ‘real’ liberal commitments (for example, Ronald 
Dworkin’s insistence that the ‘real’ or ‘fundamental’ commitment of liberalism is to a 
notion of equality).11 To repeat, I do not think that there is or there ever was such a unified 
foundational core of the liberal tradition. And in any case determining whether that is or 
has been case does not seem the most pressing problem of political philosophy. 
Philosophers try to come up with plausible theories. Whether those theories can be classed 
in traditions such as ‘liberalism’, ‘socialism’, and ‘conservatism’ is a separate matter, if not a 
secondary one, which lately has received a lot of attention, as liberalism has become a 
rather popular brand name (perhaps because of its association with presently successful 
forms of economic organisation). But the 17th and 18th theorists that are now recognised as 
the founding fathers of liberalism (most notably Locke, Adam Smith, and, on some 
readings, Hobbes) did not write in order to be liberals.12 In fact, the term ‘liberalism’ did 
not originate until the early 1810’s, when it was chosen as the name of a Spanish political 
party.13 And even the theorists of what one may call the second wave of classical liberalism 
(19th century: Constant, Humboldt, J.S. Mill, Tocqueville) did not seem to regard their 
contributions as part of an established tradition, or at least that does not seem to have 
been one of their main concerns—something that can hardly be said of contemporary 
liberals.14 So what we now call the liberal tradition is an opaque mixture resulting from the 
                                                
11 See, for example, Sovereign Virtue. 
12 In line with this point, E.K. Bramsted and K.J. Melhuish observe in the introduction to their vast 
historical anthology of liberal thought that “There can be little doubt that liberalism was a major doctrine, 
in substance if not always in name, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries and that it has had 
significant, if diminishing, repercussions in our own century. Seen in historical perspective, liberalism grew 
into a complex web, although it was not conceived as such.” (Western Liberalism, p. xvii). 
13 See John Gray, Liberalism, p. xi, and Raymond Geuss, ‘Liberalism and Its Discontents’, p. 13. 
14 And in my view, regrettably so, at least in those cases where showing one’s membership in a popular 
tradition of thought becomes a substitute of more sustained argument in favour of one’s position. 
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interactions of  a number of books produced over several centuries, and a number of 
political struggles that have taken place at the same time.15 
So, as pointed out above, liberals disagree as to where the prescriptive commitment 
to maximal individual equal liberty comes from. And those foundational disagreements 
generate some differences at the prescriptive level too—indeed, that is perhaps the best 
reason to study the foundational level: to characterise and defend a specific set of liberal 
policies. The convergence at the policy level, then, is broad but very far from complete. 
For example, liberals who maintain that liberalism is grounded in a utilitarian account of 
value tend to favour political arrangements that would restrict individual liberty, were it to 
jeopardise the public good. Conversely, Kantian-inspired liberals are usually reluctant to 
subject individual rights to constraints driven by consequentialist concerns. What those 
considerations show is that, of course, the line between the prescriptive and the 
foundational level is in fact blurred, but the distinction remains a useful one: despite 
foundational disagreements between liberals, there happens to be a class of 
uncontroversially liberal policies (as those divergent foundational stories happen to 
produce largely convergent prescriptions). Of course some theorists, and critical theorists 
of various stripes in particular, may argue that the story goes the other way around: liberal 
political prescriptions are the product of (say) power relations, and the foundational stories 
told by philosophers are just a misleading window dressing. From such a point of view, the 
convergence on policy matters might in fact ring an alarm bell. However, interesting as 
they may be, hypotheses of that kind are not of immediate relevance for my present 
purposes. My main concern here is to see whether a foundational story can be told in a 
plausible way—plausible independently of what the story is supposed to ground, that is. 
Providing a causal account of how such a foundational story came to be told is an imporant 
task, but a separate (or at least a separable) one. 
                                                
15 As Raymond Geuss aptly noted, “Janus-faced historical phenomena of this kind that encompass both 
conceptual or theoretical elements and real social forces pose special difficulties for traditional forms of 
philosophy.” (Ibid.). 
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A polity in which most members of the class of liberal policies are enacted, then, 
can safely be called a liberal polity.16 That is of course true for the purposes of the liberal 
legitimacy view, but also more generally. Indeed, as noted above, it is in my proposed 
modest, policy-based sense that one can talk about ‘the liberal tradition’, and not in the 
sense of a shared foundational core, which is instead the object of deep disagreement. 
Hence those relatively uncontroversial prescriptive commitments are what, for the time 
being, I shall be referring to as ‘liberalism’ in a general, unqualified way. My focus here, 
however, is of course on the controversial foundational commitments. Indeed, in this 
thesis I would like to indirectly show the appeal of proceeding mainly from the 
foundational story to the prescriptive level, and not the other way around. To understand 
what I mean by ‘the other way around’, consider the way in which many contemporary 
liberal thinkers start from an analysis of a liberal prescription or policy, e.g. the concept of 
a right, and then move on to uncover and defend the foundational commitments required 
or implied by this concept. Call that the reflective approach to the foundations of liberalism. 
To describe the reflective approach in a more general way, one could say that it starts from 
the widely acknowledged appeal of the liberal tradition (i.e. of political norms that 
safeguard maximal individual equal freedom), and then move on to consider how one may 
go about providing a normative foundation for them. My approach, which we may term 
constructive, may not be superior in any theoretically relevant way, yet I hope it will at least 
prove an effective expository strategy. 
 
1.4 Let us now proceed to examine the second requirement of the liberal legitimacy view, 
consent. An unqualified requirement of consent on the part of citizenry may very justifiably 
rise many political philosophers’ eyebrows: a range of well-known arguments quite 
conclusively show that it is hopeless to claim that all or even a critical mass of citizens of 
modern states actually consent (either tacitly or expressly)17 to being coerced by those states. 
                                                
16 There are and will of course always bee many borderline cases and grey areas, but they are not a problem 
for this account, because there also are plenty of clear-cut cases. 
17 See, for example, A. John Simmons, ‘”Denisons” and “Aliens”’, pp. 164-165. 
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That is especially true in societies characterised by persistent ethical disagreement, such as 
is the case in virtually all modern liberal democracies.18 So we need a second-best form of 
consent, one that can still preserve what is important about consent (i.e. its ability to 
guarantee the safeguard of the foundational commitment that made it a requirement in the 
first place), while at the same time not becoming an unattainable goal. Thus some form of 
hypothetical consent will be the liberal legitimacy theorists’ choice. The idea here is that, if 
we specify a satisfactory notion of hypothetical consent, the foundational commitment that 
motivated liberal legitimacy theorists to require consent in the first place will be 
safeguarded to an acceptable degree. Indeed, what distinguishes the liberal legitimacy view 
from other consent-based accounts of political authority is precisely its particular 
understanding of hypothetical consent. This is expressed in terms of the political 
framework having to be justifiable or acceptable to the citizenry (thus I am tempted to suggest 
that the word ‘consensus’ captures this idea better than ‘consent’): “People should be able to 
consent to their political arrangements”.19 As Jeremy Waldron puts it: “Liberals demand 
that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of 
each person’s understanding.”20  
Liberal legitimacy theorists aim to establish that a political framework is acceptable 
to the citizenry—and thus that it enjoys their hypothetical consent—through the ideas of 
public reason and public justification. The basic thought here is that the normative 
principles determining the main features of the political framework should be acceptable, i.e. 
it should be such that it could be accepted by the citizenry, or by a relevant subset of them. 
That is to say, those normative principles need be justifiable with reference to the citizens’ 
                                                
18 In fact some theorists argue that persistent ethical disagreement is a necessary result of the freedom enjoyed 
by individuals in modern liberal-democratic societies (see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 36f. and 216f.), and 
thus liberal theory needs to envisage special arrangements to deal with it. We shall return on this point in 
the next chapter, when discussing how public justification is conceived as a response to the challenge of 
persistent ethical disagreement.  
19 George Klosko, Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus, p. 3. 
20 Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, p. 61. 
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normative commitments: “People should be governed on the basis of principles they are 
able to understand and accept”.21 To elucidate the idea, note how ‘acceptable’ and 
‘justifiable’ could be read in at least two ways here: (i) on the one hand, the political 
framework may be presented as consented to in the sense that it is arrived at through a 
process of deliberation conducted according to rules that guarantee the preservation of the 
citizens’ free consent. That is to say, the rules are such that the foundational commitments 
generating the consent requirement (e.g. personal autonomy)22 will be safeguarded 
throughout the deliberation process. Call that hypothetical consent through public 
deliberation. On the other hand, (ii) ‘presented’ and ‘justified’ can be understood in a 
counterfactual way, as in ‘it could have been arrived at if certain rules for the conduction 
of deliberation had been followed’. The difference, of course, is that on this model no 
actual deliberation need take place. Call that hypothetical consent through public justification, 
or public reason (I shall use the terms interchangeably, unless otherwise specified).  The 
former understanding of hypothetical consent is a narrow one, and one that is usually 
associated with theories of deliberative democracy. The liberal legitimacy view’s trademark 
account of  hypothetical consent is rather the latter. However, it should be noted how 
within such an account of public justification there is room for instances of the 
deliberative-democratic account: the idea that allows to reconcile these two slightly 
different standards is that for assessing the legitimacy of principles that are already in place 
public justification is enough, whereas for debating those principles in order to change 
them or supplement them we need public deliberation.23 After all, the best way to make 
sure that a principle could have been arrived at through some procedure is to actually 
follow that procedure to identify it. So there is a distinction to be drawn between public 
                                                
21 Klosko, Ibid. p. 2. 
22 Autonomy is just an example here. I will expand on how autonomy may usefully be deployed as an 
umbrella term for the liberal legitimacy view’s foundational commitments in Chapter II, section 1.1.  
23 That, for example, is how I read Rawls’ Political Liberalism, as it will become clear in Chapter III. 
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reason and public deliberation;24 yet many theories of legitimacy based on public 
justification will incorporate (elements of) a theory of public deliberation in the way I just 
described. At any rate, for the purposes of this thesis we shall not consider those theories 
that rely entirely on the deliberative-democratic model of consent through public 
deliberation. This is not just an arbitrary restriction of the subject matter: the main reason 
for leaving ‘pure’ deliberative democracy out of the picture is that this thesis is a study of 
the normative foundations of liberalism, whereas deliberative democracy (at least in its 
pure form, and not when it is just a component of a wider theory of public justification) is 
often taken to be not necessarily tied to liberalism, or even an alternative to it.25  
That is a rather rough account of the liberal legitimacy view’s understanding of 
hypothetical consent. And of course a minute’s reflection on that account will raise some 
important issues with it. Is this sort of consensus viable? That is to say, even assuming that 
it can be achieved, will a liberal democratic society be able to sustain such a consensus over 
time? Moreover, does the public justification account of hypothetical consent carry enough 
normative force? The worry here is that this type of consent may be too hypothetical, i.e. 
too distant from the act of actual consent, the only which intuitively and forcefully confers 
legitimacy upon a set of political arrangements. Yet exploring those questions would clearly 
                                                
24 That distinction I just introduced, however, is not standard in the literature. In fact, the terms ‘public 
reason’, ‘public deliberation’ and ‘public justification’ are often used interchangeably, and sometimes 
confusingly so.  
25 To be fair, there is not much agreement as to the reference of the term ‘deliberative democracy’, with 
some theorists calling Rawls a deliberative democrat (e.g. Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative 
Democracy’), and others presenting deliberative democracy as overcoming certain problems inherent in 
liberal accounts of political authority and legitimacy, and thus defining an altogether  (see, for example, 
Talisse, Democracy After Liberalism. Interestingly, one of the early advocates of ‘radical’ democracy as a 
necessary overcoming of liberalism was Carole Pateman, whose starting point was a critique of liberal 
accounts of legitimacy and obligation through consent—see her monograph The Problem of Political 
Obligation). For an overview of these debates, see Bohman and Rehg (eds), Deliberative Democracy, and Fishkin 
and Laslett (eds), Debating Deliberative Democracy.  
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take us too far from our current focus; they will however constitute the main focus of 
Chapter II, and we shall return to them for a final (and more informed) assessment in 
Chapter VI. 
 
1.5 With an initial account of the liberal legitimacy view’s two requirements in place, we 
should now consider the somewhat deeper question of whether and how those 
requirements may be related. That question is worth asking not simply as a matter of 
further clarification of the requirements, but for genuine theoretical concerns, which will 
come up again and again in the course of this study. Indeed, one might wonder whether 
the pairing of the consent and the justification requirement is somewhat arbitrary. The 
worry here is that if we take free consent to carry (at least some) legitimating force, it is not 
immediately clear why we should discard such force when it is not used to support liberal 
political institutions and practices, and vice versa. So there must be something to do with 
the connection between the two requirements that explains why their pairing is not 
arbitrary. For that would appear to be what the liberal legitimacy view prescribes. In other 
words,  we have seen that on the liberal legitimacy view free consent to a liberal political 
framework produces legitimacy, but in order to fully understand why this is the case we 
need to get clear about what happens when a polity fails to satisfy either of the 
requirements.26 That should cast some light on the connection between the two 
requirements, and on the way in which the liberal legitimacy view’s foundational 
commitments (whatever they may be) operate. 
It is perhaps easiest to start by considering the case of a political framework that 
only satisfies the consent requirement, i.e. a political framework that is freely consented-to 
by its citizenry, but is not liberal. On the liberal legitimacy view this polity need not be 
illegitimate, but it may very well be. Liberal legitimacy theorists need not be committed to 
the view that non-liberal regimes are never legitimate. The position can just be that if a 
liberal regime does not want to be self-defeating it needs consent. So, on this weak version 
                                                
26 By ‘what happens’ I mean what the consequences should be from the point of view of a normative 
assessment of legitimacy, not from the point of view of what sort of political action is required. 
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of the view, there must be something about liberalism—presumably something about the 
foundational commitments that inform this choice of political framework—that requires 
free consent from the governed; but other political arrangements may be such that the 
justification requirement does not apply. Even on this weaker view there is of course still 
conceptual room to say that while non-liberal arrangements may be legitimate (in the sense 
that they meet some sort of threshold requirement, say), liberal arrangements are more 
legitimate, or are preferable on other grounds. ‘Weak’ liberal legitimacy theorists of a more 
universalistic bend are indeed likely to take a position somewhere along those lines. More 
particularistic theorists would instead maintain that their theory only applies to liberal 
regimes, and that different regimes need be evaluated through different accounts of 
legitimacy.27 At the other end of the spectrum of liberal legitimacy theory we find a strong 
version of the view: regardless of consent, non-liberal arrangements can never be 
legitimate. Here the idea would probably turn out to be that only consent to morally 
innocent (or even praiseworthy) political arrangements carries legitimating force, and only 
liberal arrangement are morally innocent (or praiseworthy). Finally, there is of course an 
intermediate position as well: not every polity that is consented to is legitimate, but liberal 
political arrangements are not the only ones that can be legitimated through free consent 
either. At any rate those distinctions, while useful to characterise the liberal legitimacy view 
in its possible variants, also begin to tell us something about how the two requirements 
may relate to each other. 
What about, then, the (opposite) case of a polity that only satisfies the justification 
requirement, i.e. a liberal polity that does not enjoy the free consent of its citizenry? Clearly 
                                                
27 Rawls’ Political Liberalism seems closer to the particularistic approach, and has thus been widely criticised 
for ‘preaching to the converted’—an important point to which we shall return in Chapters III and VI. 
However in The Law of Peoples Rawls takes a position that does appear to entail the superiority of liberal 
political arrangements. Presumably Rawls’ way out of this seeming inconsistency would be to claim that 
liberal states are indeed superior, but not because they are more legitimate. At any rate, exploring this issue 
may be revealing for an overall assessment of Rawlsian liberalism, but it would divert us too much from our 
present concerns.  
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on the liberal legitimacy view such a polity would turn out to be illegitimate (so the 
asymmetry with the previous case is just an apparent one, for only liberal polities need both 
consent and justification), but why? On the weak and intermediate versions of the liberal 
legitimacy view, as pointed out above, we need an explanation of what it is about liberalism 
that puts it in need of free consent as a necessary condition for legitimation. On the strong 
version of the view the question is rather more pressing: if consent can only confer 
legitimacy upon liberal political arrangements, why cannot we do away with it and simply 
say that the justification requirement is the only requirement of legitimacy? To defend itself 
from these objections the liberal legitimacy view has to provide an account of the 
connection between consent and liberalism; and it seems to me that the only way for such 
an account to do the work it needs to do is through the idea that the liberal foundational 
commitments, whatever they may be—though we can, if only for ease of reference, 
subsume them under the umbrella term ‘personal autonomy’—are such that they cannot be 
properly instantiated by any political arrangements unless those arrangements are, in some 
sense, endorsed by the polity’s citizenry. It is not difficult to imagine a few examples of 
how this may conceptually be the case: for example, we can imagine a liberal legitimacy 
theorist maintaining that her commitment to personal autonomy requires (among other 
things) the legal enforcement of private property rights; and she will also maintain that the 
enforcement of such rights will not suffice to safeguard the citizens’ autonomy unless it is 
also endorsed by them. It might be helpful to note how this position mirrors the idea that 
well-being requires endorsement of the courses of action that cause such well-being.28 
Another way of making sense of this position would be to connect it with the familiar 
argument (famously put forward by John Locke) that one cannot freely consent to give up 
one’s freedom. Or, to give this point a more Kantian or even Rousseau-esque flair, we 
might even go as far as saying that if one does not consent to be free, then one is neither 
free nor consenting.29 The punch-line here would be something along the lines of “consent 
                                                
28 A position taken, for example, by Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom, pp. 369-395. 
29 This might sound frighteningly illiberal and, in my view, rightly so. Indeed, it is no surprise to find that, as 
Raymond Geuss reminds us in ‘Liberalism and Its Discontents’ (pp. 16-17), early liberal thinkers were very 
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and liberalism, or neither”. I should point out, though, that those are just speculations as 
to what reasons motivate the joint consent-liberalism requirement—as we shall see 
throughout the chapters in which I analyse particular versions of the liberal legitimacy 
view, those reasons are seldom made explicit. In fact, as we shall see, many liberal 
legitimacy theorists are wary of entering into much detail about where their deep normative 
allegiances lie.30 Again, the challenge that we shall be testing the liberal legitimacy view 
against is that of being able to account for how those commitments, whatever they may be, 
support the pairing of the consent and the justification requirement, and thus produce a 
sound foundation for liberal political authority. More technically, the question would be: 
from what premises does it follow that the conjunction of the two requirements forms the 
correct account of the legitimacy of liberal political frameworks? 
 
 
 2. Authority, Justification and Legitimacy 
 
2.1 Before proceeding in our analysis of the merits of the liberal legitimacy view it will 
perhaps be best to take a step back and consider exactly what sort of philosophical work 
the view is meant to do. In other words, what problems does the liberal legitimacy view 
address? What exactly is it a theory of? Simply saying that it addresses the problem of 
legitimacy will not do, for there is unclarity about the ordinary meaning of the term, and its 
                                                                                                                                                  
wary of Kant’s notion of freedom. The same could arguably be said of Rousseau’s. This is an important 
worry, and one to which we shall return to in some detail in Chapter VI. 
30 Again, the foremost example of such an attitude is Rawls, who makes a point of not specifying any 
foundational commitments (or at least not any commitments that are wide in scope and thus controversial, 
as we shall see in Chapter III), for he wants to allow for a variety of different foundational commitments to 
converge on a liberal ‘overlapping consensus’. Nonetheless it is worth noting how some liberal legitimacy 
theorists such as Charles Larmore (see ‘The Moral Foundations of Political Liberalism’) and Katriona 
McKinnon (see Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism) do think that it is necessary to spell out 
those commitments in some detail.  
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meaning in the philosophical literature is all but controversial. Nonetheless we may start 
from the general idea that a philosophical theory of legitimacy is a theory of what it takes 
for political authority to have sound philosophical foundations, from a normative (as 
opposed to descriptive) point of view. This tentative characterisation naturally calls for a 
few preliminary distinctions—which I shall introduce in this section—between different 
senses of ‘legitimacy’ and of other terms in the conceptual surroundings of legitimacy: 
proper exercise vs proper grounding of political authority; political power vs political 
authority; de facto political authority vs legitimate political authority.31 Those distinctions will 
then prove useful to provide an account of what the liberal legitimacy view is a theory of.  
 We may begin by observing how saying that political authority has sound normative 
foundations may mean (at least) one of two things: it may mean that political authority is 
being exercised in a normatively sound way, in the sense that, at a given point in time or 
during a given period, a sufficient number of the acts ascribed to individuals and institutions 
invested with political authority satisfy some normative requirement or other. On the other 
hand, political authority may be normatively sound in the sense that it is properly grounded: a 
sufficient number of the agents and agencies invested with political authority at a given 
point in time or during a given period came to hold such authority in a normatively sound 
way. To put it more simply, we may say that in the former case we would ask the question 
“Are those with political authority doing their job properly?”; in the latter sense the 
question would rather be whether those doing that job were entitled to occupy that 
                                                
31 The latter two distinctions are fairly uncontroversial (at least on the surface), and my account will not 
depart from the orthodoxy in any particularly significant way. For a standard account of the same 
distinctions, see for example Thomas Christiano, ‘Authority’, section 1. The distinction between proper 
exercise and proper grounding of political authority, on the other hand, is not usually discussed in the 
literature. It may also be useful to note how there often are discrepancies both across and between 
philosophical and social-scientific uses of terms such as ‘legitimacy’, ‘power’, and ‘authority’. In particular, 
some social scientists use ‘legitimacy’ to mean something like ‘perceived de facto authority’. Also, some 
theorists use ‘authority’ as meaning ‘legitimate authority’, whilst using ‘power’ for what I call ‘de facto 
authority’. Thus all definitions provided here must be regarded as stipulative, at least some extent.  
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position in the first place. Here one may be tempted to object that it would certainly be 
possible—and indeed even rather plausible—to say that whoever is capable of doing that 
sort of job properly is thereby entitled to be in that job; thus the distinction would wither 
away. But in my view that would be a misleading conclusion, for it would narrow the 
concept of normatively sound political authority down to a particular conception of it, 
namely one based on the idea that the normative criterion for soundness can only have to 
do with how well those in authority perform their function. Yet it is certainly possible to 
imagine an alternative criterion based, for example, on whether the persons in authority 
descend from the right family.32 As a further clarification, it may be worth observing how 
the distinction between proper exercise and proper grounding of political authority might 
be considered somewhat akin to Robert Nozick’s familiar distinction between end-result 
and historical principles of distributive justice: end-result principles judge distributions at 
the current time-slice, according to some structural criteria of just distribution, whereas 
historical principles judge distributions according to how they came about.33 The parallel is 
thus clear enough: the issue of the proper exercise of political authority is about authority’s 
                                                
32 It simply will not do for any opponents of the distinction between proper exercise and proper grounding 
of political authority to reply that ultimately all criteria need be based on an assessment of the performance 
of those in authority, and thus that proper grounding can be reduced to proper exercise. To clarify, in the 
case of my counterexample they would reply that, ultimately, the belief that membership of a certain family 
confers authority must rest on the further, perhaps deeper belief that somehow membership of that family 
confers competence in the exercise of political authority. Yet this line of reply seems quite clearly question-
begging. For good measure, consider another example, namely the view that political authority rests on a 
sound normative foundations only if it has been conferred by a deity. Now the opponents of the distinction 
would need to argue that this view makes sense only if we regard divine conferral of political authority as an 
indicator of the competence of those in authority. But this line of reply, with its Euthyphronic echoes, 
clearly nullifies everything that is distinctive about the divine conferral view of authority, thus again begging 
the question as to whether that view could be distinguished from what we may call the competence view of 
political authority.  
33 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 153ff.  
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compliance with certain standards at the current time-slice, whereas the question of the 
proper grounding of political authority concerns the manner in which those invested with 
political authority came to occupy such a position. 
 In drawing my distinction between proper exercise and proper grounding of political 
authority I have been taking the very notion of political authority for granted. On closer 
inspection, however, it becomes clear that, in order to have a workable concept of political 
authority, one need at least distinguish it from the closely related concept of political 
power. Political power is simply the ability, on the part of individuals or organisations, to use 
threats and rewards to motivate a state’s residents to act or not act in certain ways. Political 
authority, on the other hand, obtains when some agents and/ore agencies as a matter of fact 
exercise political power reliably in a state, and the residents of that state as a matter of fact 
regard those who exercise political power as being entitled to do so (more often than not 
there will of course be a causal link between both conditions, but that is a matter that does 
not concern us here; yet we shall return on it in 2.1 below). 
 The notion of political authority I presented in the above paragraph has an entirely 
empirical denotation. Presenting the notion in that way was instrumental for isolating the 
concept of political power; yet, once again, to say that the empirical denotation of the 
concept of political authority exhausts the concept’s remit would be to reduce the concept 
to one of its conceptions. There is indeed a difference between de facto authority and 
legitimate political authority. That is to say that one may have political authority in the 
sense that one, as a matter of fact, reliably exercises political power in a way that is 
generally endorsed or at least recognised by those subject to it. But there is also another 
sense in which one may exercise political authority, namely a normative sense: political 
authority is legitimate (as opposed to being just de facto) when some sort of normatively 
satisfactory relationship (in a broad sense of the term) exists between those in authority and 
those subject to the authority. For example, political authority might be legitimate if a 
consent relationship obtains between the state and its subjects, or if the state satisfactorily 
protects certain rights and interests of its subjects, and so on. Clearly the normatively 
satisfactory relationship, i.e. the criterion for legitimacy, may very well be a complex one, 
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consisting of the conjunction of several relationships such as those I just provided as 
examples here.34 
 The concept of legitimate political authority brings us somewhat closer to our main  
concern, namely the liberal legitimacy view. However, before moving on to consider some 
rather more controversial distinctions, which will help us bringing the liberal legitimacy 
view into a sharper focus, it is worth pausing to ask a clarificatory question: on which side 
of each of the above distinctions does the account of the liberal legitimacy view provided 
so far fall? The answers are rather straightforward, and, as it will become clear shortly, that 
is why we will in turn need further distinctions to really grasp what exactly the liberal 
legitimacy view is a theory of.  
 At any rate, with regard to the distinction between political power and political 
authority, it is rather evident that the liberal legitimacy view aims to offer a foundation for 
political authority: it does not aim to justify isolated exercises of political power, but rather 
it offers a normative underpinning to a system of political authority.  
 As for the distinction between proper exercise and proper grounding of political 
authority, it seems clear that the two requirements of the liberal legitimacy view test a 
polity’s legitimacy at a given time-slice, thus offering an account of what constitutes proper 
exercise of authority, whilst remaining silent on the issue of whether such authority is also 
well grounded. Note, then, how the term ‘legitimacy’ in the context of the liberal legitimacy 
view has a rather different meaning from its ordinary one, which can cover  both proper 
exercise and proper grounding of political authority.  
 Finally, in terms of the distinction between de facto authority and legitimate political 
authority, as one would expect, the liberal legitimacy view aims to provide an account of 
the latter: it concerns what it takes for the correct normative relationship between a state 
and its citizens to obtain. 
 At this point, before moving on, one might wonder why the concept of political 
obligation has not figured in our list of key terms yet, as it normally is a staple of any 
discussion of the legitimacy of political authority. Indeed, the obligation-correlative theory 
                                                
34 As, of course, in the case of the liberal legitimacy view.  
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of authority is the standard account of legitimacy: roughly, for political authority to be 
legitimate just means that it puts its subjects under an obligation to obey its commands. In 
other words, on the obligation-correlative view political authority is morally legitimate if 
and only if those subjected to it are under a political obligation to comply with it (political 
obligation being, on most accounts, the obligation to obey the law just because it is the law). 
However, in this thesis I shall mostly avoid the language of political obligation, as it does 
not seem very helpful to me. That is because there is no clear and uncontroversial 
distinction between obligations (which may be understood as categorical reasons for action) 
and other (pro tanto) reasons for action.35 The salient point here is that there will virtually 
always be some reason(s) for upholding or complying with political authority, and if those 
reasons cannot be starkly distinguished from obligations, then the notion of political 
obligation becomes too controversial to be conveniently deployed here.   
 
2.2 The above distinctions help us identifying the liberal legitimacy view as a theory of the 
proper exercise of legitimate political authority. Yet that is not enough to fully grasp what exactly 
it is a theory of. In particular, while we have seen that for political authority to be legitimate 
a normative relationship between a state and its subject has to be in place, we still need to 
get a grip on exactly what sort of relationship that might be. To use a simple metaphor, we 
might say that the concept of legitimacy is an empty box, until we fill it with an account of 
what it takes for political authority to be legitimate. For that purpose I will now introduce a 
further distinction, namely that between the concepts of justification and legitimacy. In the 
                                                
35 One might think of this distinction (or lack thereof) in terms of the familiar debate on internal and 
external reasons. If there are no external reasons, some theorists would argue, then it is impossible to 
distinguish obligations from other reasons for action. One might wonder, however, whether it would not be 
possible to still pick out obligations counterfactually: if there were any categorical or external reasons, then 
this would be one of them. Clearly we cannot discuss those arguments here; suffice it to point out how the 
very notion of an obligation is a controversial one, and thus it should not be taken for granted. So I would 
argue that, if political philosophers were to take this controversy in ethics more seriously, the obligation-
correlative view of authority would lose some currency. 
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next sub-section I shall also introduce some social-scientific ideas about legitimacy, in order 
to better delineate the contours of that normative relationship in the broader context of the 
concept of legitimacy which, as we have seen, also has empirical connotations. 
If we move away from the ordinary sense of the term ‘legitimacy’, we will find that 
there is indeed an important (yet often overlooked) distinction to be drawn between the 
concept of legitimacy and the concept of justification.36 Understanding how state 
legitimacy is different from state justification, and what role the former plays in the liberal 
legitimacy view is crucial in order to understand the normative relationship between state 
and citizens advocated by the liberal legitimacy view, and to identify the target of my 
critique of this strand of contemporary liberalism. In the technical sense that I am 
introducing here, the terms ‘justification’ and ‘legitimacy’ both refer to properties of a 
political system which are useful in assessing whether the exercise of political authority in a 
given political system can be fully proper; yet they track very different properties a polity 
may possess. Legitimacy obtains when a political system stands in a particular relation to its 
subjects, namely when the subjects consent to its authority (even if only hypothetically, at 
least on some views37). And whether this is the case has nothing to do (conceptually) with 
                                                
36 For this distinction, I rely on A. John Simmons’ insightful analysis in ‘Justification and Legitimacy’. In a 
nutshell, the idea is this:  
‘The general quality of virtues of a state (i.e., those of it appealed to in its justification) are one thing; 
the nature of its rights over any particular subject (i.e., that in which its legitimacy with respect to 
that subject consists) are quite another thing.’ (P. 136, my italics.) 
Simmons, in turn, traces the distinction back to Locke’s Second Treatise. The accounts of the 
concepts of justification and legitimacy I offer in this section are by and large drawn from Simmons’ work, 
and should be considered largely stipulative, for there are no well-established conventions regulating the use 
of those terms in the literature. 
37 For example, Simmons maintains that a state is legitimate only if it enjoys the actual consent of its 
citizens [ibid.]; on this strongly voluntaristic view, then, hypothetical consent arguments are just a particular 
form of justification-based accounts of the foundations of political authority (a point I discuss in more 
detail at the end of this sub-section). Here I am considering those arguments as legitimacy-based simply 
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what other properties the system possesses. Justification, on the other hand, is a property of 
a political system which obtains if the system possesses certain virtues (moral or 
otherwise); for example, if it guarantees certain standards of well-being to the citizens, if it 
promotes certain valuable activities, and so on. Whether a political system is virtuous or 
not, of course, is completely independent of what its citizens think of it, and hence of 
whether they consent to its authority.  
Conceptions of the justification and conceptions of the legitimacy of political 
systems, then, respond to different questions, and thus are separate matters, from the 
conceptual point of view; yet I want to point out that it is also useful to have a common 
denominator for both concepts, such as the concept of normative foundation of political 
authority. That is because, if the main aim of normative political philosophy is to provide 
guidance for political action (as I think it is), often it will not do to stop at the 
acknowledgment of this distinction. Moreover, understanding how this common 
denominator works should enable us to pin down the liberal legitimacy view with a 
reasonable degree of precision. Consider a situation of choice such as this: you are the 
head of a NGO, and you need to decide whether to allocate some scarce resource to 
country A or country B. The only relevant information you have is that A is a morally 
virtuous state, whereas B is one whose citizens freely consent to it. What do you do? More 
importantly (for our purposes here, that is), on what grounds do you decide? What the 
example shows is that, at least in some circumstances, one needs to prioritise or trade off 
between the dimensions of justification and legitimacy, by asking which is more important 
                                                                                                                                                  
because most of their proponents (most notably Rawls) see themselves as liberal legitimacy theorists (in the 
sense that they keep the consent requirement separate from the justification requirement). And there does 
seem to be at least a prima facie case for not considering this a redundant separation, if only because (unlike 
Simmons) I do think that some forms of hypothetical consent can do at least some legitimating work, as 
explained in this passage by Jeremy Waldron: “Though a social order not legitimated by actual consent may 
be unfree, that unfreedom can be mitigated by our recognition that it is at least possible to imagine people 
giving it their consent.” (‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, p. 51). I shall make the relevant 
distinction between different forms of hypothetical consent in Chapter II, section 2.2. 
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in an evaluation of how solid the normative foundations of a system of political authority 
are. Surely it is correct to say that justification and legitimacy are different “dimensions in 
which states may be morally evaluated”;38 but that leaves open the politically and 
philosophically salient question as to what dimension (if any) is more important. So, I do 
not wish to deny that justification and legitimacy are distinct issues. My point is just that 
their difference can be made sense of as the difference between two competing ways of 
understanding the question: “When does political authority rest on sound normative 
foundations?”.39 
 As it should be clear by now, the liberal legitimacy view embodies elements of both 
legitimacy and justification, in the consent and the justification requirement respectively 
(which of course explains the designations I chose for the two requirements). However 
here one might object that the two requirements are not quite as distinct from each other as 
I have been presenting them because, strictly speaking, the form of consent envisaged by 
the liberal legitimacy view cannot count as a proper (in the technical sense explained above) 
legitimacy requirement, for hypothetical consent really is justification in legitimacy’s clothing, 
so to speak. This is a familiar point: propositions expressing hypothetical consent are 
conditional in form, and the antecedent typically incorporates assumptions that perform a 
justificatory function and carry out the actual normative work. For example: “As a citizen 
committed to equality, you should consent to a system of progressive taxation.” Clearly—
the objection goes—this is tantamount to making a case for progressive taxation based on 
the virtuousness of an egalitarian taxation system, so why bother talking about consent? 
But that would really be too quick a dismissal, for at least two (related) reasons. Firstly, not 
all forms of hypothetical consent need be the same in terms of their ability to generate 
                                                
38 Simmons, Ibid., p. 157. 
39 I assume that justification and legitimacy are the only relevant evaluative dimensions for the assessment 
of a political framework, i.e. of the system of norms and institutions regulating political life. Other 
dimensions may become relevant when assessing individual policies of political acts; for example, Simmons 
(Ibid., pp. 155-157) identifies a third dimension (which however does not apply at the level of the political 
framework), but that issue is beyond our current focus.  
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reasons for action, and in fact in Chapter II I shall draw a distinction between different 
degrees to which hypothetical consent departs from actual consent. Moreover, while this 
point may carry some weight about hypothetical consent in general, perhaps the liberal 
legitimacy view can overcome the difficulty if somehow the combination of a quasi-
legitimacy40 requirement (such as hypothetical consent) with a particular justification 
requirement, i.e. liberalism, can account for the loss in voluntarism due to the hypothetical 
nature of the envisaged consent. And, vice versa, one might also ask whether the 
hypothetical consent can go some way towards explaining why the justification requirement 
demands liberal political arrangements and not others. More generally, the potentially 
problematic issue that I intend to flag here is that, as anticipated in 1.5 above, there seems 
to be some sort of ‘Catch-22’ interdependency between the two requirements, but it is not 
clear (at least not immediately) how those requirements can support each other without 
incurring in a form of vicious circularity. 
 
2.3 So the liberal legitimacy view shows some kind of overlap or perhaps a contamination 
between legitimacy and justification, between consent and normative justifiability, in the 
sense that, on the one hand, the sort of consent required by the view (at least for liberal 
regimes) becomes relevant only if given to liberal political institutions and practices, and 
thus—as we shall see in the following chapters—its hypothetical component is engineered 
precisely to obtain this result; on the other hand, the virtues instantiated by liberal regimes 
can fully perform their normative justificatory role only if those regimes are consented to 
by their citizenry. I propose to illuminate the interaction between the two requirements by 
putting this account of political legitimacy in dialogue with what is perhaps the most 
elaborate social-scientific account of the concept of legitimacy available, namely David 
Beetham’s tri-partite analysis of it.41 For Beetham there are three components or 
‘dimensions’ to legitimacy:  
                                                
40 In Simmons’ technical sense of ‘legitimacy’, that  is. 
41 See Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, especially chapters 1, 3, and 5. 
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For power to be fully legitimate, then, three conditions are required: its 
conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared 
beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate, or of the most significant among 
them, to the particular relations of power. All three components contribute to 
legitimacy, though the extent to which they are realised in a given context will be a 
matter of degree. Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing affair.42 
Importantly, Beetham maintains that the concept cannot and thus should never be 
reduced to any of them. Neither should any of the components be left out, or lumped 
together with another one. The table below provides a concise synoptic exposition of 
Beetham’s account of legitimacy, with some details of the social facts that each dimension 
of legitimacy expresses itself through (the ‘criteria’ of legitimacy), and of each dimension’s 
corresponding form of illegitimate authority:43 
 
Dimensions of Legitimacy Criteria of Legitimacy Forms of illegitimate power 
Legality: 
“[power] conforms to 
established rules” 
 
Rules 
Illegitimacy:  
“Breach of rules” 
Normative justifiability: 
“The rules can be justified by 
reference to beliefs shared by 
both dominant and 
subordinate” 
 
Beliefs 
Legitimacy deficit: 
“Discrepancy between rules 
and supporting beliefs, absence 
of shared beliefs” 
Consent / recognition: 
“There is evidence of consent 
by the subordinate to the 
particular power relation.” 
 
Acts 
Delegitimation: 
“Withdrawal of consent” 
 
                                                
42 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
43 All quotations in the table are from The Legitimation of Power, pp. 16ff. Note that Beetham does not 
distinguish between political power and political authority as I did above, but rather refers mostly to 
‘power’. This difference is inconsequential for our present purposes.  
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Note how this conceptual analysis of the three dimensions applies universally, to all 
past, present and future forms of political authority (or at least it is meant to do so). 
However, what counts as a criterion of legitimacy is culturally variable. So, for example, 
what counts as an act of consent changed from feudal society to modern liberal democracy; 
but no regime, medieval or contemporary, can claim legitimacy unless it is the beneficiary 
of whatever counts as an act of consent in the relevant socio-cultural context. 
Now,  how does the liberal legitimacy view map onto this analysis of legitimacy? 
What do the proponents of the liberal legitimacy view talk about when they talk about 
legitimacy?  In the light of the above analysis of the three dimensions of the concept of 
legitimacy, the answers to those questions are bound to not be very clear. As we have seen, 
within the liberal legitimacy view there is a tension, or rather a somewhat puzzling overlap, 
between normative justifiability and consent. To use the conceptual instruments provided 
by Beetham’s analysis, we may say that the liberal legitimacy view does not satisfactorily 
account for the separateness of the three dimensions of legitimacy because it is not 
altogether clear that, on the liberal legitimacy view, there are different criteria for each 
dimension. To see why this is the case, let us focus on each dimension in turn.   
As far as legality is concerned, we may easily say that the liberal legitimacy view has 
a place for it: recall how the scope of the view is what we have termed the ‘political 
framework’, i.e. a polity’s constitution or its functional equivalent. So, compliance with the 
norms laid out by the political framework constitutes the ‘rules’ criterion of legitimacy. In 
terms of normative justifiability, we may say that, by requiring a consensus the political 
framework, the liberal legitimacy view satisfies the criterion of there being a convergence 
of beliefs as to the regime’s authoritativeness.44 The problem arises, however, when we 
                                                
44 More precisely, we may speculate that the idea of consensus through public justification (incorporating 
elements of public deliberation, as seen above), may perform what Beetham considers a difficult task for 
any account of the second dimension of legitimacy, namely the linking of abstract principles with practical 
strategies for their actualisation:  
Discussions of this second dimension [normative justifiability]  in the literature of 
political science have great difficulty in bridging the gap between the underlying principles, or 
I – Liberal Legitimacy 
 38 
look at the third dimension of legitimacy, namely consent. Indeed, the fact that the 
consensus element of the view has already been invoked with regard to the ‘normative 
justifiability’ dimension of legitimacy should already have raised some eyebrows. What 
other resources are available to the view in order to account for the consent dimension? 
More specifically , The problem here is that the sort of hypothetical consent envisaged by the 
liberal legitimacy view can hardly be called an act of consent, for how can hypothetical 
consent be publicly manifested in a tangible way?45 Without indulging in obvious irony, we 
can simply observe that it seems rather clear that acts of consent need be actual.46 
The important question that remains to be asked here, of course, is whether this 
failure of the liberal legitimacy view to map on to an adequate social-scientific account of 
legitimacy constitutes a problem in terms of the view’s ability to offer a sound normative 
foundation for liberal political authority. A full answer to this question will have to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
legitimating criteria, of a constitutional system, on the one hand, and the practical, 
institutional arrangements for their realisation, which may work more or less well, on the 
other. It is essential to bridge this gap if the theory of legitimacy is not to remain suspended 
between a wholly abstract discussion of principles and a pragmatic analysis of institutions, 
which are never able to make contact with one another. (Ibid., p. 126). 
45 Here one might be tempted to object that, in some sense, participation in public deliberation could be 
considered an act of consent. There are however at least two rather convincing rejoinders to this. First, as 
we have seen, public deliberation is only a rather peripheral component of wider theories of liberal 
legitimacy through public justification (it does become more central in deliberative democracy, but we have 
also seen that deliberative democracy is often correctly presented as an alternative to liberalism). Second, 
the participants in a procedure of public deliberation may still not endorse the outcome, and it is at least 
questionable whether mere participation without endorsement of the procedure’s outcome can be 
understood as an act of consent.  
46 With regard to how the criteria for consent are acts, Beetham observes: “The consent of the subordinate 
makes its own distinctive contribution to the legitimacy of power, through the symbolic and normative 
force of actions which are conventionally recognised as expressing consent to the powerful, and, by 
implication, to the rules of power or constitutional system also.” (Ibid., p. 150). 
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postponed for now, as this is a stage-setting chapter, and thus we have not yet fully 
assessed the interplay of the view’s requirements, or even how each of them plays out 
individually, both at the abstract level of a general account of the view, and at the more 
specific level of particular versions of the view. Nonetheless we may point out that, in line 
with the issues to do with the role of hypothetical consent in relation to the justification 
requirement, in the light of the parallel between Beetham’s account of legitimacy and the 
liberal legitimacy view, we can see a potential danger for the consent requirement to not be 
able to perform the legitimating task it is meant to perform, for it may turn out to be too 
closely tied to the justification requirement. Moreover, it simply will not do for legitimacy 
theorists to claim that they are only interested in normative justifiability, and that it is thus 
fine for their account of consent to be entirely subsumed under that dimension of 
legitimacy. While it is indeed perfectly adequate for the liberal legitimacy view to stop at 
normative justifiability, for that is in fact the remit of philosophical, normative accounts of 
legitimacy (as recognised by Beetham himself47), it is still puzzling that, in the liberal 
legitimacy view, there is an insistence on the separate role of the virtues, i.e. the normative 
justifiability of liberal polities on the one hand (justification requirement), and the 
legitimating force of consent on the other hand (consent requirement), while at the same 
time the type of consent envisaged is such that it can be subsumed under the dimension of 
normative justifiability. As pointed out above, the worry here is that the consent 
requirement will turn out to be either rather redundant or in a relation of vicious circularity 
with the justification requirement. A crucial question we shall of course return to in 
Chapter VI. 
 
 
3. Concluding Observations 
 
3.1 Let us briefly review the main points of what has been a rather long chapter, in order 
to recapitulate the exposition offered so far, and thus see what lies ahead. Firstly, we have 
                                                
47 Ibid., pp. 4-7. 
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analysed the prescriptive content of the liberal legitimacy view, and we have found that the 
view can be understood as consisting of two requirements, whose conjunction constitutes a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the legitimacy of political authority (on some 
versions of the view, for the legitimacy of any kind of political authority; on other versions, 
just for liberal authority). We have termed the two requirements ‘consent’ and 
‘justification’ respectively. The former requires that, in some (typically hypothetical, and 
based on the idea of public justification) sense the political framework (i.e. the polity’s 
constitution or functional equivalent, for that is the scope of the view) enjoys the consent 
of those subject to its authority. The latter requirement prescribes that the political 
framework take a liberal form. We have then explored what that means, and concluded that 
‘liberalism’ should be understood as a tradition identifiable at the level of policies and 
practices, rather than at the level of the philosophical foundational commitments that 
justify or motivate those policies and practices. The next question had to be about the 
relation between the two requirements. Here we flagged some potential problems for the 
view, to be discussed in the rest of the thesis: is the sort of consent envisaged by the view 
so hypothetical as to become redundant next to the justification requirement? Relatedly, is 
the pairing of the two requirements arbitrary, thus generating a vicious circularity? After 
seeing what the view’s content is, we moved on to an account of what the view is a theory 
of. That required an overview of the liberal legitimacy view’s conceptual surroundings (i.e. 
the concepts of political power, authority, justification, and legitimacy), which then led to 
establishing that view is a theory of the proper exercise of legitimate political authority. 
Finally, we tried to see how the view’s account of legitimacy matches up with a social 
scientific account of the concept of legitimacy. That once again helped us flag the potential 
problems I just mentioned about the role of the consent requirement and the interplay of 
the two requirements. 
 
3.2 What, then, should be our next steps towards presenting a comprehensive critique of 
the liberal legitimacy view? First we need a more detailed account of the liberal legitimacy 
view’s strategy for mustering consent (i.e. an account of the various versions of the idea of 
public justification, which we shall discuss in Chapter II). With that account in place we 
I – Liberal Legitimacy 
 41 
will be equipped to carry out tests of how the two requirements (and their combination) 
work out in the main versions of the liberal legitimacy view (Chapters III-V). That, in turn, 
will provide a basis on which to offer a final assessment of the view from a theoretical, 
practical and historical perspective (Chapter VI). 
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 CHAPTER II 
Public Justification 
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
 
0.1 In the previous chapter we have seen how, on the liberal legitimacy view, 
the (hypothetical) consent of the citizenry is a necessary condition for the 
proper exercise of liberal political authority. However, as it has been pointed 
out by Rawls and others, this approach becomes problematic in societies 
characterised by a high level of cultural and ethical disagreement: the fact of 
ethical diversity makes it unlikely that citizens will converge towards and 
consent to the normative commitments of a liberal polity, at least as they have 
been traditionally understood—in fact, it seems unlikely that they will converge 
and consent to any single political framework.1 We have also seen that, as a 
response to this problem, proponents of the liberal legitimacy view construct 
their account of hypothetical consent through the idea of public reason, or 
public justification.2 The basic thought here is that of finding a way of bypassing 
this pervasive disagreement by providing a shared medium, or a procedure, to 
settle the politically salient disputes: if the political framework is one that could 
have been agreed upon by the citizens as the outcome of a process of 
deliberation conducted according to rules that safeguard the view’s salient 
normative commitments (e.g. the citizens’ personal autonomy), then the 
political framework is (hypothetically) consented to.  
                                                
1 As detailed in I.1.2 By ‘political system’ or ‘political framework’ I roughly mean what Rawls 
refers to as “the basic structure of society”, i.e. “constitutional essentials and basic questions 
of justice” (Political Liberalism, p. 10). Those cornerstones of a polity are what, according to the 
liberal legitimacy view, is in need of (hypothetical) consent—if this relation of consent obtains, 
every single action or feature of the government outside this domain, then, will be indirectly 
but still sufficiently legitimate. 
2 Recall that I use the terms ‘public reason’ and ‘public justification’ interchangeably, except 
where otherwise specified. 
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 In opposition to that now predominant approach, in this chapter I set the 
stage for carrying out the task (to be completed over the next four chapters) of 
arguing that the public reason strategy is bound to fail, and that therefore the 
liberal legitimacy view should be abandoned as an account of the foundations of 
liberal politics. More specifically, I argue that the idea of public justification 
embodies two desiderata that are in tension with one another, and that this 
tension is very likely to become unsustainable under conditions of ethical 
diversity such as those typical of the citizenry of modern liberal democracies. 
Moreover, in anticipation of an argumentative convergence I shall expand on in 
Chapter VI, I argue that this internal difficulty of the idea of public justification 
is connected to the general worries about the structure of the liberal legitimacy 
view I presented in the previous chapter: my main contention here will be that 
the sort of restrictions on the acceptable modes of consent (i.e. the rules for the 
conduct of deliberation) called for by the public justification approach, besides 
being in tension with one another, also highlight the fact that the sort of 
consensus envisaged by the liberal legitimacy view is either irrelevant or 
redundant. In the light of those conclusions, I also try (very briefly) to 
anticipate what direction of inquiry I intend to pursue in order to characterise 
and defend an alternative normative foundation for liberalism, or indeed for 
political authority in general.  
 
0.2 The chapter is structured as follows. I begin section 1 by briefly recalling the 
account of the structure of the liberal legitimacy view I provided in the previous 
chapter. That in turn leads me to present the sort of difficulties the liberal 
legitimacy view faces under conditions of persistent ethical diversity. Hence, in 
section 2, I come to the main focus of the chapter: I show how the idea of 
public reason or public justification, variously interpreted, is supposed to 
provide a solution to those difficulties. I briefly distinguish between two main 
conceptions of public reason (idealistic and realistic), show how they are 
connected to the liberal legitimacy view (by arguing that each embodies a crucial 
desideratum of the view), and how they inform some of the major strands of 
contemporary contract-based liberal theory: political liberalism, modus vivendi-
based liberalism, and justificatory liberalism. In section 3, then, I point out what 
II – Public Justification 
 44 
are the questions worth asking in order to consider whether any of these 
theories, or families of theories, succeeds in achieving the desiderata of liberal 
legitimacy. I show that there is a problematic tension between the two 
desiderata and that this problem is connected to the structural worries about the 
view I flagged in Chapter I. In the fourth and last section, I summarise the main 
points discussed so far, and propose some rough ideas for a research 
programme (which I shall return to in the last chapter and in the conclusion) 
for the characterisation of an alternative to the contract-based account of the 
foundations of (liberal) political authority. Indeed, contrary to most recent 
liberal orthodoxy, I would like to argue that the demise of the liberal legitimacy 
view and, more broadly, of the contract-based tradition as an account of the 
foundations of political authority need not coincide with the demise of 
liberalism as a normative political theory. Rather, it should lead to the 
rediscovery of the unduly neglected substantivist strand of the liberal tradition. 
 
 
1. Consent, Legitimacy and Diversity 
 
1.1 In Chapter I we have seen that the liberal legitimacy view is constituted by 
the conjunction of two normative requirements, which we have termed consent 
and justification. Roughly, the former requires liberal political frameworks to 
enjoy the free (even if only hypothetical) consent of those subject to their 
authority. The latter requires that the political framework be indeed liberal, 
where ‘liberal’ means that its policies and institutions promote maximal 
individual equal liberty.3  
                                                
3 So, of course, the liberal legitimacy view’s insistence on legitimacy (i.e., in the technical sense 
explained in Chapter I, on whether the political framework is in a consent relationship with 
those subject to its authority) does not imply turning a blind eye to matters of justification (i.e. 
whether a polity possesses certain virtues, promotes certain values, etc.) altogether. Neither 
does it imply a commitment to a particular view of what is the right response to illegitimate 
exercise of political authority (revolution, resignation, and so on). Within the liberal legitimacy 
view there is room for a range of different positions on these matters. What remains firm, 
however, is the idea that political authority is properly exercised only if (in some sense) it 
enjoys the consent of the governed, regardless of what there is to be said for the particular 
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Note how in that reconstruction of the view there is no mention of the 
deep normative commitments that motivate either requirement or, perhaps 
more importantly, their conjunction. It is rather intuitive that consent, at least 
ceteris paribus, carries some normative force (and in this chapter we will ask 
exactly how that is supposed to be the case on the liberal legitimacy view’s 
account of consent). As for liberalism, we have seen how it is possible to define 
it at the level of political practice, i.e. at the prescriptive rather than at the 
foundational level: in fact, there certainly are borderline cases, yet in most 
instances we do not have much of a problem telling whether a polity is liberal 
or not. Even though there is disagreement among liberals as to what values 
should inform and guide institutional design and policymaking (e.g., some 
liberals give more weight to equality, others to negative freedom, and so on), 
there is a good level of convergence as regards the preferred political outcomes 
(so virtually all liberals support a political framework which safeguards 
individual rights, etc. It is in this sense, I maintain, that there can be a unified 
meaning of the term ‘liberal’ in spite of the wide theoretical disagreements 
about the foundations of liberal political practice).4 
So, liberal legitimacy theorists believe that their foundational 
commitments, whatever they may be, can only be safeguarded by freely 
                                                                                                                                 
values and virtues instantiated by a political framework. But that should not be taken as a 
statement of a ‘black and white’ view of legitimacy (though neither does it exclude it): there 
may be more or less legitimate states—yet that does not imply that theorists cannot stipulate a 
threshold requirement for legitimacy, or uphold both a threshold requirement and a regulative 
ideal of full legitimacy. Again, there is logical space for a diverse array of positions here. 
4 A further clarification of my terminology. Note that, on the basis of the distinction between 
the prescriptive and the foundational level sketched here, a proponent of the liberal legitimacy 
view may hold that a liberal (in the prescriptive sense) polity is not legitimate. Now the slightly 
confusing point here is that, in the literature, such a position is often expressed by saying that 
a liberal democracy that does not enjoy the consent of its citizens is not a genuinely liberal 
polity (even though it happens to uphold policies quite close to those upheld by legitimate 
polities). To avoid confusion, just bear in mind that ‘liberal’ in the latter sense refers of course 
to the foundational level. As I made clear above, here I reserve the unqualified use of ‘liberal’ 
for the prescriptive sense—but that is by no means conventional in the literature, where there 
is instead a certain tendency to trade on the blurriness of the line between prescriptive and 
foundational level and thus lump the two together.  
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consented-to liberal political institutions and policies. The liberal legitimacy 
view, then, should explain why that need be the case. More precisely, it should 
explain from what premises it would follow that the conjunction of its two 
requirements is the correct test of the legitimacy of liberal polities. Presumably 
those premises will indeed turn out to be the view’s foundational commitments. 
Let us begin, then, to put a minimal amount of flesh on the abstract bones of 
the notion of ‘normative commitments’. For that purpose, I propose to use the 
idea of personal autonomy as an umbrella term, i.e. a as some sort of 
placeholder for the whole array of foundational normative commitments of the 
various variants of the view, i.e. the core values that are invoked by different 
theorists in order to motivate their adherence to the liberal legitimacy view (e.g., 
for Rawls, a certain conception of the person as free and equal). More precisely, 
what I have in mind is the intrinsic value5 of personal autonomy understood as 
self-government. Now that is a deplorably vague phrase; however, a fairly high 
degree of vagueness is required at this initial stage, if we are to find a 
formulation of the core normative commitment of the liberal legitimacy view 
that is inclusive enough to range over the differences between the various 
versions of the liberal legitimacy view. So, we may say that the liberal legitimacy 
view consists of two main components: a foundational normative commitment 
(personal autonomy), and a device (the conjunction of the two requirements) 
that tells us whether that commitment is being honoured by a given polity. Note 
that on this view the joint requirement device is not just one out of many 
possible ways of tracking whether a polity honours the commitment to 
                                                
5 By ‘intrinsic value’ I understand something close to what Ian Carter, in his discussion of the 
value of freedom, has called ‘independent value’ (see ‘The Independent Value of Freedom’), 
and later, ‘non-specific value’ (see A Measure of Freedom): the valuable thing is valuable 
independently of the benefits it affords. In the case of autonomy, of course, this formulation 
leaves open a number of important questions. Most importantly, even if we accept that 
autonomy is valuable independently of the value of what we can autonomously do, the 
question remains open as to whether the intrinsic value of autonomy should be understood 
procedurally or substantially, i.e. whether autonomy can be understood without reference to 
further substantive ideals (for a discussion of this issue, and of its relevance to contemporary 
liberalism, see Christman, ‘Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy’). However, I trust 
that for our immediate purposes it will not be necessary to explore this problem.  
II – Public Justification 
 47 
autonomy; rather, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for the safeguard 
and—on some views—the promotion of personal autonomy to which liberal 
legitimacy theorists are committed at the foundational level, and thus it is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for legitimacy.  
 But how exactly would personal autonomy do the foundational work 
required here? In what could be deployed as an answer to that question, Jeremy 
Waldron convincingly argued that the guiding thought behind hypothetical 
consent-based versions of liberalism seems to be that of providing a normative 
foundation for political authority, i.e. for a restriction of freedom and 
autonomy, which does not compromise on freedom and autonomy in any 
salient way: “If the rule is one that the citizen has agreed to, surely little that is 
important in relation to liberty is lost if it is subsequently enforced against 
him.”6. Waldron’s analysis brings out very clearly how, on the liberal legitimacy 
view, the commitment to autonomy is present at the foundational level already 
(consistently with my initial nutshell characterisation above): autonomy is the 
notion deployed to legitimate political authority, and not something that enters 
the picture just at the policy level. It is deployed in a negative way: the idea is 
not that political authority is grounded thanks to its function of protecting or 
promoting autonomy. Rather, the value of autonomy acts as a constraint on the 
exercise of political power: political authority is properly exercised only if it 
does not infringe on personal autonomy in any relevant way. The basic idea is 
that a legitimate political framework does not just need to embody liberal 
values; for political authority to be properly exercised we also need the free 
consent of the citizenry, for that guarantees the safeguard of autonomy.7 
                                                
6 Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, p. 42. 
7 Some liberal legitimacy theorists would of course argue that, strictly speaking, a polity which 
does not enjoy the free consent of its citizens does not in fact (fully) embody liberal values, 
even if its constitution and its most important political institutions are recognizably liberal. 
However nothing of importance hangs on that, as the issue largely boils down to a verbal point 
about whether we want to build the liberal legitimacy view into the very idea of ‘embodying 
liberal values’. Yet I think that is a point worth noting, as many liberal legitimacy theorists are 
inclined towards that understanding of what it means for a polity to fully embody liberal 
values. And that, as we shall see, is sometimes conducive to a blurring of considerations 
regarding whether a polity possesses certain moral virtues and considerations regarding 
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 That commitment at the foundational level, then, naturally leads the 
proponents of the liberal legitimacy view as the foundation of political authority 
to favour liberal political arrangements, namely (following the above 
considerations on the content of the liberal tradition) political prescriptions 
which safeguard maximal individual equal liberty, in particular through 
representative government, which is a defining feature of liberal regimes.8 And 
it is rather easy to see why liberal norms are attractive for these theorists: the 
attraction lies in the strategy, typical of the liberal tradition, of safeguarding and, 
on some views, promoting autonomy through the institutions of constitutional 
democracy. For these institutions are designed in such a way that they produce 
political norms through a process which is directed by the will of individual 
citizens and hence allows a form of self-government. In other words, liberalism 
provides a framework that ensures political authority is guided by and held 
accountable to the will of the citizenry, with each citizen taken into account as 
an individual, and no one as more than one. So, the connection with the liberal 
legitimacy view consists in the fact that these norms allow to run what for 
liberal legitimacy theorists is the test of a polity’s allegiance to the foundational 
commitment to personal autonomy, namely the test of consent to a liberal 
political framework. Exactly how this connection is supposed to work will 
become clearer once the account of the idea of public justification (provided in 
section 2 below) will be in place. 
   
1.2 The liberal legitimacy view, variously articulated, has become the dominant 
foundational account of contemporary contract-based liberalism. However even 
some of its main proponents (most notably Rawls) have recognised that it runs 
into a serious problem. Under the conditions of individual freedom granted by a 
liberal political framework (i.e. the framework of choice for liberal legitimacy 
theorists), a wide variety of alternative conceptions of the good are preserved, 
                                                                                                                                 
whether there is a consent relation between a polity and its citizens. To use the terminology 
introduced in the previous chapter, that would be a blurring of justification and legitimacy. 
8 Some may want to object to this assimilation of liberalism and democracy. But recall that I 
am using the term ‘liberalism’ in the modest sense described above, and it is undeniable that 
virtually every regime that is or has been considered liberal features some form of 
constitutional representative government.   
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created, and allowed to prosper, in a way that probably would not be possible 
under a regime with fewer protections of individual liberty. Moreover, this 
seems to be a persistent condition, rather than a transitory one: most people 
seem to have lost faith in the old Enlightenment idea that, over time, the 
exercise of human reason, even a free and honest exercise of human reason, 
would lead to agreement.9 Call this the fact of ethical diversity.10 Now the 
problem with this is that under conditions of persistent ethical diversity there 
are few if any chances that citizens will freely consent to the main tenets (i.e. 
the constitutional framework or its functional equivalent) of a political system, 
liberal or otherwise.11 Liberalism is the normative output, as it were, of the 
liberal legitimacy view, but it generates conditions which make it problematic 
for the view’s conditions of legitimacy to continue to obtain. That is what 
makes the problem inescapably pressing and crucial for liberal legitimacy 
theorists. Rawls calls this ‘the problem of stability’12. The phrase can be 
misleading. What he has in mind is not simply the problem of whether 
institutions will crumble because of a lack of allegiance on the part of the 
citizenry; rather, the problem is the one I just described, namely that of the 
prospect of a lack of free consent to the political framework. The challenge, 
then, is to develop an account of (hypothetical) consent that can preserve 
autonomy to a satisfactory degree (i.e. that can allow consent to remain genuine 
free consent) whilst being sufficiently inclusive towards the citizenry. So, 
consider Rawls’ by now familiar statement of the liberal principle of legitimacy:  
                                                
9 For an account of this Enlightenment idea of rational convergence and of its crisis in 
contemporary Western societies, see Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, pp. 5-14. 
10 I prefer to avoid the term ‘pluralism’, which is used widely but confusingly (because of its 
technical sense in some areas of philosophy). 
11. In ‘Pluralism and Liberal Legitimacy’ Robert Talisse refers to roughly the same problem 
with the term ‘the paradox of liberal legitimacy’, but I am not sure that the fact that the 
political arrangements favoured by proponents of the liberal legitimacy view lead to a situation 
in which the ideal of liberal legitimacy becomes unobtainable (or at least runs this risk) is a 
paradox in any technical sense of the term. 
12 See Political Liberalism, pp. 140-144. The potential problem (but not its actuality) was 
prefigured in A Theory of Justice (pp. 453ff.). In chapter III I will discuss Rawls’ treatment of 
this issue in some detail. 
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Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.13  
Because of the challenge of diversity, it becomes a daunting task to 
identify forms of political authority which “all citizens as free and equal may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.” In the next section I shall explore 
what seems the only strategy available through which liberal legitimacy theorists 
can confront this problem, namely the idea of hypothetical consent through 
public justification, or public reason. 
 
 
2. Legitimacy, Diversity and Public Reason: Realism vs Idealism 
 
2.1 Let us now begin to look closely at how the public reason strategy is 
supposed to work. As anticipated, the rough idea is that of identifying a shared 
medium, or a procedure, which enables us to work out a solution to our 
political disputes in a way which transcends the controversies we have about the 
relative values of our conceptions of the good, and the like. Public reason, then, 
just is whatever procedure can enable us to perform this mediating task, and 
hence to deliberate in a way that generates policies which we can say we 
consented to. Of course, the difficulty rests with the fact that (i) there is very 
little common axiological ground we can assume the citizens share,14 and yet we 
want to include as many as possible within the consensus, for in principle each 
of them has an equally valid claim to equal concern, and we cannot arbitrarily 
restrict the pool of those whose consent is needed; and (ii) we are in search of 
free consent, hence agreement at any cost (e.g. at gunpoint) will not do. The 
problem, then, is whether there is a middle ground that avoids both problems.  
                                                
13 Rawls, Ibid., p. 137. 
14 In support of this empirical claim, see (again) Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, pp. 5-
14.   
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 That was just a preliminary sketch. Let us now take a closer look at the 
idea of public justification. The fact of diversity is a problem for liberal 
legitimacy theorists because there is no direct way leading from each citizen’s 
private normative standpoint (i.e. his or her conception of the good, to borrow 
Rawls’ phrase) to a single set of normative commitments large and precise 
enough to provide the basis for designing a political framework. In other words, 
for such an agreement to be possible, citizens have to take a standpoint 
different from the one they occupy in their ordinary dealings, a standpoint 
designed in order to allow effective deliberation regarding the design of the 
political framework. The aim of public reason, then, is to serve as the medium 
between each private standpoint and the values informing the political 
framework. Indeed, it attempts to do this by offering an alternative standpoint, 
a public standpoint that enables us to reach some kind of consensus about what 
the basic structure of society should look like. The standpoint of public reason 
is the standpoint we need to take if we want to reach an agreement on what 
normative principles should inform the political framework. So, the idea is to 
construct public reason—i.e. to construct a standpoint for deliberation about 
the political framework—in such a way that it can be shown that citizens have 
reason(s), from the standpoint of their private outlooks, to adopt a public 
outlook when deliberating about the basic structure of society.  
 As we shall see shortly, then, divergences arise among public reason 
theorists as to what kind of reasons there might be for adopting the public 
standpoint, and that in turn leads to divergences about what kind of reasons 
may legitimately be deployed in discussion within the public standpoint. But 
before we discuss these divergences between different conceptions of pubic 
reason, let me clarify the concept of public reason further. The characterisation 
of public reason as a standpoint I offered so far may come across as excessively 
abstract. To clarify the idea, think of it in terms of a procedure, of a set of rules 
for the conduct of public deliberation (recall, however, that no actual 
deliberation need take place: principles are publicly justified so long as they 
could have been arrived at through such a process of public deliberation). So, a 
conception of public reason specifies (i) what issues pertain to the political 
framework (and should hence be dealt with through public reason), (ii) what 
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kinds of reason may legitimately motivate a citizen to engage in deliberation 
through public reason, and (iii) what types of reasons may legitimately be 
employed to back up one’s position when engaging in deliberation about the 
political framework.15 So, for a component of the political framework (an article 
of the constitution, say) to be publicly justified, and hence legitimate, it needs to 
be justified according to the procedural requirements of public reason.16 The 
features that are required for this procedure to count as public reason, then, will 
vary conspicuously depending on the particular conception of public reason at 
stake. I shall turn to characterising the main possible conceptions of public 
reason in 2.2. below. Before that, however, we need to investigate the link 
between public reason and liberal legitimacy a bit further. 
 So far, in characterising the idea of public reason, I have been taking more 
or less for granted that for a normative principle to be publicly justified just is 
for it to be (hypothetically) consented to. But in what precise sense does public 
justification satisfy the liberal legitimacy view’s consent requirement? In order 
to answer this question, we need to understand exactly how the device of public 
justification is supposed to establish a relation of consent between a publicly 
justified political framework, and the citizens to whom it is publicly justified. 
The basic idea, as anticipated, is to present a publicly justified political 
framework as one that enjoys the consent of the government in the sense 
envisaged by hypothetical social contract theory. The fact that a set of political 
arrangements is justified through the procedure of public reasoning makes it the 
case that, if the citizens can (or could)17 recognise the merits of the particular 
conception of public reason that governs public deliberation on the political 
framework, and hence can (or could) consider themselves bound by the 
outcomes of public deliberation conducted according to the requirements of 
                                                
15 These three issues are clearly connected and often interdependent. It would not be 
possible—or for that matter very helpful—to provide an account of their interplay at such an 
early stage of my exposition. However I shall do so in the following chapters, when discussing 
particular conceptions of pubic reason. 
16 There could of course be several competing publicly justifiable normative principles that 
could be used to design the political framework. 
17 Whether one or two layers of hypotheticity are deployed depends on the type of conception 
of public reason. I shall explain this shortly, in 2.2. below. 
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public reason, then a relation of hypothetical consent is established between the 
political framework and the citizenry.  
 Now, of course, reasonable doubts may be cast as to whether any form of 
hypothetical free consent is free consent in any relevant sense of the term, and 
hence whether it can perform the foundational role assigned to it by the liberal 
legitimacy view. The familiar thought here is that, as A. John Simmons argues,18 
only a voluntaristic notion of consent can perform that task, whereas 
hypothetical consent-based theories of legitimacy are just a disguised way of 
grounding political authority through justification, i.e. by appeal to the values 
that are enshrined in the antecedent part of the conditional in which a given 
hypothetical contract argument is expressed. Indeed, from a logical point of 
view, hypothetical consent arguments are of the form: ‘If you reasoned in such 
and such a way, then you would consent to this form of government’. That 
formulation translates as: ‘Because it is possible for you to reason in such and 
such a way and consent to this form of government (i.e. even if you do not 
consent to it here and now, this is not necessarily the case), it is as if you 
consented to it.’ Now, if one stopped at the mere consideration of the logical 
form of the argument, it would be rather easy to embrace scepticism about the 
legitimating reach of hypothetical consent. And this would be a quick way of 
reinforcing the worries about the redundancy of the consent requirement I put 
forward in the previous chapter. However, the deeper (and not analysable at 
that level of abstraction) question is whether a particular hypothetical consent 
theory succeeds in the task of fleshing out an antecedent that is appealing to 
those whose consent is being sought, in such a way as to ensure a satisfactory 
level of voluntarism19—a task which of course is made more difficult by the 
challenge of diversity.20 The natural reply of liberal legitimacy theorists, then, is 
simply that (i) a more voluntaristic approach would set the bar too high (even 
                                                
18 See Simmons, ‘Justification and Legitimacy’. 
19 To see how liberal legitimacy theorists might go about tackling this task, in the next sub-
section I shall argue that different forms of hypothetical consent carry different voluntaristic 
normative force. 
20 The latter question will in fact be crucial in my assessment of the various strands of theories 
of public justification. 
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more so under conditions of ethical diversity), and in any case (ii) there is still 
room to distinguish between a completely consent-blind approach to the 
foundations of political authority, and one that is at least concerned with 
making sure that citizens could consent to the main tenets of the political 
framework. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “Though a social order not legitimated 
by actual consent may be unfree, that unfreedom can be mitigated by our 
recognition that it is at least possible to imagine people giving it their 
consent.”21 Surely the notion of hypothetical consent is a weakened and ‘second 
best’ one, when compared to that of actual consent; but it also seems the only 
viable one. This might strike some as too quick, in the sense that perhaps a 
strictly voluntaristic theory of legitimacy, i.e. one based on actual consent is not 
a completely utopian ideal, after all. A first line of response to this could simply 
point out that, among liberal legitimacy theorists, there is a near-universal 
consensus on hypothetical consent as the only feasible option. There are of 
course theorists, such as Simmons, who defend such a voluntaristic theory of 
legitimacy. However, that position leads Simmons to embrace philosophical 
anarchism, as he maintains that, since voluntarism is the only plausible theory of 
legitimacy, a legitimate state has never existed and will most probably never 
exist (See Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ‘Philosophical Anarchism’, and 
‘Justification and Legitimacy’). At this point one may ask why we should not 
understand legitimacy just as a regulative ideal—something I shall touch upon 
at the end of section 3, through my distinction between active and passive 
normative political theories.22 Let us now move on to see what particular 
versions of the idea of hypothetical consent are deployed by public reason 
theorists. 
 
2.2 For the limited purposes of this preliminary exploration of the project of 
achieving legitimacy through public justification, it will suffice to distinguish 
                                                
21 Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, p. 51. 
22 A second and perhaps more interesting line of response points out how unrestrained 
consent-seeking might end up sanctioning undesirable (from a liberal point of view) forms of 
political organisation. I shall explore the latter line at some length in Chapter IV, when 
discussing the prospects of a modus vivendi-based account of liberal political legitimacy. 
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between two main versions of the idea of public reason. I propose to classify 
theories of public reason according to the sort of hypothetical consensus they 
envisage. In a nutshell, the main divide is between realistic and idealistic 
approaches to public justification, i.e. approaches that try to construct public 
reason on the basis of reasons the citizens actually have, and approaches that 
construct it on the basis of reasons the citizens should have, in the light of a 
commitment to the freedom and equality of their fellow citizens. The 
distinction can be understood in at least three ways: motivational, epistemic and 
internal/external. In the motivational sense, having reasons is a matter of those 
reasons’ capacity to produce action. In the epistemic sense having a reason is a 
matter of being able to appreciate its merits. The familiar contrast between 
internal and external reasons, finally, can be deployed to clarify the distinction 
at stake in the sense that actually having a reason is comparable to having an 
internal reason, whereas reasons that we should have can be thought of as 
external reasons.23  
Before explaining that distinction, a brief excursus is needed here in order 
to place my taxonomy of theories of public reason in the wider context of the 
large and growing literature on this subject. Even though recently it has been 
argued that the idea of public reason was implicit in the writings of several 
theorists of the 17th and 18th century (e.g. Hobbes, Locke and Kant),24 and even 
though some key elements of Rawls’ view on public reason were already present 
in some of his 1980s’ articles,25 the topic as we know it has gained prominence 
only after the publication of Political Liberalism. There Rawls formulated his 
influential version of what, in my reading, is largely an idealistic theory of public 
                                                
23 See Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’. A standard way of thinking about the 
familiar contrast is this: an internal reason is a reason that actually explains my actions, 
whereas an external reason is merely a reason that, per se, is relevant to my action (just as it is 
would be relevant to anyone in a situation similar to mine), but may not have any actual 
bearing on it. 
24 See Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’, Ivison, ‘The Secret History of Public Reason: From Hobbes 
to Rawls’, O’Neill, ‘Kantian Politics: The Public Use of Reason’, and Postema, ‘Public Practical 
Reason: An Archaeology’. 
25 See Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus’, and ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’. 
II – Public Justification 
 56 
reason. He then clarified and developed the view further in a later essay, “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, and in a chapter of his last book.26 In the light 
of Rawls’ work, and of course also in opposition to his views, much has been 
written on public reason in the last decade or so. Several different taxonomies 
of theories of public reason, each trying to keep track of this flourishing line of 
research, can be found in the recent literature. For example, Fred D’Agostino 
and Gerald Gaus have identified two main families of views on public reason: 
considering the question of why we should ‘reason publicly’, they distinguished 
between ‘the pragmatic-legitimation view’ (whose main concern is achieving 
peace and stability) and the ‘epistemological-moral view’ (primarily concerned 
with honouring certain moral and epistemological commitments).27 Each of 
these views, then, is associated with what D’Agostino and Gaus call an empirical 
and a normative conception of public reason. This distinction is rather similar to 
the one I traced between idealistic and realistic conceptions of public reason 
(for example, I followed their lead in tracing the conceptions back to Kant and 
Hobbes), though not entirely interchangeable (in fact, there is no complete 
overlap when it comes to placing the various theories in one of those families, 
most notably Rawls’ theory—but the disagreement may be due to different 
readings of Rawls, rather than to different views on how to classify conceptions 
of public reason. I shall return to this point in Chapter III). D’Agostino and 
Gaus also suggested another aspect under which theories of public reason may 
differ: a reason can be public in a consensual way (i.e. if we accept reason R as 
public each for the same reason), or in a distributive way (i.e. if we accept reason 
R as public each for his or her own reasons). Note how this divide cuts across 
the dichotomy between the ‘pragmatic legitimation view’ and the 
‘epistemological-moral view’. The distinction between consensual and 
normative conceptions of public reason has then been reinterpreted by Duncan 
Ivison, who understands it as the most salient dichotomy between conceptions 
of public reason.28 D’Agostino also proposed a list of no less than seven 
                                                
26 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.  
27 D’Agostino and Gaus (eds), Public Reason, pp. xii-xiii. 
28 Ivison, ibid. 
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“dimensions of variation among conceptions of public reason”,29 which I 
cannot summarise here (but I shall come back to some of these distinctions 
later on). Finally, given the close link between the project of public justification 
and hypothetical contract theory, another, more traditional, dichotomy that 
springs to mind when considering my distinction between idealism and realism, 
namely the one between contractualism and contractarianism. Indeed, these are 
all suggestions worth taking into account, however I cannot fully subscribe to 
any of these approaches. Hence, in order to avoid verbal equivocation, I shall 
classify the theories of public reason in my own terms. 
 Let us start from the realistic conception. Here the guiding idea is a 
Hobbesian one: public reason is just a way of reasoning we adopt for the 
purposes of living together in a political system—the fact that it enables us to 
do that is its only appeal. Thus the content, as it were, of the ideal of public 
reason, i.e. the rules for the adjudication of political controversies, does not 
really matter that much, as long as those rules make it possible for us to coexist 
in a peaceful polity. This view is connected to a pragmatic conception of 
legitimacy: crudely, anything goes, as long as it secures agreement  and stability. 
A single layer of hypotheticity, as it were, is deployed here. The reasons that 
citizens need in order to take the standpoint of public reason must be reasons 
they actually possess.30 That of course does not mean that they will necessarily 
take that standpoint; the point is just that, taken as they actually are, citizens can 
take the standpoint of public reason. 
 I read some recent attempts to ground liberal politics in a modus vivendi 
as the most promising expression of the realistic conception of public reason in 
contemporary liberal theory. It should be noted that most modus vivendi-based 
theories of the foundations of liberalism31 are developed independently or even 
in opposition to the legitimacy view. And most Hobbesian theories of public 
                                                
29 D’Agostino, Free Public Reason, p. 33. 
30 By this I mean that they must be reasons that are actually available to the citizens, and that 
can become conclusive reasons for action. 
31 See for example Dauenhauer, ‘A Good Word for a Modus Vivendi’, Gray, Two Faces of 
Liberalism, Haldane, ‘The Individual, the State, and the Common Good’, Hershowitz, ‘A Mere 
Modus Vivendi?’, Mills, ‘Not a Mere Modus Vivendi: The Bases for Allegiance to the Just State’. 
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reason32 are developed independently of the idea of modus vivendi, and of the 
project of grounding liberalism. Nonetheless, I intend to show (in chapter IV) 
that those lines of inquiry can promisingly be integrated and complement each 
other for the purposes of providing a legitimacy-based account of the 
foundations of liberalism.33  
 The idealistic conception, on the other hand, is broadly Kantian in spirit: 
the idea here would be to take a standpoint which ought to be accepted by all. 
Private standpoints are not like that (because of our moral and epistemological 
idiosyncrasies), thus we should strive to find a public one.34 This is true both at 
the epistemological level (e.g. ‘use reasons that are intelligible to others/comply 
with epistemological standards that are acceptable to others’) and at the moral 
level (‘make on  others only claims that can be justified to them’). More often 
than not the two levels are combined in a set of mixed epistemological and 
moral criteria. Liberal legitimacy theorists usually resort to these constraints in 
order to make sure that the hypothetical agreement secured through public 
reason is respectful of personal autonomy; that is to say, in order to make sure 
that the secured consent—albeit hypothetical—is free.35 This view is connected 
                                                
32 I have in mind mainly David Gauthier’s (ibid.) and Michael Ridge’s (‘Hobbesian Public 
Reason’)work on this topic. 
33 The link between modus vivendi and Hobbesian public reason has been explored by Gerald 
Gaus in Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, pp. 56-83. 
34 The Kantian approach to public justification has been well analysed by Onora O’Neill (ibid.); 
also see Korsgaard (‘The Reasons We Can Share’). Both O’Neill’s and Korsgaard’s reading of 
Kant is influenced by Rawls’ work, hence their accounts of Kantian public reason provide a 
valuable insight in the broader theoretical framework in which Rawls inscribes his theory of 
liberal legitimacy, which I shall analyse in the next chapter. Habermas is of course the other 
prominently Kantian legitimacy theorist—yet, as explained in the introductory chapter, 
Habermasian deliberative democracy does not fall within the scope of this study. For an 
account of Kantian public reason in the light of Habermas’ work, see McCarthy, 
‘Enlightenment and the Idea of Public Reason’. 
35 Note how this is not a point about ensuring that the procedure will have a certain outcome 
(that is taken care of by the justification requirement, whereas here we are discussing the 
consent requirement of the liberal legitimacy view); it is a point about ensuring that the 
(hypothetical) deliberation procedure will take place in a way that honours the value of 
autonomy. 
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to a moralistic conception of legitimacy: norms that violate those epistemological 
and moral constraints will not be admitted in the public competition for the 
citizens’ consent, regardless of whether they would actually be consented to. 
Notice how two layers of hypotheticity are in place here: in order to take the 
standpoint of public reason, citizens must be motivated by reasons which they 
may or may not possess, but which they have moral and/or epistemic reasons to 
act from (from an objective or impartial point of view). In other words, citizens 
are not taken as they are, but as they should be. 
 Most contemporary theories of public reason are primarily idealistic. Two 
main strands of liberal theory spring to mind: Rawls’ political liberalism, and 
Gerald Gaus’ justificatory liberalism.36 These are rather different views (which 
we shall explore in some detail in Chapters III to V), however, for the purposes 
of this preliminary classification, suffice it to note how they all resort to 
restrictions of a moral and epistemological nature on the sort of reasons that 
can be deployed when engaging in the task of public justification. I am thinking 
of Rawls’ notions of reasonableness and of the burdens of judgment37 and of 
Gaus’ moral epistemology of public justification.38 
 
                                                
36 As in the case of the taxonomies of theories of public reason discussed in an earlier 
footnote, several different lists of public reason-based liberalisms have been proposed in the 
literature. For example, Gaus (ibid.) discusses seven contemporary theories of public reason. 
D’Agostino, on the other hand, analyses six such theories (see Free Public Reason). Interestingly 
enough, there is less overlap than one might think between the two lists. That is, of course, 
because each scholar cuts up the logical space available to public reason in different ways. 
However, in the light of D’Agostino and Gaus’ extensive and detailed accounts of the current 
debate, my identifying just three main theories of public reason may seem crude, to say the 
least. As an explanation (if not a justification) of my choice, at this stage I can only say that I 
do not aim for completeness as much as for in-depth discussion of what I take to be the most 
influential, promising and original views—this is partly due to the fact that I believe that most 
views on public reason are largely derivative from the Rawlsian strand of thought, or at least 
can be presented as such. 
37 Rawls, Political Liberalism, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement.  
38 Gaus, Value and Justification, Justificatory Liberalism, and Contemporary Theories of Liberalism.  
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2.3 It is important to note that to say that a given theory of public reason stands 
out mostly because of, e.g., its idealistic traits, is not to say that that is all there 
is to the theory. Indeed, the conceptions of public reason presented above are 
Weberian idealtypen. The actual theories of public justification (or at least the 
plausible ones) embody mixed rationalistic and idealistic positions. That is 
because no theory of public reason can be fully realistic or fully idealistic 
without facing insurmountable difficulties. And that in turn shows that each 
idealtyp represents one of two main families of (conflicting) desiderata for a 
theory of public reason. But let us proceed in an orderly way, and first see what 
those problems affecting each idealtyp are. 
 The main problem plaguing the idea of a pure realistic conception of 
public reason is rather easy to spot: on the realistic approach, all that counts is 
the existence of a hypothetical agreement on a set of rules and procedures for 
public deliberation. But then any concern for how that agreement came about 
(at gunpoint, under the effect of propaganda, and analogous situations) 
becomes secondary, if not entirely irrelevant. Now that is a problem because we 
were interested in consent in the first place because we thought that requiring 
hypothetical consent of the governed would have been a good way of making 
sure that their personal autonomy was safeguarded in a salient sense, which 
arguably is not the case at gunpoint or under the effect of propaganda. To put it 
differently, liberal legitimacy theorists are interested in free consent (even if 
only hypothetical), not just any type of consent. And by free hypothetical 
consent I mean consent that can be given by an autonomous agent, for it is the 
value of personal autonomy that confers foundational power on liberal 
legitimacy as a foundation of political authority, as we have seen in 1.2 above. 
Now, it is clear that the unrestrained pursuit of agreement—i.e. the sanctioning 
of agreements obtained at gunpoint or under the effect of propaganda—does 
not guarantee free consent in this sense. Thus even theories aiming for a strong 
realistic bent need some moralistic constraints in order to fend off the risk of 
achieving a type of unfree consent, i.e. a type of consent with no foundational 
power, and hence of no interest to liberal legitimacy theorists. In chapter IV I 
shall explore in some detail how realistic a liberal conception of public reason 
can be. 
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 As for the idea of a pure idealistic conception, we can say that the 
potential source of trouble lies with its framing of consent within a double layer 
of hypotheticity. Clearly the problem is that it would be a rather vacuous 
intellectual exercise to design a conception of public reason, a public 
standpoint, characterised by admirable moral and epistemological commitments, 
which however hardly any citizen is likely to embrace. Indeed, if we say that the 
citizens could consent to a political framework if they reasoned well (and by that 
we mean that they should comply with certain moral and/or epistemological 
standards we set—call them normative constraints on public reason), then our 
theory of public reason becomes indifferent to what values the citizens actually 
embrace. In this way what does the foundational work is not the consensus of 
the citizenry; rather, the foundational work is carried out by the values 
enshrined in our normative constraints on public reason. These values may be 
worth pursuing in their own right, but it is at best misleading to present such a 
theory as an answer to the liberal legitimacy view’s consent requirement. We 
should rather consider it in relation to the justification requirement.  
 The proponents of such a theory, however, might object that it could very 
well be the case that the citizens of the society for which the theory is designed 
for (or at least the great majority of them) actually “reason well”, i.e. they satisfy 
the theory’s normative constraints. But this line of reply is hardly satisfactory, 
for at least two reasons. First, whilst it would probably be utopian to require 
universal consensus, the problem of excluding part of the citizenry from the 
consensus should not be underestimated. By so doing we would effectively be 
saying that the only consent worth seeking is that of a particular class of 
citizens, namely those citizens who recognise and agree to be bound by the 
values enshrined in the normative constraints on public reason. This is not just 
a pragmatic problem due to the fact that, because of a lack of consent, the 
polity will become instable. Even if the government succeeded in restraining 
and controlling those citizens, there would still be the moral problem of not 
treating equally individuals who have the same right to live under legitimate 
political authority, and the theoretical problem of justifying our choice of 
normative constraints. Second, the reply shows that, on the idealistic model of 
public reason, whether conditions of legitimacy can obtain and persist, and thus 
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whether the theory is relevant to the society it is designed for, is contingent on 
what views the citizens happen to hold: if the citizens happen to be able to put 
themselves in the public standpoint characterised in terms of our preferred 
epistemological and moral standards, then political authority is legitimate. But 
this would be just a fortunate coincidence; moreover, nothing in the theory 
ensures that legitimacy will continue to obtain.39 
 Now, what those symmetrically distributed problems show is that, as 
anticipated, no plausible theory of public reason can be purely realistic or purely 
moralistic. In other words, both a measure of realism and a measure of idealism 
are vital desiderata for a theory of public reason. In line with how we have 
labelled the types of legitimacy associated with each idealtyp of theory of public 
reason, let us call these desiderata pragmatic and moralistic.40 As we have seen the 
pragmatic desideratum has to do with making sure that hypothetical consent to 
a publicly justified set of principles informing a constitutional framework be a 
concrete possibility, in the sense that it be something feasible given the citizens’ 
actual motives, beliefs, and reasons. The moralistic desideratum, on the other 
hand, tracks the need to ensure that the notion of consent is not emptied of its 
                                                
39 Strictly speaking, perhaps it would be possible to include within the theory’s normative 
constraints a requirement such that citizens who “reason well” are citizen who are not going to 
change their point of view on matters relevant to the procedure for the design of the political 
framework. However, as a matter of fact it is unlikely that there would ever actually be many 
such citizens; and that would make the fortunate circumstance of harmony between the 
theory’s normative constraints and the citizens’ outlook extremely unlikely. 
40 In identifying these two kinds of desiderata I roughly follow D’Agostino (ibid., Ch. 5), who 
distinguishes between the families of ‘moralistic’ and of ‘realistic’ desiderata (I changed the 
terminology simply to avoid confusion with the terms I used to refer to the two main types of 
theory of public reason.), and identifies five of each kind. The moralistic desiderata are 
universality, independence, transparency, reflexivity, determinacy. The realistic desiderata are 
universality, salience, intelligibility, stability, and determinacy. The lists are not meant to be 
entirely exhaustive, though they are intended to cover the most important desiderata. At any 
rate, unlike D’Agostino, I do not think it possible to capture the varieties of theories of public 
reason within such a rigid and detailed scheme, and in fact it is at least questionable whether all 
theories pursue every single element on that list of desiderata. Rather, at this stage it will be 
enough to observe how different theories of public reason pick out different desiderata, with 
the aim of achieving a viable balance between pragmatism and moralism.  
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legitimating force. In extreme synthesis, we can say that if public reason is the 
legitimacy theorist’s strategy to ensure that the political framework is freely 
consented to by the citizenry, the pragmatic desideratum of public reason looks 
after the consent, and the moralistic desideratum looks after the freedom. The 
troubling fact is that there is a tension between those families of desiderata: if 
we relax the normative constraints on public reason we will achieve a higher 
degree of realism, but that will require us to compromise on the safeguard of 
the foundational moral commitment (the value of personal autonomy) that 
motivated us to try to ground political authority through a theory of liberal 
legitimacy. In the course of a discussion of Rawls’ Political Liberalism, Chandran 
Kukathas advanced a similar concern:  
 
Different peoples, or groups, or communities, have different views or 
conceptions of justice. In these circumstances the question is: how can 
people live together freely when there is this sort of moral diversity? One 
kind of answer suggests that the solution is to articulate a conception of 
justice that is capable of commanding widespread, if not universal, assent. 
But the problem with this move is that, in order to secure that assent, it is 
necessary to strip the conception of justice of much of its substantive 
content or run the risk of having a theory which commands the loyalty of 
only a small subset of its audience.41 
 
Along similar lines, albeit in a rather different context, Jonathan Wolff notes: 
 
However it seems to me evident that the more plausible it is to argue that 
everyone does engage in a certain form of consent, the less plausible it is 
that the named form of consent is an appropriate basis for liberal political 
obligation. That is, either it is unlikely to be a genuine form of consent, or 
it is unlikely to have any binding force42 
 
That problem, of course, arises unless the citizens happen to be 
committed to personal autonomy to a sufficient degree; however, under 
conditions of ethical diversity, to expect such a widespread consensus on this 
                                                
41 Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, p. 6.  
42 Wolff, ‘What Is the Problem of Political Obligation?’, p. 162. 
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value seems wildly optimistic. In fact, the idea of public justification is supposed 
to overcome or bypass precisely this lack of agreement. Any theory of public 
reason, then, will have to seek a satisfactory trade-off between the two 
desiderata.  
 
 
3. Difficulties With Public Justification 
 
3.1 If that reconstruction of the structure of the project of public justification is 
correct, there are at least two main directions of inquiry that a critic of the 
project may take. The first one would be to argue that no (coherent) conception 
of public reason can satisfy both types of desiderata, because of the tension 
between them: any trade-off would always trade away too much of the non-
dominant set of desiderata. The second one would be to argue that there is no 
way of telling what type of trade-off is better, or indeed whether a certain trade-
off is at all acceptable, because the conflicting  desiderata are incommensurable, 
making it the case that there are no rational grounds on which to decide how to 
trade-off between those desiderata. 
 The latter strategy has been pursued by Fred D’Agostino in what is one of 
the most complete studies of the problems of public justification to date.43 
However, I find an aspect of D’Agostino’s strategy somewhat problematic, 
namely his use of the notion of incommensurability. The problem is that the 
debate on the nature of incommensurability is all but wide open in the current 
literature, with theorists arguing over the very logical possibility of such a 
concept, and about its purported implications.44 Moreover, even if a consensus 
were formed on the view that incommensurability exists and has certain 
implications (an unlikely perspective at the moment), the crucial problem would 
                                                
43 This is how D’Agostino summarises his position: “I hope to show the idea of public 
justification may itself be subject to a kind of indeterminacy that is derived from the 
incommensurability of some of the values [i.e. the desiderata] in terms of which this idea is 
defined.” (Ibid. p. 7) 
44 See, for a start, the essays and the introduction in Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason. 
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remain open as to how to identify incommensurability, i.e. as to how to tell 
whether two objects actually are incommensurable. Indeed, very little if any 
attention at all has been paid to this further aspect of the issue of 
incommensurability so far. In general, it does not seem safe to base a view on a 
position in a separate area of research, which may very well be revolutionised in 
the near future. Hence, deploying a well thought-through notion of 
incommensurability seems a task that is hard to manage within a monograph on 
a separate and rather distant subject.45 
 The former strategy, on the other hand, is the one I intend to embark on. 
The rough idea is to try to show that, because of the strident conflicts between 
the demands of the moralistic and the pragmatic desiderata, there is no 
satisfying trade-off to be found. But that is not because we cannot tell whether 
the trade-off is rational, but rather because we can tell that one or more of the 
desiderata has not been met to an adequate level. To repeat, while D’Agostino’s 
critique is that the public justification project is bound to fail because we cannot 
tell whether it can honour its own normative commitments, my (intended) 
critique is that it is bound to fail because we come to realise that it fails to 
honour those commitments. Of course, in order to pursue this line of argument 
I need to spell out what exactly are the desiderata of each family pursued by 
each conception of public reason, what would be an acceptable level of 
realisation for them, and so on. That is a task I shall take up in the next three 
chapters, as I will proceed to explore the three main theories of public reason I 
have listed above (political liberalism, modus vivendi, and justificatory 
liberalism).  
After that discussion, I shall conclude my argument by returning (in 
Chapter VI) to the structural worries about the liberal legitimacy view I flagged 
in Chapter I. However it is not too early to begin to consider how those 
structural worries (about the circular arbitrariness of the pairing of the view’s 
two requirements, and about the risk of redundancy of the consent 
requirement) relate to the problematic tension between the two desiderata of  
                                                
45 Interestingly enough, D’Agostino’ last book, Incommensurability and Commensuration, is indeed a 
study of the very concepts of incommensurability and commensuration, in which he seems to 
have moved away from some of the views he defended in Free Public Reason. 
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public justification I just identified. Indeed, the realistic desideratum reminds us 
that we need be wary of excluding sectors of the citizenry from the consensus 
just to satisfy the moralistic desideratum. That is because within the liberal 
legitimacy view there seems to be no clear account of why we place certain 
restrictions on the process of public deliberation and not others, i.e. why we opt 
for a particular trade-off between the desiderata, between moralism and 
pragmatism, and not another one. The restrictions could never be accused of 
being too much or too little, if we had an account of why exactly they need be 
what they are. But what would such an account look like? The view is silent 
about this crucial question. Proponents of the view may be tempted to reply 
that the restrictions are simply what is required to ensure that consent is free 
consent, but that does not explain away the problem of the arbitrary pairing of 
the two requirements: if they say that consent just has to be free, it is not clear 
why freely consented-to illiberal arrangements should not be legitimate; if on 
the other hand liberal outcomes are built into the notion of free consent (for 
example by construing freedom as requiring a commitment to treating others as 
free and equals), so that only consent to a liberal political framework will count 
as free consent, then the recourse to consent becomes redundant. In both cases 
further arguments would be needed, to explain the need for the justification 
requirement, and to account for why freedom requires consent to liberalism, 
respectively. In the next chapters we will consider whether particular versions 
of the view can offer those arguments. So far, our worries about the structure 
of the liberal legitimacy view have been reinforced.  
 
3.2 Before concluding the chapter it is perhaps worth taking a step back to 
make one further observation about the task we are engaging in. Let us suppose 
that working hypothesis for a critique of the project of public justification I just 
sketched turned out to be correct. What would be the significance of such a 
result? First of all, it is important to note how there is a sense in which to 
accept that the public reason strategy is bound to fail, and that hence there are 
no chances that an ethically diverse society will have a legitimate government, is 
not inconsistent with maintaining that the liberal legitimacy view is correct. 
Personal autonomy may still be the correct foundational commitment to assume 
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when setting out on the task to provide a philosophical foundation to the 
exercise of political authority, and free (hypothetical) consent to a liberal 
political framework may still be the only device that enables us to realise 
whether that foundational commitment is being honoured. The upshot of such 
a position, of course, would be that most political systems are illegitimate (or at 
least all those regulating the political life of ethically diverse societies, hence all 
liberal regimes, for they bring about conditions of diversity), and that therefore 
the exercise of political authority is hardly ever fully proper. The next question 
would then be what to do about this, and perhaps then how to distinguish 
between different types of illegitimate political frameworks, what is the place of 
considerations of justification, and so on—a rather grim picture. 
 But that is just one way of understanding the moral of the story. In fact, it 
is the correct way of understanding it only if we take the liberal legitimacy view 
in what one may call a ‘passive’ sense, i.e. just as a criterion for institutional 
evaluation (much like a regulative ideal), rather than as an ‘active’ theory, aimed 
at realising a particular political project. Of course, it could be objected, even a 
passive theory, in a sense, shapes political prescriptions, for those trying to 
apply the theory will adjust their policies with the aim of ‘scoring high’ 
according to the theory’s parameters. But still, there is a distinction that can be 
traced between passive and active theories, because an active theory aims to act 
as a blueprint for institutional design, and hence is committed to providing a 
viable normative output, whereas a passive theory is not. To remain in the 
engineering metaphor, the passive approach is not a blueprint, but just a list of 
negative and positive features that can be found on already existing 
blueprints—and the elements in the list do not necessarily add up to a complete 
design. So, if we understand the liberal legitimacy view in the passive sense, 
there is nothing within the view that commits it to ever identifying a well 
grounded polity: all the theory needs to do is to be clear enough to enable us to 
evaluate a given system, to enable us to tell whether it is legitimate or not.46 
Thus not being able to overcome the challenge of diversity (through the idea of 
public reason) would not be a real setback for the view. However, now the 
                                                
46 Notice that, if D’Agostino’s critique were correct, the liberal legitimacy view would not even 
be able to accomplish this task.  
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question naturally arises as to which of these approaches to the philosophical 
enterprise of grounding political authority we should embrace.  And it seems 
quite plausible to me to embrace the active approach, mostly because it is richer 
and more fruitful than the passive one: it can perform the same tasks of 
institutional evaluation as the passive approach, plus it provides us with 
guidance in a larger array of circumstances (or at least it attempts to do so).  
 Hence, if we understand the liberal legitimacy view in the active sense 
(which, by the way, seems to be a sense in which most of its proponents 
understand it), we should evaluate (also) according to its capacity to produce a 
feasible normative output.47 And it becomes evident that the view is unable to 
provide such an output. In fact, as we have seen above, the normative output of 
the view is liberalism, which then brings about the conditions of ethical 
diversity that cause liberalism to fail to meet the requirement of consent. The 
public reason strategy is then deployed to overcome this difficulty; however if 
the working hypothesis advanced here were confirmed and the public reason 
project shown to be unfeasible because of its conflicting desiderata, it would 
follow that the liberal legitimacy view should be abandoned as a foundational 
account of political authority. 
 
 
4. Concluding Observations 
 
4.1 It is time to pause in our exposition and sum up the main points established 
in this chapter. The chapter’s main purpose was to analyse the liberal legitimacy 
                                                
47 The term ‘feasible’ is unclear here. Following Erik O. Wright (see ‘Guidelines for 
Envisioning Realistic Utopias’), we can stipulate that a normative political theory is achievable 
when its prescriptions can be instantiated in political practice; and it is viable when, once 
achieved, it can be sustained over time. We can then further stipulate that a normative political 
theory is feasible when it is both viable and achievable. Those distinctions, in turn, enable us to 
differentiate between two senses in which a normative political theory may be active: a strong 
sense, i.e. when it is feasible, and a weak sense, i.e. when it is merely viable or merely 
achievable. Finally, notice how the above categories have nothing to do with whether a 
normative political theory is desirable, i.e. whether its prescriptions satisfy certain normative 
standards.  
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view’s strategy for fulfilling the consent requirement through the idea of public 
justification, or public reason. We have thus seen how public justification 
should be understood as a (hypothetical) procedure for the conduct of 
deliberation about the design of the political framework. Restraints on such 
procedure are in place (in terms of what sorts of reasons and arguments might 
be deployed), in order to ensure that the citizen’s personal autonomy is not 
infringed upon during the deliberation process. However, theorists disagree as 
to what sort of restraints are most appropriate. Idealistic theories of public 
justification abstract entirely from the reasons actually available to the citizenry, 
and develop rules for the conduct of public deliberation that model the 
participants on what they should be like, from a morally and epistemically laden 
point of view. Realistic theories, on the other hand, maintain that debate should 
be conducted with reasons that are available to the citizenry, taken as they 
actually are. Each of the two types of theory embodies a crucial desideratum of 
this approach, namely the moralistic and the pragmatic desideratum 
respectively.  The former concerns the need to ensure that consent is genuinely 
free, in order to safeguard the foundational normative commitments (e.g. 
autonomy) that gave rise to the consent requirement in the first place. The latter 
concerns the aim of maximising the inclusiveness of the consensus. This 
account of public justification, then, paved the way for advancing a critical 
hypothesis: it is indeed rather clear that the two desiderata are in conflict, and it 
is not at all clear that a satisfactory balance between them will be identifiable. 
That problem, in turn, is connected to a worry about the overall structure of the 
liberal legitimacy view I raised in the previous chapter. As we have seen, the 
view runs into serious difficulties in trying to account for its particular choice of 
trade-off between the two desiderata, i.e. for the particular restrictions it places 
on the conduct of public deliberation. Now, could those difficulties be due to 
the fact that liberal legitimacy theorists devise their conception of public 
justification in such a way that its understanding of free consent tries to 
overcome the view’s structural difficulties about arbitrariness and redundancy 
by making sure that the legitimating force of consent is tied to its being 
expressed in favour of liberal political arrangements? The problem here, of 
course, is that the account of hypothetical consent through public justification 
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seems the wrong place in which to provide an argument for the non-
arbitrariness of the pairing of the two requirements, or for the non-redundancy 
of the consent requirement, as the role of consent is precisely what is disputed. 
Yet such an argument is needed somewhere and, at least so far, we have not 
been able to find it anywhere within the liberal legitimacy view.  
 
4.2 My critical hypothesis against the liberal legitimacy view, of course, prompts 
the further question of whether abandoning the view should also lead us to 
abandoning liberalism at the policy level. In other words, the question is 
whether there are other foundational roads to liberalism. I think we can 
tentatively answer this question in the affirmative. Indeed, as anticipated in the 
introduction, there is an important yet now minoritary strand of liberal theory 
that has always adopted a substantivist48 rather than a contract-based approach 
to the foundations of political authority, based on the appeal of the values 
promoted by and within the liberal state, rather than on the alleged relationship 
of consent between the liberal state and the liberal citizens. To take such a view, 
then, is not to deny that consent should play a role at all in institutional 
evaluation, for the possibility of a relationship of consent may very well prove a 
reliable indicator of the presence of particular virtues in the state. But these are 
all issues for the constructive part49 of the thesis, whereas I still have to carry 
out the critical part. So, as anticipated at the outset of this chapter, in the next 
three chapters I shall consider the three main theories of liberal legitimation 
through public reason I have identified (political liberalism, modus vivendi, and 
justificatory liberalism), in order to see whether my general remarks and worries 
actually apply to the actual positions in the contemporary debate. After that 
critical (in any sense) stage, I will draw some more general conclusions about 
                                                
48 The most famous representative of this line is of course J.S. Mill, whereas its main forebear 
is arguably Hume. More recently this approach has been defended by Joseph Raz (see The 
Morality of Freedom) and others.  
49 I do not intend, of course to argue for a particular form of justification-based liberalism. 
That would be the topic for another thesis. Rather, I just wish to defend the abstract view that 
a purely justification-based account of the foundations of political authority is not 
incompatible with liberalism (a claim many contemporary liberals would no doubt reject), and 
that indeed it provides a better foundation for it. 
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the liberal legitimacy view and its standing with regard to the broader challenge 
of providing a normative foundation for liberal political practice. That, in turn, 
will provide a basis on which to sketch some possible directions of inquiry for 
the positive programme I just hinted at.  
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CHAPTER III 
Political Liberalism 
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
 
0.1 There is little doubt that Rawls’ later work1 constitutes the main driving 
force behind the rise of the liberal legitimacy view as the dominant account of 
political authority in contemporary liberal theory, and thus behind the revival of 
the contract-based liberal tradition.2 Thus Rawls’ ‘political’ liberalism is the 
natural starting point for my critical exploration of the prospects of the various 
versions of this strand of liberal thought. Indeed, as we shall see, the other 
versions of the liberal legitimacy view can be considered largely derivative in 
respect to political liberalism. In this chapter, then, I shall unpack Rawls’ theory 
of liberal legitimacy, place it on the conceptual map of theories of legitimacy I 
presented in the previous chapter, and advance a critique of it. 
 Before embarking on these tasks, a clarification might prove useful in 
order to set the stage: Rawls’ aim in PL is to correct an inconsistency in his 
celebrated theory of ‘justice as fairness’.3 Rawls’ solution to this problem is to 
change the status of justice as fairness from that of a comprehensive moral 
conception of justice to that of a political moral conception (I shall explain the 
meaning of those terms in the next section). He thus explains why such a 
change of status is necessary, spells out the normative requirements of a such a 
                                                
1 I shall focus mainly on Political Liberalism (in this chapter: PL), but also on the earlier essays 
that led to the development of this influential volume (‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory’, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, and ‘The Domain of the Political and 
Overlapping Consensus’), as well as on Rawls’ later restatements and clarifications of his 
theory of legitimacy through public reason: ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ and Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement. 
2 I explain why I do not consider A Theory of Justice the starting point of this revival at the very 
beginning of section 1. 
3 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
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political conception of justice, and argues that justice as fairness is able to cope 
with these requirements (regrettably from the point of view of clarity, he does 
not always keep these three issues separated). Now the interesting thing here is 
that these requirements of legitimacy and consistency, according to Rawls, apply 
to any liberal conception of justice (justice as fairness becomes thus just one out 
of many possible legitimate conceptions of justice), i.e. to the set of normative 
principles characterising the political framework. In other words, in PL he 
intends to provide an account of the foundations of all normative liberal 
political theory. He does this through a theory of liberal legitimacy whose 
requirements, in his view, any liberal conception of justice (such as justice as 
fairness) should satisfy. Here, in presenting the arguments of PL, I shall isolate 
the discussion of the normative requirements of liberalism in general, i.e. of 
liberal legitimacy, from the issue of how justice as fairness copes with them 
(which takes up a great part of the book), and analyze only the former. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to show that Rawls’ theory does not 
satisfy the desiderata of theories of legitimacy I have presented in the previous 
chapter. Indeed, Rawls argues that a political system is well grounded when it is 
stable. As I shall make clear, this notion embodies both pragmatic and moral 
elements; in my reading this is Rawls’ strategy to overcome the tension between 
what we have called the moralistic and the pragmatic desideratum of liberal 
legitimacy theory. However, I shall argue that this attempt is unsuccessful.  
 
0.2 The chapter is structured as follows. I begin (section 1) by presenting the 
main problem that motivates Rawls’ quest for a political conception of justice, 
which I shall call ‘the fundamental question’. I will then provide a brief account 
of the answer to that question, in order to have the structure of political 
liberalism on the table. In section 2 I show how the core of political liberalism 
is constituted by a theory of legitimacy4, and outline the main tenets of this 
theory. With that in place, I move on to offer my critique of the political liberal 
theory of legitimacy: I argue that political liberalism is unable to strike a 
satisfactory balance between the moralistic and the pragmatic desideratum. This 
                                                
4 Burton Dreben was among the first interpreters of Rawls to suggest that the theory of 
legitimacy was the main focus of PL (see ‘On Rawls and Political Liberalism’). 
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point will in turn give us a slightly different angle from which to highlight the 
structural worries about the liberal legitimacy view we discussed in the previous 
chapters. In the third section I review my arguments and provide a brief 
assessment of where those arguments leave us in terms of the larger project of 
assessing the liberal legitimacy view.  
 
 
1. The Structure of Political Liberalism 
 
1.1 The above observation that Political Liberalism marked the beginning of the 
revival of the contract-based liberal tradition might sound surprising. After all, 
Rawls’ earlier and most influential work, A Theory of Justice, was already 
characterised by a contractualist approach. Yet that is hardly relevant here, as 
that work, unlike Political Liberalism, was not about legitimacy and authority, but 
rather about justice. Rawls did not write A Theory of Justice in order to provide a 
liberal theory of justice; justice as fairness is a theory of justice simpliciter. It is 
only later that Rawls realised that, for reasons that will become clearer in this 
chapter, he had to show that justice as fairness could be a legitimate basis for 
the characterisation of a liberal political framework. Political Liberalism, then, 
aims to show precisely that justice as fairness can be understood as being 
compatible with the values that citizens of a liberal democratic society can 
reasonably be expected to hold. At any rate, one should not forget that for 
Rawls there remains a very close link between justice and legitimacy, as he 
maintains that we have a natural duty to obey just institutions (thus this duty 
would provide legitimacy to the exercise of authority on the part of just states).5 
The crucial point, then, is that this duty becomes effective only once we 
recognise just institutions as such—hence the need for a consensus on the 
political framework.6 As will become clearer shortly, that is why, in Rawls’ own 
                                                
5 Rawls refers to this duty as ‘the duty of justice’. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 114ff. and pp. 334-
335. Also cf. PL, pp. 142ff. 
6 In fact, Rawls observes that “Citizens would not be bound to even a just constitution unless 
they have accepted and intend to continue to accept its benefits. Moreover this acceptance 
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words, the main question political liberalism is meant to answer is as follows: 
“How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”7. Rawls calls this problem “the 
question of stability”. This question sets the agenda of political liberalism, and 
Rawls’ answer to it, then, constitutes the whole normative structure of political 
liberalism. Let us first get clear about its various components. As we will see, 
Rawls’ use of the term ‘stability’ is somewhat misleading, for the question 
addresses two distinct (and yet connected) issues: legitimacy and peaceful 
coexistence (or ‘stability’ in the ordinary sense). As we shall see, each of these 
issues addresses the moralistic and the pragmatic desideratum, respectively. But 
before diving into Rawls’ terminology, it will be best to start with a working 
paraphrases of the question, which could be roughly formulated as follows: 
given that the citizens of liberal democratic societies hold reasonable different 
and incompatible conceptions of the good life that regulate all aspects of 
morality, how can they agree on a moral matter such as the principles of justice 
regulating fundamental aspects of their life in society (i.e. what in Chapter I I 
have called ‘the political framework’)? This formulation shows us two important 
components of the conceptual framework of political liberalism, namely that of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine, and that of a political conception of justice 
regulating the basic structure of society. 
 A comprehensive doctrine is a conception of the good that covers all 
aspects of what is valuable in human lives. It can be a religious doctrine, a 
philosophical doctrine, and the like. As for the reasonableness of a 
comprehensive doctrine, suffice it for now to say that it is what makes a 
doctrine worthy of being accommodated in a liberal society. I will discuss how 
and why this is so later on. 
                                                                                                                                 
must be in some appropriate sense voluntary.” (A Theory of Justice, p. 336). Also cf. PL, pp. 
xviiiff. 
7 PL, p. xx. 
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 A political conception of justice is the set of moral rules8 that regulate the 
basic structure of society, that is “society’s main political, constitutional, and 
economic institutions and how they fit together to form a unified scheme of 
social cooperation from one generation to the next”.9 That is ‘the domain of the 
political’: ‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘basic questions of justice’, i.e. what I 
have been calling ‘the political framework’. So notice that a political conception 
is a moral conception, but not a comprehensive one: it is smaller in scope than a 
comprehensive conception, for while the former only applies to the domain of 
the political, the latter, as noted above, regulates all that is valuable in human 
life. Actually, Rawls notes that very few doctrines are fully comprehensive. Most 
doctrines will in fact cover aspects of value that go well beyond the domain of 
the political, and yet not be so fully articulated as to include conceptions of 
everything that is of value in human life (and even if all doctrines were 
comprehensive, it would still be unlikely for most citizens to be willing to 
follow their preferred doctrine to the letter in every circumstance). In these 
cases clearly the problem of stability is less difficult; there will however always 
be some fully comprehensive reasonable doctrines (and citizens fully committed 
to them). Hence, in order to analyze the argument of political liberalism in its 
full development, we shall consider the hard cases. 
 Now the problem is, how can a plurality of (reasonable) comprehensive 
doctrines be accommodated by a single political conception of justice? If a 
                                                
8 Here (following Rawls) I am using ‘moral’ in a rather loose sense, according to which ‘moral’ 
rules are articulated on the basis of certain ‘values’. In the case of a political conception of 
justice, they are ‘political values’ (PL, p. 11n). It is not very clear whether Rawls wants to draw 
a line between prudential, moral and other types of values, so I will assume a rather capacious 
notion of ‘value’, one comprising any ideal or principle informing one’s conception of the 
good life. 
9 PL, p. 11. The definition of the concept (as opposed to a conception) of justice from A Theory of 
Justice could appropriately be employed here: “A characteristic set of principles for assigning 
basic rights and duties and for determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation”. (A Theory of Justice, p. 5). The only difference, in 
PL, is that the scope of justice is narrower and limited to ‘the domain of the political’. It is 
correct to employ this definition because here we are talking about a conception of justice, not 
the conception of justice. On this point also see Rawls’ discussion (ibid.) of the concept-
conception distinction (a distinction derived from H.L.A. Hart’s work). 
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doctrine is comprehensive and thus covers all aspects of morality, there cannot 
be room for a political conception of justice (which is by definition a moral 
conception) by the side of it. The conception of justice cannot be added, as it 
were, to the comprehensive doctrine (precisely because the doctrine is 
comprehensive, all-embracing: it allows for no other authorities in matters of 
morality, and for no other subjects besides those it covers). So, if they are to co-
exist, the two doctrines must coincide. That is to say, the political conception of 
justice must be part of the comprehensive doctrine. Obviously the problem here 
is that while there is a plurality of comprehensive doctrines, for society to be 
well-ordered there must be just one political conception of justice:  
 
...a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, 
philosophical or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive 
use of state power. If we think of political society as a community united 
in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the 
oppressive use of state power is necessary for state power. [...] Call this 
‘the fact of oppression’.10 
 
Clearly a background assumption typical of liberal legitimacy theory is at 
work here: it would be wrong to try to impose a single comprehensive doctrine, 
for that would be only possible through oppression, i.e. through a violation of 
citizens’ personal autonomy. Or, in other words, through a violation of the 
liberal legitimacy view’s consent requirement.  
 
1.2 This problem of achieving convergence without oppression is dealt with 
through the ideas of (i) ‘political constructivism’ and (ii) ‘overlapping 
consensus’: a political conception of justice (i) must be constructed as if it had 
been derived from any reasonable conception of the good, so that (ii) it will be 
capable of becoming the object of  an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. In other words, the political conception of justice 
must be modular: it must be such that it could be grounded in any of the 
                                                
10 PL, p. 37. 
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numerous reasonable comprehensive doctrines. And for this modularity to be 
possible, the political conception must be presented as freestanding:11 
 
While we want a political conception to have a justification by reference 
to one or more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor as 
derived from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society, as 
if this structure were simply another subject to which that doctrine 
applied. [...] We must distinguish between how a political conception is 
presented and its being part of, or as derivable within, a comprehensive 
doctrine. I assume all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to 
which the political conception they accept is somehow related. But a 
distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as 
freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such 
wider background.12  
 
 That is to say that the formulation of the political conception must not 
depend on any comprehensive doctrine, for that would make it unacceptable to 
proponents of other doctrines. Only in this way can an overlapping consensus 
obtain, and it is also in the light of the idea of an overlapping consensus that 
the political conception is neutral with regard to the good, in (at least) two 
senses: (i) the basic structure of society as defined by the political conception 
should not aim at favouring any particular comprehensive doctrine; (ii) as the 
focus of an overlapping consensus, the political conception constitutes common 
ground—i.e. neutral ground—between different and diverging comprehensive 
doctrines.13 The idea of neutrality, together with that of the priority of the right 
over the good, should not be intended as completely forbidding the use of non-
instrumental ideas of the good. Rawls does indeed acknowledge that “the right 
and the good are complementary: no conception of justice can draw entirely 
                                                
11 It may be interesting to note how this idea had been anticipated by Judith Shklar: 
“Liberalism does not in principle have to depend on specific religious or philosophical systems 
of thought. It does not have to choose among them as long as they do not reject toleration.” 
(‘The Liberalism of Fear’, p. 24). 
12 PL, p. 12. 
13 See PL, pp. 192-194.  
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upon one or the other, but must combine both in a definite way.”14 The point of 
liberal neutrality is rather that the ideas of the good employed by the political 
conception of justice must be presented in such a way that does not commit the 
conception of justice to affirming the truth of one particular comprehensive 
doctrine. In other words, the ideas of the good must be political ideas of the 
good, i.e. limited to subjects pertaining to the domain of the political.15 Also one 
should of course not take ‘neutrality about the good’ to mean ‘neutrality about 
morality’: the political conception of justice is a moral conception. The relevant 
opposition, here, is political vs comprehensive, not political vs moral. 
The challenge of political liberalism, then, is to explain exactly how such 
an overlapping consensus can take place. In other words, how one could 
possibly maintain a liberal understanding of politics by the side of a non-liberal 
(religious, philosophical, etc.) understanding of the good life. That problem will 
not be our main focus here—at least not directly. Let me just mention very 
briefly, for the sake of giving an idea of the broader picture of Rawls’ theory 
and linking it with the discussion of public justification of the previous chapter, 
what is the strategy that enables a political conception of justice to become the 
focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
Roughly put, for the overlapping consensus to be possible, the political 
conception (and thus the debates about its subject: ‘constitutional essentials’ 
and ‘questions of basic justice’) must not employ values and ideas that are only 
intelligible or acceptable to proponents of a comprehensive doctrine about 
which reasonable people can be expected to disagree. It must instead be 
                                                
14 Ibid., p. 173. 
15 Thus Rawls says that “The priority of right means that the ideas of the good used must be 
political ideas [...], so that we need not rely on comprehensive conceptions of the good but 
only on ideas tailored to fit within the political conception.” (PL, p. 209). It is hardly possible 
to discuss the plausibility of this notion of political ideas of the good in abstract, without 
reference to a particular conception of justice, for each conception of justice will employ 
different ideas of the good. Rawls discusses the case of the five ideas of the good that can be 
identified in justice as fairness in (PL, Lecture V). Various different uses of the term 
‘neutrality’ are discussed in PL, pp. 190-195. Another useful discussion of the various senses of 
‘neutrality’ (which, just like Rawls’, is largely derived from the work of Ronald Dworkin) is in 
Charles Larmore’s  The Morals of Modernity, pp. 125-127. 
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publicly justified, i.e. expressed in terms of values and ideas implicit in the 
public culture of society; in Rawls’ terminology, it must be expressed in 
compliance with public reason. At this point one might wonder how this translates 
in the terminology set out in chapter II. Are these reasons, in virtue of their 
being implicit in the public culture, available to citizens as they actually are, or 
as they should be? Put another way, is this a primarily realistic or idealistic 
conception of public reason? The latter reading seems to be the most plausible 
one. These ideas may very well be implicit in the public culture, but that does 
not mean that they are available to all citizens, taken as they are. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, they are only available to ‘reasonable’ citizens. 
 Whether or not such an overlapping consensus is possible, and whether or 
not the conception of justice at its focus can be true to the requisites of 
neutrality are the issues that have generated the great majority of the criticisms 
of the project of political liberalism.16 That is in fact a vital problem for the 
assessment of political liberalism, but it is not the one I am interested in here. 
Thus, I shall grant Rawls that there is a sense in which the overlapping 
consensus is possible; what I am interested in, then, is exactly what this sense is. 
Indeed, my concern is whether this possibility can suffice to satisfy the 
desiderata of a liberal theory of legitimacy through public reason I presented in 
the previous chapter.  
 What I have tried to show so far is in fact just that the normative 
structure of political liberalism is designed in order to accommodate reasonable 
pluralism; to return to the terminology introduced in Chapter II, we can say that 
the structure of political liberalism is a response to the challenge of diversity i.e. 
the problem, faced by liberal legitimacy theorists, of providing an account of 
how citizens may converge on a political framework in a society characterised 
by the diversity brought about by the legitimacy theorists’ preferred form of 
                                                
16 Clearly another main issue of the debate on Rawls’ political liberalism has been the ability of 
the theory of justice as fairness can abide by the standards of political legitimacy set out in PL. 
This issue is in fact the main concern of PL as intended by Rawls. Here however, as I stated in 
the introductory section, I am concerned only with the framework of requirements of political 
legitimacy, and not with its application to any particular conception of justice (such as justice 
as fairness).  
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political organisation. The conception of justice, for instance, needs to be 
political and not comprehensive precisely because the doctrines held by the 
citizens are comprehensive and plural. And the ‘politicity’ of a conception of 
justice is what makes it justifiable. In other words, the question of stability 
comes into play and sets the agenda of political liberalism only once we take 
reasonable pluralism seriously, i.e. when we realise that it is appropriate and 
necessary for a conception of justice to accommodate a plurality of 
incompatible reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A question, at this point, 
arises quite naturally: we know from our account of the challenge of diversity 
that a liberal political framework should seek to accommodate ethical diversity 
in order to secure the consensus of the citizenry, however—in the case of 
neutralistic political liberalism—why precisely that measure of ethical diversity 
defined through the idea of reasonable comprehensive doctrines? As we shall 
see, answering this question (which of course is just another way of addressing 
the worries about the arbitrariness and circularity of the liberal legitimacy view 
we discussed in Chapters I and II) will reveal a crucial aspect of the theoretical 
structure Rawls deploys in order to establish the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus. 
 However, before turning directly to this problem, it will be useful to look 
at political liberalism’s fundamental question more closely. At the beginning of 
this section I anticipated that the fundamental question, the question of 
stability, can be understood as resulting from the combination of two problems, 
namely the problem of stability and that of legitimacy. Alternatively, and 
perhaps more precisely, we may say that Political Liberalism’s account of 
legitimacy incorporates an account of stability. In the next section, then, I shall 
explain why this is so, and how. That is to say, I shall provide an account of 
both issues, and show how they are connected to each other in the fundamental 
question.  
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2. Stability for the Right Reasons 
 
2.1 It is now time to understand what Rawls means when he says that the 
fundamental question of political liberalism is that of ‘stability’. There is an 
intuitive sense in which the fundamental question concerns stability (in the 
ordinary sense of the term), in that it asks about the ‘existence over time’ of a 
‘stable society’ of citizens ‘profoundly divided by incompatible moral doctrines’. 
One might in fact think that stability is just about making society’s institutions 
persist in spite of conflicts between ethically diverse citizens. This familiar sense 
of ‘stability’, however, is not Rawls’—indeed, he does from time to time specify 
that he is interested in a special kind of stability, which he refers to as “stability 
for the right reasons”17. But then what exactly does ‘stability’ mean in the 
context of political liberalism? Strictly speaking stability has to do with the 
motivation, on the part of the citizens, to comply with the conception of justice 
regulating the basic structure of society. More precisely, the general problem of 
stability concerns how citizens can develop and maintain a sense of justice such 
that they will be motivated to comply with the conception of justice regulating 
the basic structure.18 What is important to point out here is that, as noted 
above, the stability required by the standards of justification of political 
liberalism is not merely—or perhaps even primarily—a pragmatic matter. It 
does not have to do just with the pragmatic problem of securing social order 
and avoiding the outburst of open, perhaps violent conflicts between 
individuals or groups divided by incompatible comprehensive doctrines.19 (A 
social order supported only by a necessarily contingent equilibrium of power 
between conflicting comprehensive doctrines is termed by Rawls a ‘modus 
vivendi’.) Hence the sense of justice that should cause the citizens to honour 
the political conception of justice is not to be understood as stemming just 
from prudential considerations, but rather from moral ones. But why is 
                                                
17 See PL, pp. xlii, 388n, 390, 392. 
18 Ibid., pp. 141ff. 
19 It is important to stress this point because the formulation of the question of stability for 
political liberalism has led many commentators to see a Hobbesian Rawls, seeking just the 
avoidance of conflict. 
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prudence-based, modus vivendi-stability not enough?20 Answering this question 
will lead us towards the second issue implicit in the fundamental question of 
political liberalism, legitimacy, and it will show the connection between both 
issues. 
 Modus vivendi-stability is not acceptable because it would violate a 
requirement that any liberal political conception of justice must comply with. 
This requirement is what Rawls calls ‘the liberal principle of legitimacy’.21 The 
liberal principle of legitimacy, of course, is a moral principle. The thought 
behind the liberal principle of legitimacy is quite familiar. In a liberal democratic 
regime the citizens are viewed as free and equal, and political power is exercised 
by them jointly, precisely in virtue of their freedom and equality. Hence any use 
of political power that is not presented in a way that citizens could be 
reasonably expected to endorse ‘for the right reasons’ does not respect their 
freedom and equality. To repeat, the citizens’ freedom and equality are the only 
legitimate sources of political authority, and the use of political power must, as 
it were, be accountable to them.22 Thus the liberal principle of legitimacy is a 
moral principle in the sense that it stems from a moral conception of persons as 
free and equal and as possessing the two moral powers of forming and 
exercising a sense of justice and a conception of the good.23 (As it should be 
                                                
20 It is actually not completely clear whether Rawls thinks, as I will argue below, that there is a 
moral veto on modus vivendi arrangements, as he never says this explicitly. He does explicitly 
affirm, however, that the overlapping consensus is not a modus vivendi, (PL pp. 146ff), in 
virtue of its “moral object and moral grounds” (ibid. p. 148). Hence I take it that this ‘is’ can be 
read as an ‘ought’, in the sense that a consensus that does not satisfy the requirements of 
stability of legitimacy is morally unjustified. 
21 On the centrality of the problem of legitimacy for political liberalism, see Dreben, ‘On Rawls 
and Political Liberalism’. 
22 As clarified by the quotation below, this does not mean that every political decision must be 
such that citizens could be expected to directly endorse it (that would leave no room at all for 
the democratic confrontation of different political outlooks). This endorsement is however 
granted indirectly through the endorsement of the constitutional system that makes every 
political decision possible and legitimate. 
23 This conception of the person must in turn be presented as a purely political one, i.e. not 
dependent on any controversial metaphysical doctrine and thus publicly intelligible for 
reasonable and rational citizens. In PL, pp. 29-35 Rawls explains in some detail how the 
III – Political Liberalism 
 84 
clear, in Rawls’ theory this conception performs the function of what in the 
previous chapter I vaguely referred to as the value of personal autonomy: it 
provides the premises from which the appeal of the legitimacy view flows.) As 
we have already seen, Rawls formulates the principle as follows: 
 
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. This is the liberal 
principle of legitimacy.24 
 
Rawls also refers to this principle as ‘criterion of reciprocity’:  
 
“By what ideals and principles, then, are citizens as sharing equally in 
ultimate political power to exercise that power so that each of them can 
reasonably justify their political decisions to each other?” 
    “The answer is given by the criterion of reciprocity: our exercise of 
political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we 
offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as 
justification of those actions.”25  
 
In a footnote, then, Rawls explains that this criterion of reciprocity “is a 
duty arising from the idea of reasonableness of persons...”.26 The fact that the 
idea of reasonableness can generate duties indicates its moral connotation.27 The 
idea here is that if a liberal democratic state wants to take its citizens’ freedom 
and equality seriously, its political life must be regulated by a constitution upon 
which the citizens can freely agree, as equals. That rules out the modus vivendi 
                                                                                                                                 
conception of the person employed in justice as fairness can be presented in such a way. The 
two moral powers and the way they help defining the conception of the citizens as free and 
equal are discussed specifically in PL, pp. 81ff.  
24 PL, p. 137.  
25 PL, p. xlvi. 
26 Ibid., xlvin, my italics 
27 I shall come back to this rather important point in the next section. On the morality of the 
reasonable see Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, pp. 231ff. 
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constitutional agreement because it does not stem from a freely endorsed moral 
conception of justice, but rather from the necessity of preventing open conflict 
(in a sense, choosing a modus vivendi arrangement is like ‘choosing’ to give up 
one’s wallet at gunpoint). Given then that a modus vivendi would be illegitimate 
from a liberal point of view,28 we need to find a moral conception of justice. (I 
take it that, as Locke suggested with regard to religious doctrines, a moral 
conception is something one can only endorse freely or not endorse at all—one 
can of course be forced to act on an unendorsed moral conception, but that is 
precisely what the liberal principle of legitimacy tries to avoid as much as 
possible.)29 
 Now the problem, as we know, is indeed that the moral conception of 
political justice is part of one’s comprehensive doctrine, but there is no 
agreement, in liberal societies, on comprehensive doctrines. Combining the 
liberal ideal of legitimacy with the fact of reasonable pluralism, then, we arrive 
at the formulation of the question of stability we saw at the outset of our 
discussion: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”30 At this point we 
already know Rawls’ answer to the question, but it is important to reflect on it 
in order to shed light on two related matters. Firstly, as it should become clear 
shortly, this question is Rawls’ way of introducing his strategy for responding to 
what I have labelled the challenge of diversity. Secondly, the combination of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy and of the question of stability in the light of the 
fact of reasonable pluralism makes the question of stability a moral question, at 
least in part. In fact, now that we are acquainted with Rawls’ liberal principle of 
legitimacy and with its connection to the problem of stability, we can see how 
the fundamental question of political liberalism does not just ask whether 
people can peacefully co-exist notwithstanding their divisions on matters of the 
                                                
28 Whether Rawls is right on this point will be the object of Chapter IV. 
29 ‘As much as possible’ in the sense that the principle will nonetheless sanction the imposition 
of a moral conception upon unreasonable citizens. As Rawls puts it, unreasonable doctrines 
should be ‘contained’ (PL, p. xix). 
30 Ibid., p. xx. 
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good life (a modus-vivendi arrangement would be enough to answer this 
question affirmatively). He mentions instead a “just society of free and equal 
citizens”, thus referring to the liberal political moral conception of the person 
the liberal principle of legitimacy is meant to protect:   
 
The kind of stability required of justice as fairness [and thus of any other 
legitimate liberal conception of justice] is based, then, on its being a liberal 
political view, one that aims at being acceptable to citizens as reasonable 
and rational as well as free and equal, and so as addressed to their public 
reason. [...] If justice as fairness were not expressly designed to gain the 
reasoned support of citizens who affirm reasonable although conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines –the existence of such comprehensive doctrines 
being a feature of the kind of public culture that liberal conception itself 
encourages—it would not be liberal.31 
 
 And to be liberal (i.e., for Rawls, to comply with the liberal principle of 
legitimacy), we have seen, is a moral matter. To sum up: the question of stability 
is (also) a moral question because its formulation depends on a moral 
conception of the citizens as free and equal that is at the core of any liberal 
theory of legitimacy (it is in this sense that Rawls sometimes uses the phrase 
“stability for the right reasons”). In other words, political liberalism must 
respond to the question of stability and thus accommodate reasonable pluralism 
through a shared moral political conception of justice because imposing on free 
and equal citizens a conception of justice they cannot endorse would fail the 
test of liberal legitimacy. However, it is important to point out how the question 
is not purely a moral one: there is a pragmatic aspect to it, for the very form of 
the question shows that Rawls wants to argue that it is possible for “a stable and 
just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” to exist and 
persist.32 This aspect, of course, is driven by what (in Chapter II) we have 
termed the pragmatic desideratum of a theory of liberal legitimacy. Below I shall 
                                                
31 PL, p. 143. 
32 I take it that what Rawls has in mind is not mere logical possibility, which does not seem 
enough in the context of normative political theory. 
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come back to this issue, which will play a crucial role in my critique of the 
Rawlsian project; in order to see why this is the case, however, we need to get 
clear about another aspect of Rawls’ theory, namely his notion of reasonableness. 
Indeed, reasonableness plays a very important role in the structure of political 
liberalism’s theory of legitimacy, because, as we shall see shortly, it ensures that 
the agreement obtained through an overlapping consensus will meet the 
requirements posed by the theory’s moralistic desiderata: it ensures that the 
agreement will be an agreement between free and equal citizens, i.e. an 
agreement that preserves personal autonomy, the foundational commitment we 
have identified as the central moral commitment of the liberal legitimacy view. 
In other words, by shaping the rules for the conduct of public deliberation (for 
only reasonable citizens may take part in the procedure), reasonableness 
specifies what it takes for consent to qualify as genuinely free consent.  
 
2.2 Analysing the content of the notion of reasonableness brings us back to the 
question we left open at the end of the previous section: why does a liberal 
political conception of justice have to be designed in such a way that it can 
accommodate ethical diversity to the extent that it is reasonable? It could appear 
that the question has been answered in the previous section, in so far as we 
have seen the connection between the question of stability, reasonable 
pluralism, and the liberal principle of legitimacy. Actually, to some extent it has 
been answered. Reversing the argument we have just seen, in fact, we could say 
that reasonable pluralism should be accommodated in virtue of its being the 
product of the exercise of the free reason of the citizens: if, as good liberals 
should do, we want to take the citizen’s freedom and equality seriously, we have 
to respect the outcome of the free exercise of their moral powers,33 namely 
reasonable pluralism. This might be an answer to our question. However, on 
closer inspection, it does not seem a very satisfactory one. In fact, it does not 
explain precisely in what sense reasonable pluralism is to be accommodated as an 
instantiation, as it were, of the freedom and equality of the citizens, whereas 
‘unreasonable’ comprehensive doctrines should not be tolerated. In other 
words, despite the fact that any conception of the good actually existing in a 
                                                
33 On the two moral powers of the citizens see PL, pp. 81ff. 
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liberal society is produced by the free exercise of human reason, only the 
reasonable ones ought to be accommodated in the liberal polity. Why is this? 
Clearly in order to answer the question properly we must analyse the notion of 
reasonableness. We start by looking at how Rawls characterises reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines: 
  
This fact of reasonable pluralism must be distinguished from the fact of 
pluralism as such [...]. [Reasonable comprehensive doctrines] are not 
simply the upshot of self- and class interest, or of people’s understandable 
tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint.34 
 
 This points towards the idea that, as noted above, a reasonable doctrine 
should not be accommodated simply because it is expressed by a free and equal 
citizen under free institutions, but rather because there is something in it, qua 
reasonable, that makes it more valuable than just any conception of the good that 
might be conceived under free institutions. The value of the doctrine, what 
makes it worthy of accommodation in the liberal polity, is its reasonableness. In 
fact, Rawls also refers to reasonableness as a political virtue that grounds liberal 
toleration:  
 
...The idea of the reasonable especially, whether applied to persons, 
institutions or doctrines, easily becomes vague and obscure. I try to 
mitigate this by fixing on two basic aspects of the reasonable as a virtue of 
persons engaged in social cooperation among equals. I then develop from those 
two aspects the content of the reasonable. I examine next how doing this 
provides a basis for toleration in a society marked by reasonable 
pluralism.35 
 
 But what exactly does this reasonableness consist in? What is its 
connection with liberal toleration? In order to answer these questions, let us 
have a quick look at those two key aspects of reasonableness. They are (i) “the 
willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 37. 
35 Ibid., 48, my italics. 
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others do”, and (ii) “the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and 
to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the 
legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.”36  
 So, first, a reasonable person will not be guided and motivated just by the 
pursuit of his or her own self-interest, but will also possess “the particular form 
of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as 
such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might be reasonably expected 
to endorse”.37 This feature of reasonableness is connected to the citizen’s moral 
power of having a sense of justice,38 and builds into reasonableness a moral 
commitment that, as we will see below, ties it up with core values of political 
liberalism: “Reasonable persons [...] desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they, as  free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept.”39 
 In order to understand the second point we need to get clear about the 
notion of ‘the burdens of judgment.’ This notion is strictly connected to that of 
reasonable pluralism, so it is quite important for our main focus here. The 
burdens of judgment are introduced in order to account for how reasonable 
people can fail to reach an agreement about a comprehensive moral doctrine. 
These burdens are “the many hazards involved in the correct (and 
conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary 
course of political life.”40 The important point here is that reasonable citizens, in 
acknowledging the burdens of judgment, realise that free cooperation between 
equals—which is required by (i)—is only possible if political discourse (at least 
when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake) is 
conducted in terms that are intelligible and acceptable to every other reasonable 
citizen: “reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 54. 
37 Ibid., p. 51. 
38 Ibid., p. 52. 
39 With regard to this, Mulhall and Swift noted that “on Rawls’ understanding of the term, no 
one can be reasonable unless they accept the conception of the person and of society that is 
the irreducible core of political liberalism.” (Liberals and Communitarians, p. 236). 
40 These sources of disagreement are listed in PL, pp. 56-57. 
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can be reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty 
of conscience and freedom of thought.”41  
 These points show us not only that the notion of reasonableness has a 
strong moral connotation, but also that it is connected with distinctively liberal 
conceptions of the person and of society: 
  
Observe that here being reasonable is not an epistemological idea (though 
it has epistemological elements). 42 Rather, it is part of a political ideal of 
democratic citizenship that includes the idea of public reason. The content 
of this ideal includes what free and equal citizens as reasonable can require 
of each other with respect to their reasonable comprehensive views.43 
 
 Now we see why political liberalism must accommodate reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines: they are doctrines that share a liberal understanding 
of politics, an understanding of politics involving the idea of fair cooperation 
and, most importantly, the idea of free and equal citizenship. In other words, 
every reasonable person, on Rawls’ notion of reasonableness, is a political 
liberal. Hence clearly political liberalism would be self-defeating were it not able 
to accommodate all reasonable persons (and their doctrines). But political 
liberalism does not have this problem, for the notion of reasonableness is 
constructed in such a way that reasonable people will in fact be motivated to 
seek an overlapping consensus between their comprehensive doctrines. It is the 
very definition of reasonableness, in fact, that requires them to be committed to 
seek fair terms of cooperation between free and equals, and that makes them 
realise (through the acknowledgment of the burdens of judgment) that such 
terms of cooperation cannot be based on a shared comprehensive moral 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 61. 
42 Another point that makes clear why the concepts of reasonableness and of the burdens of 
judgement are characterised more morally than epistemologically  (though they do feature 
epistemological elements) is given by Rawls’ discussion of why the overlapping consensus of 
reasonable doctrines cannot be grounded on some form of scepticism about morality and the 
good, for scepticism is too controversial a doctrine for serving as a basis for such consensus 
(Ibid., pp. 150-154; on how this relates to the burdens of judgment see pp. 62-63).  
43 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
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doctrine. In other words, it is the very definition of reasonableness that 
commits them to political liberalism. So the answer to what we termed the 
fundamental question, “how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable 
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”, becomes 
simple: it is possible, provided that we define these reasonable doctrines, qua 
reasonable, as committed to “a stable and just society of free and equal 
citizens”. 
 It now becomes clear why the notion of reasonableness is deployed: the 
idea is that reasonable citizens, in virtue of their commitment to treating other 
as free and equals, will not agree on a conception of justice regulating the 
political framework which violates the personal autonomy of their fellow 
citizens. However, clearly someone’s autonomy will be violated, namely that of 
unreasonable citizens.44  The challenge here for Rawls, then, is to justify this 
exclusion in a non-arbitrary way, i.e. he needs to account for the reasons why a 
determinate subset of the citizenry are included in the consensus, and determinate 
others are not. It is not clear to me that he succeeds in this task, or indeed that 
he can succeed. On my reading of his theory, Rawls could tackle that challenge 
in two ways: (i) he could argue that the grounds for excluding the unreasonable 
citizens are given by the fact that otherwise there would be no agreement, or 
that (ii) his particular account of reasonableness is the only one that ensures 
genuinely free consent. Yet both lines of argument are problematic. In the case 
of (i), note how Rawls attempts to justify a failure in fully meeting the moralistic 
desideratum by appeal to the need of satisfying the pragmatic desideratum, too. 
                                                
44 It is important to note that it has been convincingly argued that unreasonable citizens make 
up a far greater proportion of the citizenry even of liberal democratic societies than Rawls 
seems prepared to acknowledge. For example, while Rawls maintains that most mainstream, 
non-fundamentalist christian outlooks are reasonable comprehensive doctrines, Leif Wenar has 
show that this is not the case with the Roman Catholic religion (see ‘Political Liberalism: An 
Internal Critique’). This example is important because it would probably be excessively 
demanding to require that every single citizen should be included in the consensus: surely there 
are uncontroversially unreasonable citizens, in the ordinary sense of the term. But, as Wenar’s 
work shows, Rawls’ account of reasonableness rules out conceptions of the good that are 
widely held and commonly regarded as mainstream.   
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Reasonableness, he may say, is deployed in order to identify the largest pool 
possible of citizens who can consent (at least hypothetically) to a political 
framework without forfeiting their personal autonomy. It seems to me that that 
would be a good answer to a pragmatic problem, but it does not break any ice 
as far as the moral problem is concerned. What is perhaps more, it brings us 
back to the worry about the arbitrariness of the pairing of the liberal legitimacy 
view’s two desiderata: even if we argue that the pairing is necessary for the sake 
of securing an agreement, we are still short of an argument for why securing an 
agreement should be our primary concern. As for (ii), the problem is that, if 
Rawls went down that route, he would have to commit to the view that consent 
can only be free when expressed in favour of a liberal political framework, given 
that we have seen that to be reasonable, for Rawls, equals being committed to 
upholding a liberal political framework.45 But that move would only bring us 
back to the worry about the redundancy of the consent requirement.  
Here Rawls may be tempted to reply that his theory sits in a comfortable 
middle ground between these two pitfalls. However, in order to be able to say 
that, he should demonstrate that the boundaries of reasonableness have not 
been set arbitrarily (in this sense I said, at the end of the previous section, that 
Rawls should justify the exclusion of unreasonable doctrines in a way that does 
not depend on his pre-existing commitment to the safeguard of liberal values as 
such), but there is no trace of such an argument in PL or in his most recent 
work on these issues. Thus, in a society characterised by a level of persistent 
ethical diversity such as that present in contemporary Western societies, there 
are little if any hopes to ground the exercise of political authority through 
anything like political liberalism’s theory of legitimacy. 
In the light of those points, a further observation is worth making, in 
order to reinforce the worries I advanced so far. Imagine (counterfactually) that 
the society addressed by political liberalism’s theory of legitimacy were ethically 
homogeneous enough for us to be able to say that a sufficient percentage of the 
                                                
45 It is this ‘positive’ aspect of Kantian-derived conceptions of freedom and autonomy that 
made many early liberals highly suspicious of Kant (See Raymond Geuss, ‘Liberalism and Its 
Discontents’, pp. 16-17). In fact, it is only after Rawls’ contributions that it has become 
common to count Kant among the key exponents of the liberal tradition.  
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citizens is reasonable. In this case, we may say that, on the liberal legitimacy 
view, the political framework is indeed legitimate. But the important question 
would then be: does the (hypothetical) consent of the citizenry carry out at least 
part of the task of legitimating liberal political authority, or is that job done by 
the fact the normative constraints imposed on the consensus through the 
notion of reasonableness ensure that the agreement will be respectful of the 
core liberal axiological commitments of freedom, equality, and autonomy? 
Indeed, a close inspection of the theory, such as the one carried out throughout 
this chapter, reveals that the fact that the citizens happen to be reasonable, and 
thus hypothetically consent to the political framework in Rawls’ intended way, is 
entirely contingent. What does the work needed to ground political authority, 
then, are the liberal values embedded in the notion of reasonableness, rather 
than the fact that citizens consent. So it seems that, while Rawls’ theory’s 
structure requires a form of consensus voluntaristic enough to carry some 
independent normative force, the form of hypothetical consent through public 
justification it envisages hardly meets that requirement. That is because it may 
very well be the case that citizens happen to hypothetically consent to the 
political system, but whether they do or not is indifferent, as far as the theory is 
concerned—yet another angle on the worry about the redundancy of the 
consent requirement, and on the general structural deficiencies of the liberal 
legitimacy view.  
Finally, it may be interesting to note how my proposed reading and 
criticism of PL may provide an insight into one controversy among interpreters 
and critics of Rawls’ later work (hopefully this should also clarify my own 
interpretation). In fact, it is possible to classify some readers of PL as favouring 
a moralistic interpretation, and others as favouring a pragmatic one. Larry 
Krasnoff constitutes one of the best examples of the former approach, whereas 
Leif Wenar and Jürgen Habermas are quite representative of the latter, albeit in 
rather different ways.46 Now, if my interpretation is correct, it follows that there 
is some truth on both sides of the debate, and that it is Rawls’ own failure to 
                                                
46 See Krassnoff, ‘Consensus, Stability and Normativity in Rawls’ Political Liberalism’, Wenar, 
‘Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique’, and Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public 
Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism’. 
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resolve the tension between the moralistic and the pragmatic aspirations of his 
theory that could explain why some of his readers, perhaps in an attempt to 
identify a more coherent theory than what Rawls actually offered, have been led 
to disregard the one or the other of the two vital and yet fatal aspects of Rawls’ 
theory.   
 
 
3. Concluding Observations  
 
3.1 Let us now conclude by very briefly recapitulating the main points seen in 
this chapter, and taking a look at what lies ahead. We started out by observing 
how the core business—as it were—of Rawls’ Political Liberalism is to present a 
theory of legitimacy for liberal polities, and that this particular theory is indeed 
the blueprint for contemporary liberal legitimacy theory. We have also seen that 
Rawls’ reason for putting forward such a theory is that even a just state acquires 
full legitimacy only if it is consented-to by its citizenry—a consensus which, in 
Rawls’ view, is achieved through the idea of public justification to reasonable 
citizens. The main problem in securing such a consensus, though, emerges once 
we realise that the freedom afforded by liberal democratic societies leads to the 
emergence and persistence of wide ethical diversity. The idea of public reason is 
then introduced in order to devise a standpoint from which the political 
framework can be seen as justified in terms of values present in the public 
culture of such a society—that is done through an account of the rules for 
public deliberation that would have had to be followed to arrive at the presently 
justified political framework, and that will have to be followed when debating 
changes to it. Yet these rules also have to ensure that the consensus obtained is 
free in a relevant way, i.e. that the personal autonomy of the citizens will be 
safeguarded throughout the deliberation process. Thus Rawls introduces the 
notion of reasonableness: only reasonable citizens may take part in the 
deliberation, and to be reasonable means to be committed to respecting the 
freedom and equality of other citizens. Here, however, we have noted how this 
account of reasonableness is problematic, as it arbitrarily builds liberal 
outcomes into the deliberation procedure—for what is it to be committed to 
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the freedom and equality of one’s fellow citizens if not to be a liberal? Now that 
is problematic because there is no argument within Rawls’ theory accounting for 
why we can place exactly those constraints on public reason. In other words, 
either it is not clear why only consent to liberal institutions and policies 
produces legitimacy, or ‘free consent’ is constructed in such a way as to result 
genuinely free only when expressed in favour of liberal institutions and policies, 
thus becoming rather redundant. Hence we have seen that the problems 
inherent  in Rawls’ account of legitimacy through public justification map onto 
the structural worries about the liberal legitimacy view we had flagged in 
Chapter I and discussed further in Chapter II. 
 
3.2 So, where does that leave us as regards the wider critique of the liberal 
legitimacy view? We have noted that Rawls’ political liberalism is the standard 
from which all theories of liberal legitimacy take their inspiration. The challenge 
for those theories, then, will be to preserve the general structure of the view 
(i.e. the conjunction of the two requirements of consent and justification as a 
test for legitimacy), whilst avoiding the pitfalls we have identified in Rawls’ 
version of the view. In other words, the question is whether the problems 
encountered by Rawls’ account are simply due to the way in which he defined 
certain component of his theory (chiefly, one would think, the notion of 
reasonableness), or whether it is the deeper structure of the theory that is 
somehow defective. In the following two chapters we will look at two attempts 
to salvage the structure of the view, namely modus vivendi-based liberal 
legitimacy theory, and ‘justificatory’ liberalism. In the light of those discussions, 
then, in Chapter VI I shall provide a final assessment of the liberal legitimacy 
view.   
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CHAPTER IV 
Modus Vivendi  
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
  
0.1 A framework for the exercise of political authority is grounded in a modus 
vivendi when its main features can be hypothetically presented as designed and 
adjusted over time through a virtually unrestricted bargaining process between 
the competing individuals and groups that make up the society.1  
In this chapter I consider whether a political framework2 grounded in a 
modus vivendi could or should be appealing to theorists who subscribe to the 
liberal legitimacy view. That is the view that—let us remind ourselves—liberal 
political authority is properly exercised only if those subject to it have in some 
sense freely consented to be in such a condition. The basic idea is that a 
legitimate political framework need not just embody liberal values; for political 
authority to be properly exercised we also need the free consent of the citizenry. 
As we have seen, most versions of the liberal legitimacy view understand the 
notion of agreement or consent as a hypothetical one: the problem becomes one 
of being able to present the basic structure of society as one that citizens could 
(or should) freely consent to. And that is indeed the sort of consent relation I 
shall discuss here. Finally, by ‘free’ consent (as opposed to consent simpliciter) I 
understand a form of consent that preserves the consenting individuals’ personal 
autonomy.3 And here, of course, is where the link between the legitimacy view 
                                                
1 For a more accurate definition of modus vivendi, see the beginning of the next section. 
2 Recall that by ‘political framework’ I mean what Rawls refers to as ‘the basic structure of 
society’, i.e. ‘constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice’. See Political Liberalism, p. 
10. 
3 Again, let us keep in mind that ‘personal autonomy’ should be understood as an umbrella term 
here: I use it as a conventional placeholder for the foundational commitments and core values 
that are typical of contemporary liberalism, and that are deployed by different theorists in order 
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and the idea of public reason, or public justification is forged. For the moment, 
let us just quickly look at Rawls’ take on this issue. Immediately after offering his 
definition of the liberal principle of legitimacy, he goes on to note that “Only a 
political conception of justice that all citizens might be reasonably expected to 
endorse can serve as a basis of public reason and justification.”4 So the idea is 
that principles endorsed by reasonable citizens, on an adequate characterisation 
of reasonableness, can be presented as enjoying the hypothetical consent of the 
citizenry. 
Crudely put, the attraction of the modus vivendi-approach for legitimacy 
theorists can be understood as lying mainly in the idea that a modus vivendi can 
be presented as enjoying legitimacy through public justification, for it can be 
understood as a consensus resulting from political bargaining between competing 
individuals and parties. The connection between the legitimacy view and the idea 
of public justification, or public reason,5 is by now a familiar one. In this chapter 
I shall discuss in some detail exactly how one may construct a conception of 
public reason or public justification that can present a modus vivendi based-
political framework as publicly justified, and thus legitimate.  
 If that is too crude or too abstract (or both), consider what is perhaps a 
more general way to present the appeal of the modus vivendi approach to liberal 
legitimacy theory. In recent work, John Gray proposed to abandon the stream of 
liberal thought that defends liberalism as ‘the pursuit of an ideal form of life’, in 
favour of an alternative, broadly Hobbesian approach, which presents liberalism 
as appealing in virtue of its enabling ‘the search of peace among different ways 
of life’.6 Regardless of whether this taxonomy of liberalisms captures the 
diversity of this political tradition, and regardless of the extent to which Gray is 
directly concerned with issues of legitimacy, it remains worthwhile to ask 
whether the idea at the core of Gray’s theory of modus vivendi can be deployed 
                                                                                                                                  
to motivate their adherence to liberal legitimacy theory—e.g., a certain conception of the person 
as free and equal (as in Rawls), a notion of human flourishing, and the like. 
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. 
5 I shall continue to use ‘public reason’ and ‘public justification’ interchangeably. 
6 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 2. Also see ‘Pluralism and Toleration in Contemporary 
Political Philosophy.  
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in support of the project of grounding liberal political authority through a theory 
of legitimacy by public reason. As a matter of fact, Gray does not discuss the 
issues of legitimacy and consent. It could be argued, however, that some concern 
with these problems is implicit in his case for modus vivendi, at least on a 
plausible reading of it. In fact, Gray repeatedly stresses that he does not defend 
modus vivendi qua pursuit of a super-value (peaceful coexistence and the like): 
‘The case for modus vivendi is not that it is some kind of transcendent value which 
all ways of life are bound to honour. It is that all or nearly all ways of life have 
interests that make peaceful coexistence worth pursuing.’7 The idea, then, seems 
to be that the fact of agreement between adherents of different forms of life that 
does carry (some) normative legitimating force, rather than just the particular 
values promoted by such agreement. However, for the fact of agreement to play 
this legitimating role, we need to value some conception of personal autonomy, 
but discussing this would bring us to a different level of analysis. Indeed, the 
point here is just that there is a sense in which Gray’s theory of modus vivendi 
can be read as an attempt to ground liberal political authority in virtue of its 
being the focus of a consensus, and—for our purposes—this is enough to enable 
us to read Gray as a liberal legitimacy theorist. That is not to deny that there are, 
in Gray’s recent writings on this subjects, several passages pulling in other 
directions; the point is just that his core insight can be deployed in order to 
understand the appeal of the idea of modus vivendi to legitimacy theorists.8 
 Indeed, in order to understand the relevance of the problem at stake in this 
chapter within the context of the contemporary debates on the foundations of 
liberalism, it is worth observing how a thought quite similar to Gray’s—the idea 
that liberal political frameworks are best defended simply as a minimal 
procedural medium for the adjudication of disputes between competing interests 
and conceptions of the good—seems to lie at the heart of many critiques of 
Rawlsian approaches to liberal legitimacy: many theorists defend modus vivendi 
as an account of the foundations of political authority as a reaction to what they 
                                                
7 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 134. 
8 For an extensive discussion of many aspects of Gray’s position, see the essays by George 
Crowder, Peter Jones and John Horton (and Gray’s replies) in John Horton and Glen Newey 
(eds), The Political Theory of John Gray.  
IV – Modus Vivendi 
 99 
regard as an excessive distance between Rawls’ prescriptions for the conduct of 
political deliberation  and the actual political practice of most contemporary 
liberal democracies.9 These complaints register a certain dissatisfaction with the 
restrictions Rawls poses on the deliberative process in order to safeguard the 
liberal normative commitments of freedom, equality and autonomy; in other 
words, they accuse Rawls of ‘rigging’ the deliberative process in order to ensure 
an outcome which will be friendly to the traditional liberal ideology. This worry 
has been poignantly formulated by Thomas Nagel:  
 
Part of the problem is that liberals ask of everyone a certain 
restraint in calling for the use of state power to further specific, 
controversial moral or religious conceptions—but the results of 
that restraint appear with suspicious frequency to favour precisely 
the controversial moral conceptions that liberals usually hold.10 
  
 In other words, under the pretence of implementing a neutral procedure for 
the adjudication of political disputes, neutralistic liberalism delivers an in-built 
bias in favour of certain substantial normative commitments (impartiality, 
equality, secularism, and so on). That observation naturally gives rise to the 
question as to what exactly the connection between the liberal legitimacy view 
and the idea of liberal neutrality is. Roughly speaking—for a full discussion of 
this issue would take us too far from our current focus—we can begin to note 
that the connection is not one of strict implication: one could support neutrality 
on the grounds that it produces a state characterised by certain virtues (e.g. 
impartiality and reciprocity)—in this way neutrality would be supported by 
considerations of justification rather than of legitimacy, for there would be no 
appeal to the consent of the citizenry.  However, contemporary liberal theory 
presents us far more often with legitimacy-based defences of neutrality: the 
                                                
9 For example, defenders of ‘procedural’ (liberal) democracy often use similar arguments in their 
attacks on ‘deliberative’ democrats such as Rawls. On procedural vs. deliberative democracy, see 
Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’. Recall, however, that in 
my reading Rawls hardly counts as a full deliberative democrat, even though he does have room 
for deliberative elements in his account of liberal legitimacy (see Chapter I, section 1.4). 
10 Nagel, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy’, p. 216. 
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general idea here is that neutrality has to be one of the features of the normative 
principles characterising a political framework (in Rawls’ parlance, of ‘the 
political conception of justice’) in order for it to be consented to by the citizenry.    
Indeed, by analysing how the idea of modus vivendi can be deployed (as an 
alternative to Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’) to correct what is often considered 
a weakness of political liberalism, I would like to provide an angle from which to 
systematise and make sense of what one may call the ‘radical democratic’ or 
‘pragmatic’ critique of political liberalism—a critique which is often hinted at, 
but rarely considered in detail and in all its implications.  
 One of my main concerns here, then, is to show that, despite the force of 
these criticisms of broadly Rawlsian approaches, modus vivendi is not a suitable 
alternative candidate for an account of liberal legitimacy. Indeed, while I will 
show that it is possible to use the idea of modus vivendi as the basis for a 
conception of public justification (and thus for a theory of legitimacy), I will 
nonetheless argue that even the most weakened—liberalised, as it were—modus 
vivendi-based accounts of legitimacy through public justification struggle to 
answer affirmatively to the question of whether and to what extent an agreement 
stemming from virtually unrestricted bargaining can claim legitimacy in any 
relevant sense, or at least in any sense interesting to liberal legitimacy theorists. In 
order to establish this point, we shall briefly rehearse what I take to be the 
crucial desiderata of liberal legitimacy theory, and then argue that modus 
vivendi-based legitimacy fails to satisfy one of them.  
 This line of criticism is addressed to those theorists who appeal to modus 
vivendi as a model for the normative characterisation of the democratic process 
of liberal regimes, a process which they understand as grounding political 
authority in the consent of the citizenry. However, at this point one may note 
that, indeed, many of these theorists also argue that Rawls and his followers 
place excessive emphasis on the safeguard of the core liberal values, while 
overlooking the importance of pragmatic considerations, such as the importance 
of securing political stability.11 I would like to show how, however much there 
                                                
11 See Bernard P. Dauenhauer ‘A Good Word for a Modus Vivendi’, John Haldane, ‘The 
Individual, the State, and the Common Good’, John Horton, ‘John Gray and the Political 
Theory of Modus Vivendi’, and Patrick Neal, ‘Vulgar Liberalism’.  
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may be to be said for the particular values and virtues instantiated by modus 
vivendi-based political frameworks (e.g. stability), these considerations are best 
kept separate from observations concerning the possibility of presenting modus 
vivendi arrangements as enjoying the free consent of the citizenry, for they are 
based on rather different approaches to the foundations of political authority (a 
justification-driven approach in the former case, and a legitimacy-driven 
approach in the latter). This is not to say, of course, that there cannot be 
connections between those approaches. For example, one might (rather 
plausibly) argue that a legitimate political framework is more likely to produce a 
state exhibiting the virtues of political stability, civic unity, and so on. However, 
I would like to show that keeping the approaches separate (at least to begin with) 
is conducive to a better understanding of the issues at stake.  
 
0.2 So, over the next three sections I will pursue two main aims: providing an 
account of how the idea of modus vivendi can be deployed to construct to what 
I will call a ‘realistic’ conception of public reason (section 1), and arguing that 
modus vivendi is unable to satisfy the desiderata of a liberal theory of public 
reason or public justification, and hence is not a promising option for legitimacy 
theorists (section 2). Establishing these points will lead me to some more general 
concluding remarks about the significance of my critique of the modus vivendi-
based account of political legitimacy for the overall prospects of the liberal 
legitimacy view (section 3).  
 
 
1. Modus Vivendi and Public Justification  
 
1.1 The idea of modus vivendi has come to the fore of contemporary political 
philosophy through Rawls’ discussion of it in Political Liberalism. Indeed, the 
rough characterisation of modus vivendi I offered at the outset of the chapter is 
roughly equivalent to Rawls’ widely known definition of modus vivendi: ‘A 
consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain 
institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group interests.’ 
(Ibid., p. 147). Rawls contrasts modus vivendi with the idea of an overlapping 
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consensus, which is an agreement underpinned by moral reasons (primarily, but 
also by epistemic ones). 12 To spell this out a bit further, I propose a more 
precise characterisation of modus vivendi as an agreement establishing a stable 
political framework in which at least one—but typically most—of the parties 
participate for non-moral and non-epistemic reasons, i.e. (typically) prudential 
reasons. This type of motivation for accepting a settlement should not be 
confused with that of somebody who accepts a political framework for moral 
reasons—respect for others, say—without morally endorsing its contents: in this 
case we would not have a modus vivendi, as the reasons for accepting the 
settlement would still be moral.13  
That characterisation of modus vivendi could strike some as rather different 
from what is perhaps the most articulate such characterisation in the literature, 
namely the one recently proposed by Gerald Gaus:  
Agreement X is a modus vivendi between agents A and B if and only if:  
1) X promotes the interests, values, goals etc. of both A and B; 
2) X gives neither A nor B everything they would like; 
3) The distribution of the gains of the compromise (how close X is to A or 
B’s maximum reasonable expectation) crucially depends on the relative 
power of A and B; 
4) For both A and B, the continued conformity by each to X depends on its 
continued evaluation that X is the best deal it can get, or at least that            
the effort to get a better deal is not worth the costs.14 
However, the differences lie more in the definiens than in the definiendum, 
in the sense that both definitions pick out roughly the same sort of agreements; 
the differences, then, are given by the fact that while Gaus focuses more on the 
goods and interests promoted by a modus vivendi agreement and on its being 
                                                
12 It would appear, then, that Rawls holds that there are just three types of reasons that are 
relevant in this context (moral, epistemic, and prudential); I would like to remain neutral about 
this point (so I will talk about non-epistemic and non-moral reasons), but it is probably true 
that in most cases (some of) the reasons underpinning a modus vivendi will be prudential. 
13 There is, of course, the vexed question as to whether a useful distinction between moral and 
non-moral motivation can even be drawn; but investigating that question would lead us into the 
troubled (and far too distant) waters of metaethics and moral psychology. 
14 See Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project, p. 59. 
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affected by the differences in bargaining power between the parties, I focus on 
the reasons the parties have to subscribe to a modus vivendi. The only 
substantial (yet rather inconsequential) difference is that Gaus maintains that all 
parties need to participate in an agreement for non-moral reasons (to translate 
from his language to mine) in order for it to be a modus vivendi, whereas I 
maintain that it is enough that at least one party do so. One might wonder 
whether, rather than amending Gaus’ definition, I have identified some sort of 
middle ground between his account of modus vivendi (agreement for non-moral 
reasons on everybody’s part) and Rawls’ overlapping consensus (agreement for 
moral reasons on everybody’s part). Now while this might be strictly speaking 
true, it is hardly relevant, for a situation such as that envisaged by Gaus (i.e. 
complete lack of allegiance for moral reasons) seems hardly likely to ever 
obtain.15 
To present the idea of modus vivendi less abstractly, we may simply say that 
we have a number of parties with different preferences, and they reach a modus 
vivendi whenever they reach an agreement (leading to a stable political 
framework) without constraints on the sort of reasons that can motivate the 
parties to accept the terms of the agreement. In other words, the idea is that a 
modus vivendi agreement maximizes the satisfaction of the preferences of each 
party, subject to the constraints given by the relative bargaining power of the 
parties. It is also important to note that the political framework should satisfy 
the condition of political stability (which I understand in the ordinary sense—a 
condition of social peace enabling reliably regulated social cooperation—rather 
than in the morally laden, Rawlsian sense of ‘stability for the right reasons’). 
Indeed, if this constraint were not in place, on my definition just about any 
                                                
15 It is perhaps worth noting that it has indeed been suggested that a middle ground between 
modus vivendi and overlapping consensus exists (see Christian Arnsperger and Emmanuel B. 
Picavet, ‘More Than Modus Vivendi, Less Than Overlapping Consensus: Towards a Political 
Theory of Social Compromise’). However, it seems to me that Arnsperger and Picavet’s 
argument misses the mark, for it considers overlapping consensus as a ‘merger’ (‘convergence’ 
strikes me as a more appropriate term here) of ethically diverse outlooks into a single 
conception of justice, whereas modus vivendi would be the lack of such an agreement—but that 
does not capture the Rawlsian (and generally accepted) account of modus vivendi, which does 
envisage an agreement, albeit one propped up by non-moral reasons.  
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political arrangement could be characterised as a modus vivendi (thus making 
‘modus vivendi’ almost synonymous with ‘the course of history’), for any given 
situation, including one of anarchy, could be presented as the outcome of 
hypothetical bargaining between the parties involved in it. 
 
1.2 Now how exactly does this idea of modus vivendi connect to the ideas of 
public reason and public justification? The term ‘consensus’ employed in Rawls’ 
definition is probably the best starting point to answer the question. To see why 
this is the case, let us first briefly recall where the connection between the idea 
of public reason and the liberal legitimacy view is. Public reason, or public 
justification, is the legitimacy theorist’s response to what one may call the 
challenge of persistent ethical diversity: under the conditions of freedom brought 
about by the political frameworks naturally favoured by liberal legitimacy 
theorists, citizens develop an extensive array of diverse and diverging 
conceptions of the good. What is more, this diversity is persistent to the extent 
that it becomes virtually impossible to identify, or hope to identify in the 
foreseeable future, a justificatory account of the basic structure of society that is 
(directly) acceptable to all—or even most—of the citizens’ private16 normative 
standpoints. The project of public justification, then, aims to overcome the 
challenge of diversity without renouncing the goal of reaching a consensus;17 it 
does that by offering an alternative standpoint, a public standpoint that enables 
us to reach some kind of consensus about what the basic structure of society 
should look like. The idea is to construct public reason in such a way that it can 
be shown that citizens have reason(s), from the standpoint of their private 
outlooks, to adopt a public outlook when deliberating about the basic structure 
of society. As seen in Chapter II, there is then room for an array of different 
                                                
16 Recall that ‘private’ here does not refer to the private sphere of the early liberal theorists 
(most notably Constant): it is not the domain of life where the state has no right of interference. 
Rather, it is the cultural background that is exclusive to particular citizens or groups of citizens, 
and that therefore cannot (or, on some views, should not) be appealed to when trying to settle a 
political dispute through public reason. 
17 It is worth noting that it has recently been argued that this is not even a desirable goal: see 
Bert van den Brink, ‘Liberalism Without Agreement’. Arnsperger and Picavet (cit.) also argue 
along similar lines. 
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positions on the matter of what kind of reasons there might be for adopting the 
public standpoint: roughly, on what I call an idealistic conception of public 
justification they will be mostly moral and epistemological reasons, whereas on a 
realistic conception they will be predominantly pragmatic and prudential. 
 So, modus vivendi can be understood as a legitimacy-driven account of the 
foundations of political authority, insofar as it purports to ground the exercise of 
political power by presenting it as enjoying a form of consensus on the part of the 
governed. I say that it can be understood as a version of the legitimacy view, 
rather than saying that it is a version of that view, because there could of course 
be defences of a modus vivendi-grounded political framework based on 
considerations other than the foundational role of the relation of consent 
between government and governed. Indeed, several theorists, such as John Gray, 
have offered such justification-based defences of modus vivendi. The idea here 
would still be that the basic structure of society should be shaped by ‘a 
consensus’; the difference, however, is that this arrangement is not required in 
order to characterise a particular relation between government and governed, but 
rather because it is believed that such political arrangement would best safeguard 
and promote certain goods (e.g. social peace, stability, basic human rights 
understood as interests, and so on).18 This may or may not prove a promising 
line of argument, but exploring it would be far beyond our scope here. What we 
need to show, on the other hand, is how a modus vivendi account of political 
legitimacy can be connected to a version of the realistic conception of public 
reason. 
 To recapitulate, and to put the points we have just seen in Hobbesian terms 
(for, as shown by David Gauthier’s work on public reason, those terms are 
especially appropriate when presenting a realistic account of public reason19), the 
use of private reason in deliberation about the political framework leads to social 
                                                
18 See, for example, Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, Haldane, ‘The Individual, the State, and the 
Common Good’, and Neal, ‘Vulgar Liberalism’. 
19 See David Gauthier, ‘Public Reason’. For a discussion and criticism of Gauthier’s position, 
see Michael Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason’. For a discussion of Gauthier’s and Ridge’s views 
in relation to contemporary debates on public reason and liberalism, see Gaus, Contemporary 
Theories of Public Reason, pp. 67-80. For a historical overview, see Ivison, ‘The Secret History of 
Public Reason: Hobbes to Rawls’.  
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conflict (a point famously stressed by Hobbes: crudely, left to their own devices, 
people conflict), making it impossible to identify stable terms of political 
cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Hence in societies characterised by 
persistent ethical diversity, if we want to have a justification of the political 
framework, it will have to be a public one, i.e. one which is able to transcend the 
divergences of citizens’ private conceptions of what values should inform the 
design of a political framework. 
 Let us now see exactly how the idea of modus vivendi can be connected to 
the project of public justification. I anticipated that modus vivendi could be 
linked to a particular family of conceptions of public reason, namely the realistic 
conception. This approach is Hobbesian in spirit: public reason is just a way of 
reasoning we adopt for the purposes of agreeing on how to live together in a 
political system. Thus the content of the ideal of public reason, i.e. the rules for 
the adjudication of political controversies, does not really matter that much, as 
long as they make it possible for us to coexist in a peaceful polity. Anything 
goes, as long as it secures agreement and stability. In other words, on this 
strategy we are taking citizens as they really are, in the sense that we construct 
public reason on the basis of reasons that are actually available to the citizens.20 
 As we have seen in Chapter II, the realistic conception of public reason is in 
a dialectic relation with a more idealistic, Kantian conception, according to 
which the only appropriate standpoint for public justification is the one which 
ought to be accepted by all parties concerned. Private standpoints do not satisfy 
that condition (because of the many non-universalisable features of our moral 
and epistemological makeup), thus we should strive to find a public standpoint.21 
This applies both at the epistemological level (e.g. ‘use reasons that are 
intelligible to others/comply with epistemological standards that are acceptable 
to others’) and at the moral level (‘make on others only claims that can be 
justified to them’). Often the two levels are combined in a set of mixed 
epistemological and moral criteria. Unlike the realistic strategy, the idealistic 
strategy takes citizens as they would be, did they have certain (moral and/or 
epistemological) commitments, i.e. it takes citizens as they ought to be: public 
                                                
 
21 See Onora O’Neill in ‘Kantian Politics: The Public Use of Reason’. 
IV – Modus Vivendi 
 107 
reasons is constructed on the basis of reasons the citizens should or ought to have, 
regardless of the degree to which they are actually available to them. 
 Of course, the realistic and the idealistic conceptions of public reason as I 
have just presented them are pure types; the actual conceptions found in the 
literature often try to include elements of each type. At any rate, what this 
taxonomy shows is how each pure type embodies one crucial desideratum for the 
project of establishing free hypothetical consent through public justification: the 
realistic conception embodies the pragmatic desideratum, whereas the idealistic 
conception embodies the moralistic desideratum. The pragmatic desideratum 
requires that hypothetical consent to a publicly justified set of principles 
regulating the political framework be a concrete possibility, in the sense that it be 
something feasible given the citizenry’s actual motives, beliefs, and desires. The 
moralistic desideratum, on the other hand, requires that the notion of consent 
employed retain its legitimating force, i.e. it requires that consent be given 
without violations of the personal autonomy of the consenting individuals. Note 
that those reasons are not primarily the reasons that may be deployed when 
debating about the design of the political framework. Rather, they are the 
reasons a citizen may appeal to when deciding to accept an agreement about the 
design of the political framework (yet, of course, the reasons employed in the 
debate will have an impact on some citizens’ reasons for accepting or not 
accepting the terms of the agreement). As a further point one may note that, if 
we do not place any restrictions on the reasons one may have for accepting an 
agreement, one may very well also not restrict the types of reasons and 
arguments that may be deployed when deliberating about the political 
framework. The connection between these two levels of unrestrictedness of 
available reasons is not a logical one, nonetheless it appears to be supported by 
strong pragmatic reasons: if we want the full bargaining power of the parties to 
influence the deliberative process, we have reason to allow them to defend their 
positions in the way they deem to be more effective. 
 Now it should be rather easy to see how the idea of modus vivendi connects 
with the realistic conception of public reason (and how it cannot connect with 
the moralistic conception). The (Hobbesian) idea here is to construct public 
reason in such a way that it requires us to transcend or bracket elements in our 
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private system of values, in our private reason, to the extent where we can find 
enough common ground (probably through our ‘self- or group interests’) to 
come to a settlement guaranteeing peaceful political coexistence. The medium—
indeed any medium—that enables the citizens to take the standpoint leading to 
such a consensus is indeed the Hobbesian public reason. There are no restraints 
on this process of transition from private to public reason; we need to travel as 
far from our private reason as is needed in order to converge on a public way of 
reasoning, regardless of how far that will prove. The consensus is still 
hypothetical (actual consent is chimerical, as most contemporary legitimacy 
theorists recognize), but it is just, as it were, one layer of hypotheticity, in the 
sense that the consenting individuals are not the actual citizens but their 
counterparts, yet they are not idealised to the point where their normative 
commitments are different from those of the actual citizens. So, if a modus 
vivendi can indeed be found—and it seems plausible to say that this will nearly 
always be possible, and probably even likely22—hardly anybody will be left out of 
the consensus. 
 These considerations also show in what sense we can say that the idea of 
constructing public reason through a modus vivendi is a way of responding to 
the pragmatic desideratum of theories of public reason. Indeed, the idea is 
simply that a modus vivendi-based agreement will ensure that the hypothetical 
consent secured by the agreement will be the consent of the actual members of 
the society, not of their epistemically and/or morally idealised counterparts. 
However, the achievement of meeting the pragmatic desideratum comes at a 
rather high cost, as I shall argue in the next section. 
  
 
2. Agreement, Autonomy and (Liberal) Legitimacy 
 
2.1 In this section I shall discuss what I regard as a serious problem affecting the 
modus vivendi-based approach to public reason. As we have seen, the approach 
obviously has advantages, and indeed not just advantages: it addresses a vital 
                                                
22 Anarchy or persistent political instability is a rather infrequent occurrence, after all. 
IV – Modus Vivendi 
 109 
concern of legitimacy theory, namely the need for pragmatism. However, at least 
liberal legitimacy theorists will have problems with it. In a nutshell, the main 
problem is that the sort of consent reached through a modus vivendi is 
incompatible with what is perhaps the major desideratum of the liberal 
legitimacy view, i.e. grounding political authority in a way which is respectful of 
personal autonomy. On the modus vivendi approach to public reason, all that 
counts is the fact of agreement to a set of rules regulating the political 
framework, etc. But then any concern for how that agreement came about (at 
gunpoint, under the effect of propaganda, and analogous situations) becomes 
secondary, if not entirely irrelevant. Now that, of course, is a problem because 
legitimacy theorists are interested in free consent (i.e. consent which preserves the 
consenting individual’s personal autonomy), not just any kind of consent.  
 But the problem, of course, is that the modus vivendi strategy is introduced 
precisely because, under conditions of persistent ethical diversity, there is no 
agreement of that kind. That is to say, it is introduced in order to address the 
pragmatic desideratum. The modus vivendi strategy tries to produce that 
agreement by relaxing the standards of what is legitimate, i.e. what counts as 
freely consented to, but that does not seem a good move for someone 
committed to the liberal legitimacy view. As we have seen, the appeal of the view 
lies in the fact that it allows the grounding of political authority in a way which is 
respectful of personal autonomy (hence the natural link with liberalism)—an idea 
which has been well expressed by Jeremy Waldron: ‘If the rule is one that the 
citizen has agreed to, surely little that is important in relation to liberty is lost if 
it is subsequently enforced against him.’23 But surely, if consent is obtained at 
gunpoint, its appeal for liberal legitimacy theorists quickly melts away. So it seems 
that, while the combination of modus vivendi and the realistic approach to 
public reason could prima facie appeal to those legitimacy theorists who want to 
‘take people as they are’, it is the very pragmatism of this approach to the 
foundation of political authority which, in a context of persistent ethical diversity 
such as that characterising modern liberal societies, condemns it to sanctioning 
political practices and outcomes that cannot be acceptable to a liberal legitimacy 
theorist. 
                                                
23 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’, p. 42. 
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 To further clarify that point it is worth noting how, in my reading of Political 
Liberalism, Rawls’ rejection of modus vivendi is motivated by considerations 
similar to the ones I offer here: modus vivendi does not guarantee a legitimate 
political framework because it may sanction agreements that violate citizens’ 
personal autonomy. This interpretation may appear somewhat controversial. In 
fact, many commentators have thought that Rawls’ argument against modus 
vivendi is a pragmatic one (something along the lines of ‘modus vivendi is the 
product of a contingent balance of power between competing parties, therefore 
it is bound to collapse sooner or later’); but in my view it is not—there might be 
a minor pragmatic side to the argument, but surely it is not its crux. Rather, it is 
a moral argument, because Rawls uses ‘stability’ in a moral sense (he talks of 
‘stability for the right reasons’, i.e. a situation in which citizens are morally 
motivated to comply with the norms regulating the political framework by 
considerations that do not infringe on their ‘status as free and equal citizens’—
or, in my terminology, on their personal autonomy). And that is because Rawls, 
as a liberal legitimacy theorist, is not interested in mere agreement. He is 
interested in an agreement between free and equal citizens, an agreement that 
cannot take place at gunpoint or in any circumstances curtailing the autonomy of 
the consenting parties. So, if my reading of Political Liberalism and my critique of 
modus vivendi-based accounts of liberal legitimacy are correct, it follows that 
Rawls is right in maintaining that nothing short of an overlapping consensus is 
needed to meet the desiderata of the liberal legitimacy view. But that should by 
no means be taken as a defence of Rawlsian liberal legitimacy theory against 
modus vivendi—I merely want to point out their incompatibility, against those 
who argue that Rawls was too quick in dismissing the potential of a modus 
vivendi-based account of public reason. That is not to say that there is not much 
to be said in favour of modus vivendi per se; in fact, as it should become clearer 
below, showing that the liberal legitimacy view cannot accommodate some 
instances from the idea of modus vivendi is instrumental to the larger project 
aiming at casting doubt on the viability of the liberal legitimacy view. Before we 
see why that is the case, however, we need to better understand the so-far 
sketchy argument for the incompatibility of modus vivendi and the liberal 
legitimacy view. 
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2.2 In fact, at this point a worry might arise that I have been attacking a straw 
man. After all, could the modus vivendi legitimacy theorist not reply that all her 
theory needs in order to become immune to my criticism is a simple and 
innocuous restriction on the deliberative processes sanctioned by modus vivendi, 
such as a rule prohibiting the use of coercion? Surely, she may argue, one does 
not need thick and controversial moral notions in order to have a deliberative 
process respectful of the citizens’ personal autonomy. However, it is my 
contention that this line of reply is not satisfactory because, if we consider 
carefully enough what is needed in order to cash out such a restriction in a way 
that will prove strong enough in order to safeguard the citizens’ personal 
autonomy now and in the foreseeable future (as required by the moralistic 
desideratum of liberal legitimacy theory), we will come to realize that we need a 
set of normative commitments of comparable weight (i.e. moral ‘thickness’) to 
those embodied—for example—by Rawls’ notion of reasonableness. That is 
because it is not enough, for the moralistic desideratum to be satisfied, that free 
consent be possible—it has to be guaranteed. It may very well be the case that, in 
some societies, as a matter of fact conditions are such that a free consent-
friendly modus vivendi is possible for the time being. But on the liberal 
legitimacy view the citizens’ personal autonomy cannot be left hostage to the 
circumstances (e.g. a critical increase in the popularity of intolerant ethical 
outlooks, and the like). A good theory of liberal legitimacy needs strong 
constraints in order to make sure not only that our deliberation procedure 
guarantees free consent given the present level of ethical diversity, but also that 
it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The idea is that if we look at a 
liberal, freely consented to, regime now and conclude that it is legitimate because 
it is a modus vivendi, we will be at a loss of arguments to denounce it as 
illegitimate if at some point in the future changes in the equilibrium of power or 
the level of diversity within it (say) will yield changes in the design of the 
political framework to the extent that the basic structure of that society will stop 
enjoying the free consent of the citizenry. But if we do have to go down this 
path of thick procedural constraints, surely the inclusiveness of modus vivendi 
(and hence its ability to satisfy the pragmatic desideratum) will be lost. 
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 To reinforce that point, recall how Rawls maintains that only the consent of 
reasonable citizens is needed in order to secure legitimacy.24 In this way he 
restricts the deliberative process, ensuring that it will be conducted in a way that 
is respectful of the citizens’ personal autonomy (or, as Rawls would put it, to 
safeguard the citizens’ status of free and equal persons), for reasonable citizens 
are indeed ‘persons engaged in social cooperation among equals’ (Ibid., p. 48), 
and they ‘desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, 
can cooperate with others on terms all can accept’ (Ibid., p. 50). In my view, this 
sort of restriction makes it highly unlikely that political liberalism will satisfy the 
pragmatic desideratum of liberal legitimacy theory, for it is far from clear that the 
boundaries of reasonableness are not set arbitrarily—but that is not our concern 
here. What is important to note instead, is that Rawls repeatedly stresses (with 
good reason, in my view) that his restrictions on the deliberative process are as 
‘thin’ as is compatible with ensuring the safeguard of citizens’ personal 
autonomy (in short, he does this by introducing the well-known distinction 
between moral and political values, and by restricting the bindingness of his 
prescriptions to the political sphere). This shows that, as I have been arguing, 
should the modus vivendi theorist try to ensure the autonomy-friendliness of the 
deliberative process, she would have to put in place rather severe restrictions; 
and as a result of those restrictions the modus vivendi would indeed morph into 
an arrangement not very different from Rawlsian political liberalism. 
 Here one might object that modus vivendi could at least be seen from a 
historical point of view as an instrument for eventually bringing about the sort of 
consensus envisaged by the liberal legitimacy view. If we cannot have the liberal 
legitimacy consensus right now, the objection goes, let us support the sort of 
consensus that will eventually lead to the emergence of a liberal overlapping 
                                                
24 Here one might wonder whether that consent is the actual consent of reasonable citizens, or 
hypothetical consent in the sense that, were they consulted, the reasonable citizens would 
consent. In fact it is both, in the light of my distinction (in I.1.4) between ‘public deliberation’ 
(which produces a consensus though actual deliberation on the part of reasonable citizens) and 
‘public justification/reason’ (which produces a consensus through hypothetical deliberation, in 
the sense that the object of the public justification could have been arrived at through a process 
of public deliberation): both public deliberation and public justification are present (with 
different roles) in Rawls’ theory of legitimacy. 
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consensus between free and equal citizens.25 In other words, modus vivendi may 
not be legitimate as such, but it is the path to legitimacy. In the light of our 
analysis we could respond in at least two ways. First, this objection is somewhat 
off the mark: we are after all considering simply whether modus vivendi 
arrangements could count as legitimate according to the liberal legitimacy view, 
not how legitimate political arrangements might arise. Second, and more 
importantly, it is still the case that there is no guarantee that a modus vivendi will 
evolve into a form of consensus of the sort sanctioned by the liberal legitimacy 
view. With regard to this, Richard H. Dees convincingly showed that “the story 
that Rawls tells [about the emergence of overlapping consensus from modus 
vivendi] is sketchy, but its unspoken optimism belies the deep problems that 
such a transformation involves.”26 More specifically, Dees argues that for the 
transformation to take place the parties to the conflict need to come to regard 
toleration as a value per se; historical examples, however, show how that is by no 
means guaranteed to happen, or indeed even likely: “whether toleration can be 
justified in a way that the parties to such deep conflicts can accept will depend 
crucially on contextual features”.27 Thus, if liberal legitimacy theorists want to 
defend modus vivendi as the path to legitimacy, they cannot do it abstractly: they 
at least need to provide a case-by-case account of how, in a given context, it is 
likely that the modus vivendi will evolve into a consensus between free and equal 
citizens.  
 I conclude this section by considering one last line of reply that could tempt 
the modus vivendi-legitimacy theorist. At least, she may argue, securing a 
political settlement produces stability, social peace, and so on. What is more, she 
may add, at least in some circumstances these values are to be prioritised. 
However this reply would betray a departure from the concerns of the legitimacy 
view, for it grounds political authority entirely on the value of stability, leaving 
no role to play for consent. The same would be true in the case of appeal to 
consideration such as (say) the argument that the possibility of an agreement is 
likely to track the appropriateness of certain set of rules in a given context, and 
                                                
25 This is a view famously taken by Rawls (see Political Liberalism, pp. xlii-xliii). 
26 Dees, ‘Establishing Toleration’, p. 667. 
27 Ibid., p. 668. 
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so on. On those views, then, modus vivendi would ground political authority 
through considerations of justification rather than of legitimacy: political 
authority would be grounded solely in the fact that the political framework 
possesses certain valuable features (stability and the like), rather than also in a 
relation of consent obtaining between the government and the governed. Such a 
justification-only approach might very well be worthwhile in its own right, but it 
does not help the cause of liberal legitimacy theory.28   
  
2.3 The analysis of the idea of modus vivendi I carried out in this chapter 
focuses on its prospects as a strategy for offering an account of how a political 
framework could satisfy the desiderata of liberal legitimacy theory. Now, this way 
of looking at the idea of modus vivendi may strike some as off the mark: after 
all, most proponents of modus vivendi as an account of the foundations of 
political authority do not—at least explicitly or intentionally—intend to offer a 
legitimacy-based account of the foundations of political authority (though they 
usually do intend to offer a liberal account). However, one should note that at 
least some of the rhetoric usually adopted by these theorists does imply, or at 
least allude to, a commitment to a legitimacy-based account of the foundations 
of political authority. To mention what is perhaps the most glaring example of 
this (and one I hinted at above), consider how most defenders of modus vivendi 
maintain that one of the advantages of allowing for unrestricted bargaining in the 
hypothetical deliberative process leading to the characterisation of the political 
framework consists in enabling the competing individuals and parties to freely 
express the full force of their conceptions of the good, without having to comply 
with normative constraints (such as Rawls’ reasonableness) which de facto would 
often require them to subordinate their most deeply held values and convictions 
to liberal values (freedom, equality, autonomy) disguised as procedural 
restrictions. Typical examples of this line of argument can be found in the 
debates about the role of religious arguments in political deliberation:29 critics of 
                                                
28 Two good examples of such an approach are John Horton, ‘John Gray and the Political 
Theory of Modus Vivendi’, and Patrick Neal, ‘Vulgar Liberalism’. 
29 For an extensive introduction to these debates, see Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and 
Secular Reason. For an in-depth discussion of whether and to what extent the use of religious 
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Rawls often argue that democratic representation cannot fully deploy its 
normative efficacy if we place constraints on political activity to the extent that 
some individuals and groups will be prevented from deliberating about certain 
policy matters by referring to values which, according to their conception of the 
good, are directly, and sometimes pre-eminently relevant to an assessment of the 
issues at stake (think, for example, of the role played by religious conceptions of 
personhood in the debate on abortion30). Now it seems to me that one way to 
make sense of such a claim is to interpret it as relying on the foundational power 
of a process of deliberation which allows for the views of the citizenry to be 
represented and instantiated in the structure of the political framework 
(moreover, clearly the emphasis is on the legitimacy conferred by such a process 
per se, rather than on the good consequences it would produce). And that, of 
course, is a way of presenting the political framework as enjoying a form of 
consent on the part of the citizenry, i.e. a way of grounding political authority 
through a theory of legitimacy relevantly similar to the liberal legitimacy view.31  
The considerations I offered in the previous section, however, decisively 
count against the feasibility of deploying the idea of modus vivendi to devise a 
liberal theory of legitimacy, i.e. one that guarantees the safeguard of the 
citizenry’s personal autonomy. Perhaps realising this, i.e. being aware of the 
rather weak legitimating force of the sort of consent envisaged by modus 
vivendi, many proponents of this approach supplement their position by 
                                                                                                                                  
reasons is compatible with the notion of respect among equal citizens favoured by liberal 
legitimacy theorists, see Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. A more 
descriptive and case-based approach to these issues can be found in the essays in David 
Marquand and Ronald L. Nettler (eds), Religion and Democracy, and in Ted G. Jelen and Clyde 
Wilcox (eds), Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective. 
30 Rawls’ position on this issue is stated ibid., pp. 243-244n. For a critique of this position from a 
religious perspective, see John Finnis, ‘Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason’.  
31 That is not to say, of course, that all arguments in favour of the appeal to religion in political 
deliberation are appeals to considerations of legitimacy (in the technical sense of the term used 
here). For example, David Hollenbach maintains that the use of religious arguments in the 
public sphere should not be curtailed, because doing so would jeopardise a nation’s ‘civic unity’, 
and, ultimately, ‘the common good’ (‘Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society 
and Culture’, p. 890)—a clear instance of a justification-based defence of the public role of 
religion.  
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adducing considerations of justification, as we have seen above. However, it 
should be clear by now that one should be wary of casually shifting from 
considerations of legitimacy to considerations of justification, for while both 
justification and legitimacy are a way of approaching the problem of providing a 
philosophical account of the foundations of political authority, they address 
rather different and largely independent features of a political framework, so at 
least some argument is needed if one wants to use them interchangeably. 
 
 
3. Concluding Observations 
 
3.1 Let us now very briefly recapitulate the main points of this chapter. We have 
seen how it is possible to use the idea of modus vivendi to create a particular 
(realistic) kind of theory of public justification, and thus how one might want to 
deploy such a theory as the centrepiece of a modus vivendi-based version of the 
liberal legitimacy view. However, our main conclusion here is that, while a 
modus vivendi-based theory of legitimacy certainly does satisfy the pragmatic 
desideratum of liberal legitimacy, it does so at the cost of jeopardising the 
moralistic desideratum: given a level of persistent ethical diversity such as that 
found (or quite possibly found in the foreseeable future) in most contemporary 
liberal societies, we cannot include everybody in a hypothetical consensus on the 
political framework while at the same time ensuring that everybody’s consent will 
be free in a sense interesting for liberals. Thus, while there might be plenty of 
reasons to support modus vivendi-based liberalism on the basis of the virtues 
instantiated by such a polity, the same is not true if we deem some form of free 
consent to be a necessary condition for legitimacy. And that is why liberal 
legitimacy theorists should not rest any hopes on the idea of modus vivendi. 
 
3.2 Let me conclude by briefly stating where I think the analysis carried out here 
leaves us as far as the more general and interesting issue of an overall assessment 
of the viability of the liberal legitimacy view is concerned. Even though we have 
seen that modus vivendi cannot deliver what liberal legitimacy theorists need, the 
issue it tries to address (i.e., to put it crudely, the need to achieve a broad 
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hypothetical consensus grounded in reasons actually available to the citizenry) is 
a genuine concern for liberal legitimacy theory (embodied, in fact, by the 
pragmatic desideratum), and it is far from clear that it is possible to address this 
issue adequately without falling short of the equally important goal of ensuring 
that the consensus will be respectful of the citizens’ personal autonomy. These 
considerations, then, go some way towards confirming my hypothesis for a 
critique of the liberal legitimacy view as a normative foundation for liberal 
political practice: the serious question becomes that of whether liberal legitimacy 
theorists have set themselves an impossible task, given the conditions of 
persistent ethical diversity that characterise liberal polities. Indeed, were it 
actually impossible to achieve a satisfactory balance between the moralistic and 
the pragmatic desideratum—as some of the reflections carried out here seem to 
suggest—the prospects of liberal legitimacy as a feasible (i.e. not just logically 
possible) model for the construction of a political framework, rather than a mere 
regulative ideal, would be rather bleak.32 However, in order to advance such a 
general claim in a forceful way, one need examine the entirety of the logical 
space available to liberal legitimacy theorists. So, we may say that Rawls’ political 
liberalism and modus vivendi sit at two extremes of the array of views on 
legitimacy and public justification. In the next chapter we shall focus on a theory 
which may be presented as some sort of third way. That, in turn, will pave the 
ground for my final assessment of the liberal legitimacy view’s prospects. 
 
                                                
32 The demise of the liberal legitimacy view, of course, need not coincide with the demise of 
liberalism. As anticipated, and as I will argue in Chapter VI, my research agenda is rather to 
show how liberals would be better off grounding the authority of liberal polities through a 
substantivist approach. That is because, given the range of persistent ethical diversity present or 
likely to arise in liberal societies, securing free consent to liberal values would require heavy 
procedural restrictions that would render consent redundant (by polluting it with justificatory 
constraints). Indeed, such a contract-based approach to the foundations of liberal political 
authority is not merely unsuccessful in its own right; it is also detrimental to liberalism, in so far 
as it strips liberal values of their justificatory force by turning them into seemingly arbitrary 
constraints on a consent-based legitimation process, while leaving unattended the all-important 
task of making a direct case for the desirability of liberal values and political institutions. 
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CHAPTER V 
Justificatory Liberalism 
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
 
0.1 In recent years Gerald F. Gaus1 has put forward an innovative approach 
to the project of grounding liberalism via a theory of legitimacy through 
public justification, i.e. through a version of the liberal legitimacy view. Gaus 
articulates his distinctive theory of liberal legitimacy through public 
justification primarily as a response and an alternative to Rawlsian ‘political’ 
liberalism. While he starkly distances himself from Rawls’ particular position, 
Gaus is nonetheless deeply sympathetic to the broadly Rawlsian general 
project of providing a liberal legitimacy-based account of the foundations of 
political authority through the idea of public justification. Indeed, he 
identifies the central and most promising feature of contemporary liberalism 
precisely in its ‘justificatory’ character, i.e. in the idea that political authority is 
well grounded only if its demands can be presented as justifiable or justified 
to the citizenry, and thus—in a sense—as enjoying their hypothetical 
consent.2  
 In this chapter, then, I shall consider whether Gaus’ critique of Rawls 
addresses an actual weakness of political liberalism, and (more importantly) 
whether his alternative is able to satisfy what we have identified as the 
desiderata of the liberal legitimacy view. In other words, I shall ask whether 
Gaus’ ‘justificatory’ liberalism can constitute a ‘third way’ between political 
                                                
1 See Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, Justificatory Liberalism; 
‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’, and Contemporary Theories Liberalism. 
2 Gaus uses the term ‘justificatory liberalism’ to refer both to his own brand of liberalism, 
and to the whole current of contemporary liberalism according to which political authority 
must be grounded through public justification (Gaus identifies Rawls, Macedo and Larmore 
as the main proponents of this approach). In what follows I shall use ‘justificatory 
liberalism’ in the former sense, unless otherwise specified.  
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liberalism and modus vivendi, and thus whether it is a viable option for 
liberal legitimacy theorists. My conclusion will be that, while Gaus does point 
out some real problems for the Rawlsian approach to liberal legitimacy (and 
by extension for the liberal legitimacy view at large), his proposed solution 
does nonetheless fail to meet the view’s desiderata, as it effectively (if not 
straightforwardly) amounts to what we have termed a substantivist approach 
to the normative foundations of political authority, thus marking a departure 
from the concerns of the contract-based liberal tradition of which the liberal 
legitimacy view is a contemporary expression.  
 
0.2 The chapter’s structure is this. In the first section I present Gaus’ case 
against political liberalism. I break down his critique into three main 
arguments, and briefly discuss each of them. Subsequently I illustrate how 
this critique of political liberalism is (in part) consistent with some of the 
problems we identified for that approach in Chapter III, and how Gaus’ 
arguments lead to the formulation of an alternative theory of legitimacy 
through public justification, namely ‘justificatory liberalism’. Hence, in 
section 2, I present this alternative theory and proceed to offer my critical 
assessment of this alternative project. In the third section, then, I make some 
more general observations about the wider significance of my analysis of 
Gaus’ liberalism for the prospects of the liberal legitimacy view as a 
philosophical foundation for liberal political practice. I conclude by briefly 
reviewing the chapter’s arguments and setting the stage for the final chapter.  
 
 
1. Political vs. Justificatory Liberalism 
 
1.1 As anticipated, Gaus pursues three main lines of argument against 
political liberalism (and in favour of his preferred conception of liberal 
legitimacy through public justification). Before diving into these arguments, 
however, let us first quickly summarise Rawls’ position in a way that puts it in 
dialogue—as it were—with Gaus’ conceptual apparatus. I shall then proceed 
to present and briefly discuss Gaus’ three arguments against Rawls’ project.  
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 As we have seen in some detail in Chapter III, the theory of legitimacy 
at the core of political liberalism aims at grounding the authority of principles 
of justice characterising a political framework3 by presenting them as the 
output of a process of public justification, i.e. justification through public 
reason. The idea is to define a set of rules to guide the conduct of 
deliberation about these principles; the rules are such that, if they are (or 
could have been) followed, we will be warranted in saying that the citizens 
hypothetically consented to the chosen principles. It is worth remembering, 
however, that principles justified through public reason do not need to be 
acceptable to all citizens, but just to reasonable citizens. Reasonableness is 
defined as a set of epistemological and—mainly—moral constraints operating 
on the sort of reasons that may or may not legitimately be deployed when 
arguing about the principles of justice regulating the political framework.4 
These constraints are designed in order to ensure that the (reasonable) 
citizens’ status as free and equal individuals will not be infringed upon in the 
process of deliberation about these principles, and by the enforcement of 
these principles. In other words, conducting deliberation within the 
boundaries of reasonableness and public reason—we have explored the 
interdependence between the two in Chapter III—ensures that the principles 
regulating the political framework will turn out to be acceptable to the 
                                                
3 As seen before, according to Rawls those normative principles are the ones characterising 
a polity’s constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, i.e. roughly what I have been 
referring to as the political framework. There is room for controversy as to what exactly this 
means. For our purposes it will suffice to say that the ‘basic structure of society’ is 
characterised by most of a polity’s constitution, and perhaps by those regions of ordinary 
(i.e. non-constitutional) legislation spelling out at a rather general level issues such as the 
types of entitlements granted by constitutionally-protected rights, and so on. At any rate, the 
issue of the scope of application of the liberal legitimacy view has been dealt with in some 
detail in I.1.2. 
4 For example, according to Rawls, reasonable citizens will not deploy reasons that they 
know can only be appreciated from the standpoint of their own, controversial, 
comprehensive conception of the good. 
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reasonable citizens, in the sense that they will have been chosen without 
violating these citizens’ personal autonomy.5  
 What—according to Gaus—is wrong with this approach? As pointed 
out above, I take him to be advancing three main charges against Rawls’ 
project (as well as some minor, related ones). Below I provide an account and 
a critical assessment of each of them. Before that, however, it will be useful 
to briefly consider exactly how Gaus can be read as contributing to what is 
broadly Rawls’ project as well, namely the project of grounding political 
authority in a liberal theory of legitimacy. Gaus explicitly subscribes to this 
project, by quoting and endorsing some prominent advocates of the liberal 
legitimacy view such as Stephen Macedo, Charles Larmore, and Jeremy 
Waldron,6 and by explicitly listing and appropriating what he takes to be the 
guiding ideas of the liberal legitimacy view.7 The core—and extremely 
general—idea he shares with all those liberal legitimacy theorists is that liberal 
political authority is grounded in its being in some sense “publicly 
acceptable”,8 and thus in a theory of legitimacy through public justification-
derived hypothetical consent. Gaus’ particular take on this approach, then, is 
one that takes very seriously the fact of widespread and permanent 
disagreement about the good among the citizens of a liberal democratic 
society. Indeed, he maintains that a liberal theory of legitimacy should consist 
essentially of:  
                                                
5 Or, in Rawls’ terms, their status as free and equal as envisaged by the ‘political conception 
of the person’ (see Political Liberalism, pp. 29ff.). The question remains open, of course, as to 
whether the kind of hypothetical consent envisaged by Rawls’ overlapping consensus is 
indeed enough for preserving citizens’ personal autonomy. But that issue, which I have 
addressed in Chapter III, does not concern us here.  
6 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 3. 
7 See Gaus, ‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’, p. 274. These are the 
guiding ideas he lists. Respect for citizens’ freedom and equality requires public justifiability 
of political authority; there is persistent reasonable disagreement among citizens about both 
ordinary politics and constitutional essentials; beliefs and considerations that are subject to 
reasonable disagreement cannot be used in public justification. As we shall see below, this 
characterisation of the core of the liberal legitimacy view already contains, in nuce, the gist of 
Gaus’ critique of Rawls’ approach as well as the main driving ideas of his own approach.   
8 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 3. 
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a normative theory of justification—a theory that allows them 
[justificatory liberals, i.e. liberal legitimacy theorists, in my 
terminology] to claim that some set of principles is publicly 
justified, even given the fact that they are contested by some. And this, in 
turn, appears to call for a moral epistemology, in the sense of an 
account of the conditions for justified moral belief, or at least 
justified adherence to social principles.9 
 
 That, for Gaus, is the task that any satisfactory version of the liberal 
legitimacy view should carry out, and this is also where he thinks Rawls and 
his followers fail to deliver the goods, as it were. In fact, as it will become 
clear by the end of this section, Gaus’ main contention is that the political 
liberals’ aim to characterise a conception of public justification without 
recurring to a substantial moral epistemology is wrong-headed. Let us now 
turn, then, to Gaus’ reasons for concluding that justificatory liberalism—
rather than political liberalism—is the way to go for liberal legitimacy 
theorists. As anticipated, he offers three main arguments: 
 
 (i) There is pluralism over ‘the political’ (as well).10 Roughly, the core idea 
here is that for Rawls’ overlapping consensus to be possible there needs to be 
a domain of the ‘political’ (i.e. constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice: the object of the consensus) that is uniformly recognised across the 
various comprehensive doctrines (i.e. the religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines ranging over a wide array of issues, including ‘the political’) that 
take part in the consensus. In other words, for there to be a consensus there 
needs to be agreement on the sphere of application of the political 
conception of justice that will be the object of such a consensus. Yet, Gaus 
argues, “conceptions of the political can themselves be deeply influenced by 
one’s moral, religious and philosophical beliefs and so are themselves open to 
                                                
9 Ibid., my italics. 
10 See Gaus, ‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’ and ‘Reason, 
Justification and Consensus’. 
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dispute”.11 Nonetheless, Gaus concedes that Rawls has a way out of this 
problem:  
 
An alternative, however, is to understand the political conception as 
constructed out of that which we share. […] We can define the political as 
those matters on which human reason converges, and so necessarily 
generates constitutional principles that satisfy the Principle of 
Liberal Legitimacy.12 
 
 Before considering how Gaus takes issue with that interpretation of 
political liberalism, though, it may be interesting to note how it is in line with 
the analysis of Rawls’ theory provided in Chapter III: the domain of the 
political just is something on whose nature reasonable doctrines may not 
disagree. In Chapter III I have indeed stressed that reasonableness requires 
from all comprehensive doctrines a commitment to seeking fair terms of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens; it also requires, as shown here, 
that all comprehensive doctrines agree on what those terms of cooperation 
should apply to (i.e. a certain conception of what constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice are). So, comprehensive doctrines that share an 
appropriate (i.e. liberal) conception of the political, as well as a the goal of 
seeking fair terms of cooperation between free and equal citizens, are 
reasonable doctrines, and are thus worthy of inclusion in the overlapping 
consensus.13 Now, according to Gaus the main problem with this approach is 
that it reduces the domain of the political to something too thin—as it 
were—to support something as specific as a political conception of justice: 
“since the use of human reason lead us to reasonable disagreement about 
conceptions of the justice and constitutional essentials, the political qua 
shared is limited to the abstract concept of a liberal political order”.14 If all we 
                                                
11 Gaus, ‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’, p. 265 and, at greater 
length, ‘Reason, Justification and Consensus’.  
12 Gaus, ‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’, p. 266. 
13 A move which, as seen in Chapter III, is problematic in its own right, as it renders 
political liberalism unable to satisfy the liberal legitimacy view’s pragmatic desideratum. 
14 Gaus, ibid., p. 272. 
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can share is just a commitment to seeking fair terms of cooperation between 
free and equal citizens as regards a liberal understanding of the sphere of 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, then articulating exactly 
what it means to have fair terms of cooperation (as justice as fairness does) 
will require us to move beyond the realm of what is shared. In other words, 
anything as specific as a political conception of justice (such as Rawls’ justice 
as fairness, say) will carry with itself a controversial conception of the 
political; and that, for Gaus, is a violation of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy, for it will sanction a constitution devised on the basis of a political 
conception of justice on which there will be reasonable disagreement.   
 I do not, however, think that Gaus’ argument succeeds. I think he 
misreads Rawls as regards what is required by the liberal principle of 
legitimacy. Indeed, Gaus seem to maintain that the principle requires a direct 
consensus on the content of the domain of the political (e.g. a particular 
political conception of justice and constitution). On my reading of Rawls, 
however, it only requires an indirect consensus, achieved through a (direct) 
consensus on what the domain of the political is (i.e. constitutional essentials 
and basic justice), and on what is an acceptable hypothetical deliberation procedure 
for selecting the content of the domain of the political. The idea is that the 
constitutional essentials and the political conception of justice that informs 
them have to be such that they could have been arrived at through a 
deliberation procedure that respects the reasonable citizens’ freedom and 
autonomy, i.e. one that only allows appeals to reasons that they can (but not 
necessarily do) accept. If that condition is satisfied, then even if a reasonable 
citizen does not as a matter of fact agree with the particular political 
conception of justice in place such conception will still satisfy the liberal 
principle of legitimacy, because the citizen will nonetheless see that she can 
(or perhaps more appropriately, could) endorse the constitution, even though 
she does not actually endorse it. Gaus says that “it is not reasonable to expect 
a citizen to endorse a doctrine just because it is a reasonable doctrine.”15 
Strictly speaking that is correct; yet Rawls could simply reply that it becomes 
reasonable to expect endorsement once a reasonable doctrine happens to be 
                                                
15 Gaus, ibid., p. 270. 
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the one that is in place in the citizen’s polity, for in recognising its 
reasonableness the citizen recognises that it could have been arrived at 
through the procedure described above. Thus all the various reasonable 
conceptions of justice are potentially legitimate, but only the one that 
happens to be in place commands the sort of endorsement described above, 
which confers actual legitimacy on it. So we may say that, if my interpretation 
of Rawls’ theory is correct,16 Gaus’ argument misses the (hypothetical) 
deliberative dimension of political liberalism, thus it does not succeed in 
showing that political liberalism fails to satisfy its own legitimacy principle. 
Nonetheless Gaus’ critique does offer an interesting angle from which to 
bring out a point quite close to the one I advanced in Chapter III, namely 
that political liberalism’s scope for a consensus is unsatisfactorily narrow.  
 
 (ii) The reasonable cannot float free of the rational.17 This is how Gaus 
summarises the gist of what I identify as his second main argument against 
political liberalism:  
 
The reasonable is much more closely bound to the rational than Rawls 
and other political liberals would have us believe [...] the rational is far 
more basic to political justification than political liberals suppose; and 
this [...] points to grave difficulties for political liberalism’s pragmatic 
understanding of justification.18  
  
What exactly are the ‘close ties’ between rationality and reasonableness 
Gaus refers to? And why does that matter? We have seen that, for Rawls, “the 
idea of reasonable justification ... [is] a practical and not an epistemological 
                                                
16 Admittedly, though, Political Liberalism does at times lend itself to Gaus’ interpretation; so 
my reading of it is a charitable one, in so far as it tries to cash out the version of Rawls’ 
theory that is best equipped to deal with Gaus’ objections, and—more generally—with the 
desiderata of liberal legitimacy. 
17 See Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, as well as Justificatory 
Liberalism, pp. 130ff. 
18 Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, p. 235. 
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problem”.19 Rawls’ aim is to construct a conception of justification which is 
able to float free of the matters over which the (reasonable) citizens of a 
liberal democratic society disagree, namely the matters encompassed by 
moral, religious and philosophical ‘comprehensive doctrines’.20 The idea is 
that citizens can be reasonably expected to endorse a political framework 
justified in this way because, given the aim of seeking fair terms of cooperation between 
free and equals21, they can be expected to have a (moral) motivation to forsake 
their preferred political framework (i.e. the one most in line with their 
comprehensive doctrine, and hence the one that, ceteris paribus, it would be 
most rational for them to pursue) in favour of one which others can also 
reasonably be expected to endorse in virtue of their commitment to a shared 
ideal of reasonableness, even though the latter framework will quite possibly 
be sub-optimal with respect to the ideals they believe they have most reason 
to pursue in the light of their comprehensive doctrine. 
 Now the crucial question, according to Gaus, turns out to be whether 
it makes sense, for a rational citizen, to act ‘sub-rationally’ for the sake of 
reasonableness (i.e. for the sake of the moral ideals embedded in the idea of 
reasonableness). To use Rawls’ terminology, the question is whether it is 
possible to provide an account of reasonable justification which can solve the 
practical problem of identifying fair terms of cooperation between free and 
equal citizens, while—as it were—circumnavigating the thorny and divisive 
epistemological issue of what are the most rational terms of cooperation. Gaus 
argues that, pace Rawls, this question cannot be answered affirmatively. As I 
understand it, the argument can be (perhaps a bit crudely) summarised as 
follows. 
 If a citizen adheres to a comprehensive doctrine (i.e. believes in it), then 
epistemic rationality demands that she also believes that the political framework 
                                                
19 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 62. 
20 By ‘float free’ I do not of course mean that it should be unrelated to any comprehensive 
doctrine, but rather that it should not be parasitic or exclusively dependent on any such 
doctrine. 
21 And, as we have seen in chapter III, having this aim is essentially what it means to be 
reasonable. 
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that is best in line with her comprehensive doctrine is the political framework 
it is most rational to put into place (given a fair chance of success in doing 
so). However, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, it is unlikely that the 
rest of the (reasonable, not to mention the unreasonable) citizenry could be 
expected to endorse this rationally preferable (from her perspective) political 
framework. Now the problem is that, according to Gaus, in order to endorse 
a different political framework, our citizen would need to form the belief that 
there is most reason to indeed endorse that framework. The Rawlsian would 
say here that in order to do so she only needs to make an appeal to her 
reasonableness, i.e. to her commitment to finding fair terms of social 
cooperation between free and equal citizens. But Gaus objects that this 
practical purpose cannot compensate for the failure of epistemic rationality 
required by the forsaking of the preferred political framework: “coming to 
believe on the basis of reasons irrelevant to its epistemic status indicates 
irrationality.”22 So our citizen cannot regard the agreed upon political 
framework as being truly justified, because “justification, as distinct from 
persuasion, necessarily involves giving good reasons”.23 In other words, 
endorsing a sub-optimal (from the point of view of epistemic rationality) 
political framework demands a failure of rationality that no rational citizen 
can go along with.  
 Let us look at this argument more closely. Crudely put, Gaus points 
out that it is indeed rather odd to ask someone to pretend not to believe 
something for the sake of achieving some moral ideal such as fair cooperation 
between free and equal citizens.24 But is this a genuine problem for Rawls? In 
my view, it does not need to be: what the Rawlsian conception of public 
justification demands is just that (reasonable) citizen form or possess a higher 
order—as it were—moral belief that, at least when deliberating about the basic 
structure of society, seeking fair terms of cooperation among free and equals 
                                                
22 Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, p. 244. 
23 Ibid., p. 249, my italics. 
24 Gaus’ argument is actually a great deal more complex than this. However, since it is not 
my intention to question any of it steps, but rather to judge what the impact of its 
conclusions is, it will not be necessary to illustrate it in much detail. 
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should take priority over pursuing what, according to their comprehensive 
conception of the good, is the most preferable political arrangement (and 
hence the one that, were they not committed to the ideals expressed by Rawlsian 
reasonableness, it would be most rational for them to pursue). So, on closer 
inspection, it turns out that the Rawlsian conception of public justification 
does not impose a demand of irrationality on the citizenry: it just requires 
them to hold a belief according to which they will prioritise the pursuit of fair 
terms of cooperation among free and equals over the pursuit of their own 
conception of the good. Now this demand—as we have seen in Chapter III 
and in (i) above—might be a problem in its own right for Rawls’ theory of 
legitimacy (for it leaves very little room for substantial disagreement among 
reasonable citizens), yet if we read the theory in this way, we come to see that 
Gaus’ argument cannot do the work it is supposed to do. However, before 
moving out to the next of Gaus’ arguments, it is worth pointing out how the 
critique we have just considered has the merit of bringing out (from a 
different angle) what in Chapter III we have identified as a crucial problem 
for political liberalism. The problem is indeed that, for Rawls, citizens need to 
put their commitment to liberalism well before their commitment to their 
comprehensive doctrine (at least when deliberating about the design of the 
basic structure of society)—as it should be clear by now, Gaus’ argument 
brings this out by showing that citizens need to embrace a ‘higher order’ 
belief about the priority of reasonableness (which, as we have seen in Chapter 
III, is a fully fledged moral theory, even though it is restricted in scope) over 
adherence to their comprehensive doctrine. But there is no argument 
accounting for why they should do so, which leads us back to the problem of 
whether the content of the liberal legitimacy view’s justification requirement 
(i.e. the commitment to uphold liberal political institutions and practices) has 
not been set arbitrarily. 
 
 (iii) Political liberalism is guilty of ‘justificatory populism’.25 In a nutshell, the 
worry here is that Rawls’ choice of constructing public reason from the 
reasons available to actual reasonable citizens commits him to sanctioning 
                                                
25 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, pp. 130ff. 
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normative principles that do not satisfy even rather minimal standards of 
rational justification. Gaus’ contention is that, despite the fact that the 
‘reasonable citizen’ is a rather conspicuously idealised counterpart of most 
actual citizens of contemporary liberal democracies, the constraints on the 
conduct of deliberation about the political framework required by Rawls’ 
conception of public reason do not guarantee that the principles arrived at 
through public deliberation will be epistemically satisfactory (according to his 
own, complex theory of public justification, which he develops throughout 
the first part of Justificatory Liberalism). That is because, as we have seen above, 
the Rawlsian characterisation of reasonableness is predominantly oriented in a 
moral/practical rather than in an epistemic direction.26 In fact, Gaus argues, 
Rawls’ reasonable citizens rely heavily on common sense modes of inference 
(because “citizens actually [need to] appreciate the inferences”,27 and yet 
empirical studies show that these modes of inference are not reliable; indeed, 
Gaus at times goes as far as to claim that they tend to be rather reliably 
unreliable:  
 
Now if we mean by commonsense reasoning something like 
“methods if reasoning that are readily sanctioned by a large 
majority, even after significant reflection,” then it seems pretty clear 
that commonsense reasoning is deviant from the justified 
perspectives of many.28  
 
                                                
26 One might think of this contrast as akin to the familiar one between practical and 
theoretical reason. 
27 Ibid., p. 136: “Rawls is very clear that his aim is to articulate an understanding of public 
justification that induces stability, because citizens actually appreciate the inferences.” 
28 Ibid., p. 133. Some examples of such widely accepted yet flawed methods of inference 
would be elementary mistakes in probabilistic reasoning (e.g. the gambler’s fallacy), and 
difficulties with conditionals. Once again, Gaus’ argument is very complex here, and it 
would be impossible to do it justice in such a brief exposition. Moreover, it relies heavily on 
empirical studies it would not be possible to discuss here. At any rate, the details are not 
important for our purposes, as I intend to grant Gaus his conclusions, and then see what 
their bearing is on Rawls’ views. 
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To use Gaus’ terminology then, reliance on common sense yields a 
‘deviant’ theory of public reason, whereas we should be using a ‘minimalist’ 
one instead,29 i.e. one that uses inferences that are accessible to all 
(reasonable) citizens, while not necessarily favouring those inferences that 
these citizens tend to regard as most persuasive. The point here is that, once 
we become aware of these facts, accepting a reasonably but not rationally 
justified political framework would again demand an intolerable failure of 
(epistemic) rationality.  
 What should we make of this argument? If we grant Gaus his 
empirical claims, he does seem to have established that political liberalism is 
an epistemically unreliable resource for the normative assessment of political 
norms. However, is this critique pertinent, as far as Rawls’ project is 
concerned? The answer seems to me to be a negative one: after all, Rawls is 
concerned with construing a procedure which generates principles the 
(reasonable) citizens can be expected to endorse, not one which generates 
principles above a certain epistemic standard (to be sure, Rawls’ notion of 
reasonableness, through the idea of the burdens of judgment, does contain 
some minimal epistemic standards,30 but if we accept Gaus’ observations 
about common sense modes of inference those standards turn out to be too 
permissive).31 So what Gaus is promoting is a sort of epistemic perfectionism: 
he is interested in ensuring that the citizens will not have to submit to 
epistemically unsatisfactory principles. As we shall consider in some more 
detail below, that might very well be a worthwhile concern in its own right, 
but it is highly dubious that it has any bearing as far as the liberal legitimacy 
view is concerned: indeed, whether or not the normative principles regulating 
the basic structure of society satisfy certain standards of epistemic rationality 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 See Chapter III, section 2.2, and Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 62: “Being reasonable is not 
an epistemological idea (though it has epistemological elements). Rather, it is part of a 
political idea of democratic citizenship”.  
31 On the other hand, as we shall see in the case of Gaus’ own theory, if we make those 
epistemic standards more restrictive we will encounter serious problems with the liberal 
legitimacy view’s pragmatic desideratum.  
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has very little—if anything—to do with whether those principles can be 
presented as enjoying the free hypothetical consent of the governed.  
  
 
2. Normative Justifiability 
 
2.1. In this section I shall examine the motivation of Gaus’ critique of 
political liberalism, in order to see how his preferred account of public 
justification emerges from it. So we need to see how each of the three 
arguments discussed above, regardless of whether they succeed, creates a goal 
for Gaus’ own theory of legitimacy through public justification. After that, I 
shall provide a general assessment of his position.  
 Let us begin with the argument from pluralism over the political. The 
main lesson that Gaus takes home from that argument is that, given that (he 
thinks) it is not possible  to separate the domain of the political, i.e. 
constitutional essentials, from the domain of ordinary politics in a way that is 
prior to the individuation of the normative principle that will guide the design 
of constitutional essentials, we will have to apply the criterion of legitimacy to 
all coercive uses of political authority, and not just to the domain of the 
political. Thus if the constitutional essentials are not justifiable on grounds 
that are separate from those on which we may justify other exercises of 
political authority, then we need a justification that applies across the board: 
“all legitimate public deliberation must be an exercise of public reasoning”.32  
 Gaus’ second argument was the one from the tight connection 
between the reasonable and the rational. Here the main moral is that Rawls 
cannot successfully solve the practical problem of reaching a consensus on 
fair terms of cooperation (the very aim according to which the idea of 
reasonableness is introduced and characterised) whilst using the notion of 
reasonableness to bypass the epistemological problem of individuating terms 
that citizens will find it rational to uphold: “because most of our beliefs are 
reasonably held, but can be reasonably rejected by others, arguments that 
                                                
32 Gaus, ‘Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political’, p. 280. 
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require others to accept these beliefs are inadequate from the perspective of 
liberal legitimacy”.33 To overcome this difficulty Gaus suggests that we 
identify a conception of public justification with standards that are stronger 
than mere reasonableness: “For a justificatory liberalism, the, satisfying liberal 
legitimacy requires a justification of coercive authority that is not open to 
reasonable doubt”.34 
 That observation leads us directly to Gaus’ third line of argument 
against political liberalism, namely the charge of ‘justificatory populism’. 
Indeed, how can we construct a public justification of authority that is not 
just reasonable, and thus open to reasonable doubt? Gaus’ answer, as 
anticipated, is that in constructing arguments for the purpose of public 
justification we need to rely on modes of inference that are of a higher 
standard of epistemic reliability as the commonsense inferences sanctioned by 
populist theories such as Rawls’.  
 So, to bring these points together, we can observe how Gaus appears 
to be primarily concerned with finding a conception of public reason that is 
‘normatively justificatory’, i.e. that identifies normative principles satisfying 
certain epistemic standards (the idea here seems to be that, if indeed the 
principles satisfy these standards, we will be warranted in upholding them 
even in the face of dissent or reasonable disagreement about them), and that 
can apply to all exercises of political authority. Indeed, the lack of such a 
normatively justificatory conception of public reason is the main fault he 
finds in Rawls’ theory of legitimacy through public justification.  
But what exactly does it mean that the justification of principles of 
justice through Rawlsian public reason is not ‘normatively justificatory’? Or, 
more directly, what exactly does it mean for a principle to be normatively 
justificatory? To complete our account of Gaus’ theory of legitimacy, then, 
we must provide an answer to that question. For Rawls a principle is publicly 
justified when there is a sense in which this principle is acceptable to 
reasonable citizens (and reasonable citizens are picked out—or rather 
idealised out—of the rest of the citizenry primarily in virtue of their moral 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 276. 
34 Ibid. 
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commitments, and not so much in virtue of their epistemic aptness). For 
Gaus, on the other hand, for a principle to be normatively valid and publicly 
justified for means that (i) it is most likely to track the truth of the matter, or 
in any case that it satisfies certain epistemological standards, and (ii) it is 
arrived at through modes of  inference that are the best available, subject to 
the condition that they also be accessible to all reasonable citizens (where 
‘accessible’ does not mean that those modes of inference need to be the most 
widely shared by reasonable citizens, but simply ones that can be 
understood). We may say, then, that condition (ii) acts as a constraint on 
condition (i): the truth-tracking is restrained by a publicity requirement (a 
rather weak one, as we shall see shortly).  
The challenge for Gaus’ justificatory liberalism, then, is to show that a 
liberal political order can indeed be justified in a way that satisfies those 
conditions and is thus legitimate. To be precise, though, Gaus’ objective is 
slightly more ambitious: he wants to show that his conception of public 
justification and the liberal political order are not just compatible, but 
inextricably linked: “If public justification is an inherently liberal idea, we 
need to see how it is necessarily related to basic substantive liberal principles 
such as non-interference, toleration, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
religion”.35 So the challenge is to show how those principles are logically 
connected to the idea that the exercise of political authority ought to be 
publicly justified in Gaus’ sense, i.e. that it ought to be “supported by good 
reasons that all rational citizens should be able to appreciate”.36 Four our 
purposes, however, we do not need to inquire as to whether Gaus can 
successfully show that this is the case. In fact, here we are simply looking to 
assess his theory of legitimacy through public justification,  and in order to do 
so it will suffice to consider whether it can meet the liberal legitimacy view’s 
two desiderata. It would of course be a problem if Gaus’ theory of public 
justification satisfied the two desiderata but failed to support a liberal political 
order; yet in order to proceed with my argument it will not be necessary to 
ask that question, thus we can proceed  by granting Gaus that his conception 
                                                
35 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 160-161.  
36 Ibid., p. 160 
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of public justification does indeed support liberalism. In fact, if Gaus is 
successful in showing that his account of normative justifiability not only 
supports liberalism but is necessarily tied to it, and if his theory satisfies the 
liberal legitimacy view’s two desiderata, then his theory of liberal legitimacy 
simply must be the correct account of the foundations of liberalism. Yet, 
before considering this point it will be best to see whether Gaus’ theory can 
indeed satisfy the liberal legitimacy view’s desiderata.  
 
2.2. The important question, then, is whether Gaus’ conception of public 
justification can perform the task of grounding political authority in a way 
that is appealing to liberal legitimacy theorists. It seems to me that this is not 
the case: in the remainder of this section I shall indeed argue that it fails to 
satisfy both the pragmatic and the moralistic desideratum of liberal 
legitimacy.37  
 Justificatory liberalism fails to satisfy the pragmatic desideratum because 
there is no guarantee that actual citizens will be motivated to comply with 
principles selected via Gaus’ preferred procedure. More precisely, it is not 
clear how the mere fact that the publicly justified principles will be 
‘accessible’ to rational citizens will produce the sort of wide consensus 
envisaged by the pragmatic desideratum, as citizens might (somewhat 
akratically) see the overwhelming reasons in favour of a principle, and yet not 
be able to consider it as something they could endorse. Gaus’ epistemically 
optimal procedure, in fact, may lead to epistemically satisfactory normative 
principles, but it is far from clear that the citizenry will be motivated by this 
concern for upholding epistemic standards, especially when it trumps other, 
more practical concerns, such as those addressed by political liberalism. It is 
rather interesting to note how this problem is symmetrical to the one I 
identified for Rawls’ conception of public justification: for Rawls a normative 
principle regulating the basic structure of society is publicly justified if and 
only if (a) it is acceptable to reasonable citizens, and (b) it complies with what 
he takes to be the moral commitments of liberal democracy (i.e. if it 
guarantees that citizens will respect each other as free and equal)—hence the 
                                                
37 For a characterisation of these desiderata, see Chapter II, section 2.3.  
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critique I put forward in Chapter III: whatever satisfies (a) will by definition 
satisfy (b) because, rather than as commonsensical notion, reasonableness is 
defined as a morally controversial commitment to seeking fair terms of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens. So, just as the problem I have 
identified for Rawls’ theory is that he provides no grounds38 for why the 
citizens should commit to this notion of reasonableness (with its built-in 
liberal outcomes) in the first place, Gaus’ theory suffers from an unargued-for 
assumptions that citizens will find their primary source of motivation (as far 
as political deliberation is concerned) in their commitment to following the 
demands of epistemic rationality. 
 Gaus’ conception of public justification, in my view, also fails to 
satisfy the moralistic desideratum, because what this conception of public 
justification protects is not the personal autonomy of the citizens, but rather 
the value of truth, or perhaps of truth-tracking: the principles that are better 
off from an epistemic point of view acquire legitimacy, regardless of whether 
they can be autonomously endorsed by the citizens. To be fair, through the 
accessibility requirement Gaus does introduce a small measure of concern for 
citizens’ response to those principles, but that is even weaker than the 
concern we find in Rawls’ notion of public justification, for not only it 
applies just to reasonable citizens, but it also declines to rely on the modes of 
inference that they would be more inclined to use. Put another way, there 
seems to be an important gap between something being accessible to my 
rationality, and something being something I could endorse. Gaus’ lack of 
patience for the (rather widespread) phenomenon of  epistemic akrasia just 
shows a lack of concern for autonomy: if I am unable to endorse something 
despite seeing that it is rationally optimal, then forcing me to act as if I could 
endorse it is a violation of my autonomy.39 This may perhaps be cashed out as 
a plausible moral position for Gaus to take (perhaps it is a form of epistemic 
                                                
38 To be fair, one should note that Rawls does try—very unconvincingly, in my view—to 
provide some grounds for this: he claims that this moral commitment is implicit in the idea 
of liberal democracy and, even more unconvincingly, in the public culture of liberal 
democratic societies. 
39 Except on a hyper-rationalist conception of autonomy—a point discussed below. 
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rationality-based paternalist perfectionism), but not of the sort that is 
appealing to liberal legitimacy theorists, for it gives priority to epistemic 
accomplishment over personal autonomy.40 And, as we shall see in some more 
detail below, this way of giving priority to the epistemic status of political 
principles can be read as a significant move towards a substantivist approach 
to the foundations of political authority, for it seems that most of the 
foundational work is carried out by the intrinsic worth of the principles 
(measured on the basis of their rationality, i.e. impermeability to reasonable 
disagreement) rather than by a consensus over them.  
 In the light of these considerations, then, a more general point 
emerges. Indeed, Gaus’ emphasis on the epistemic side of public justification 
strikes me as perplexing in that it makes it the case that his arguments only 
have force if we grant him that epistemic rationality should—rather 
implausibly, in this context—take priority over practical rationality. It may 
very well be the case that it is epistemically irrational to care more about 
seeking fair terms of cooperation than about pursuing what we believe to be 
true/rational, but is it irrational tout-court, especially in the context of political 
philosophy? Gaus does not seem to have a satisfactory answer to this 
question.   
A slightly different way of putting the point is this. Gaus seems to use 
the word ‘justification’ as if it only had an epistemological denotation, and 
tries (unsuccessfully, in my eyes) to strip it of its moral/practical connotation. 
So in a sense he is equivocating about the sort of justification that Rawls 
(and, more generally and importantly, the contract-based liberal tradition) is 
after. This is quite important, because a purely or even predominantly 
epistemic conception of justification is certainly far of the mark as far as the 
desiderata of the liberal legitimacy view are concerned. After all, the 
foundational commitment grounding the liberal legitimacy view, as we have 
seen in Chapter I, can be subsumed under the idea of the value of personal 
                                                
40 This, of course, would not be a problem if personal autonomy were still safeguarded to a 
satisfactory degree. But this does not seem to be the case in Gaus’ theory, as shown in my 
brief discussion of Gaus’ hyper-Kantian conception of respect for person and autonomy in 
the next paragraph.  
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autonomy: I can be autonomous even if I am epistemically irrational (perhaps 
not even Kant would deny this, yet at times Gaus seems to be worryingly 
inclined to do so: “If, as political liberals insist, the commitment to public 
justification rests upon a commitment to respect persons, it is impossible to 
understand how this commitment could be honoured by appealing to what is 
seen as an irrational belief.”;41 but my autonomy—on any non-hyper-Kantian 
and hyper-rationalist conception of autonomy—would be violated if someone 
forced me to act against my considered judgement, even if such judgment 
flies in the face of the conclusions warranted by my own epistemic rationality. 
That is why we can say that the liberal legitimacy view demands a 
moral/practical conception of justification, rather than an epistemic one. 
That is brought out even more clearly and generally if we consider that, as I 
have tried to show in Chapters I and II, liberal legitimacy theory is a 
contemporary instantiation of the contract-based liberal tradition, a tradition 
whose account of the legitimacy of political authority has as its central 
component a consensus on liberal values which, albeit typically hypothetical, 
is still characterised by pragmatic and voluntaristic concerns. Indeed, where 
those concerns to disappear as in Gaus’ theory, the very point of appealing to 
some notion of consent would disappear, or at least lose much of its cogency. 
And that shows how Gaus’ use of the notion of justifiability in a way that 
detaches it from the idea of hypothetical agreement brings the idea of public 
reason and public justification out of its original, contract-based context and 
into rather more substantivist territory, for the idea of normative justifiability 
becomes but a way of tracking whether a given normative political principles 
satisfies certain independently-set axiological standards.42  
 However, to say that Gaus’ ‘justificatory’ alternative to political 
liberalism does not really flag serious internal problems for the Rawlsian 
                                                
41 Gaus, ‘The Rational, the Reasonable, and Justification’, p. 249. 
42 Here one might be tempted to observe that even Rawls’ theory, and perhaps most 
versions of the liberal legitimacy view, may be read in this way, thus collapsing the 
deontological and contract-based rhetoric into a roundabout version of a substantivist 
account of the foundations of political authority. That is indeed a line of argument which 
we shall explore in the following and last chapter. 
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project is not to say that political liberalism (and liberal legitimacy theory at 
large) does not have serious flaws, as we have seen in Chapter III, and as one 
of Gaus’ arguments shows, namely the argument from the blurriness of the 
‘political’ (even though it is a rather inconsequential argument, at least for the 
purposes of the project of justificatory liberalism).  
 The same is true, in part, of Gaus’ second argument, the one from the 
close ties between the rational and the reasonable. Even though, as we have 
seen, it cannot do the work Gaus would like it to do, it is an interesting way 
of pointing out a weakness of political liberalism, namely that political 
liberalism requires from its citizens a far stronger commitment (and indeed 
one which takes priority over their comprehensive doctrines) to the liberal 
ideals of peaceful coexistence, freedom and equality, than Rawls would be 
happy to admit. 
 What about Gaus’ third main argument against political liberalism, i.e. 
the charge of ‘justificatory populism’? If the empirically-backed contentions 
regarding the lack of reliability of common sense modes of inference turned 
out to be plausible (and that of course depends almost exclusively on the 
results of further empirical investigation into the reliability of common-sense 
modes of inference), it would follow that Gaus has identified a noteworthy 
problem for Rawls, at least from a certain point of view, which nonetheless is 
not Rawls. Indeed, it is a problem that does not arise if we look at the issue 
from Rawls’ perspective, i.e. from a practical rather than an epistemological 
perspective. So Gaus’ main point against Rawls can be understood not as 
pointing out an inconsistency or a tension within Rawls’ view, but rather as 
flagging a major aspect of what is valuable about normative principles 
regulating the political framework, an aspect which Rawls all but neglects 
(with some reason, as far as his project is concerned, but arguably not with 
sufficient reason, if Gaus is correct). The point being that, whilst Rawls’ 
theory might be internally coherent in so far as its moral and practical aims 
go, nonetheless Gaus’ critique highlights Rawls’ lack of concern for the 
epistemic status of publicly justified normative principles.  
In the light of the latter point, perhaps it would not be too far-fetched 
to claim that, in this way, Gaus has identified a third desideratum of liberal 
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legitimacy theory, the epistemic desideratum, namely the requirement that the 
procedure for selecting the principles regulating the basic structure of society 
satisfies minimal standards of epistemic rationality. However, if (somewhat in 
line with the point restated at the beginning of this session) we maintain that 
practical rationality should take priority in this branch of philosophy, this 
desideratum would probably have to be subordinated to the other two. What 
is more, there is certainly room for arguing that such a desideratum has no 
place at all in this context: perhaps Rawls is correct in maintaining that public 
justification is a practical rather than an epistemological matter, after all. But 
it would be well beyond our present scope to pursue this line of argument 
(however interesting: it points to a deep question as to whether the aim of 
normative political theory should be that of easing political coexistence, or 
prescribing the most rational form of coexistence).43 At any rate, whatever (if 
any) importance is attached to Gaus’ epistemic grievances would just flag 
even more tensions and problems for the liberal legitimacy view as an 
account of the normative foundation of political authority. 
Finally, as anticipated, it is important to note how, regardless of what 
we make of its intrinsic merits, Gaus’ conception of legitimacy through public 
justification marks a departure form the contract-based approach to the 
foundations of liberalism towards a substantivist approach, i.e. one that 
grounds authority in a positive case for the desirability of the values 
embedded in liberal institutions and policies. To see why that is the case, 
consider this telling passage: 
 
We seek a justification for the exercise of political power that is not 
open to reasonable objections, although it may be rejected by many 
reasonable people. Constitutional politics, then, is not the realm of 
consensus, but of conclusive justifications—those not open to 
reasonable doubt. The domain of constitutional politics is not to be 
                                                
43 One might of course argue that, at a more general level, normative political theory always 
seeks to prescribe the most rational political conduct. Indeed, even a theory prescribing to 
adhere to the political norms which make coexistence easiest would have to depend on the 
claim that it is most rational to seek coexistence over perfection, to put it crudely. Yet the 
distinction at the first order level remains a useful one.  
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grasped in terms of the quasi-sociological notion of a possible 
consensus, but in terms of an epistemology that reveals to us the 
conditions that render it unreasonable to reject a justification.44   
 
A political principle is publicly justified when it is not subject to 
reasonable disagreement, but that for Gaus does not mean that reasonable 
citizens will not, as a matter of fact, contest it; rather, it just means that they 
will have no reason to be so, even though they might very well not be aware of 
that (but they could become aware of it, because of the accessibility 
requirement—that is the only contractualist concession that Gaus offers, and 
it is clearly one that pales into insignificance in the broader context of his 
theory). In other words, Gaus says that for a normative principle to be 
publicly justified just means that it is “supported by good reasons that all 
rational citizens should be able to appreciate”.45 But then what is doing the 
authority-grounding work is almost exclusively the fact that the principle is 
rational per se (plus the accessibility requirement, but only in a very minor 
way, because rational individuals appreciating the reasons in support of 
something is conceptually almost undistinguishable from that something 
being supported by good reasons); and that is tantamount to saying that 
liberal political authority is legitimate when it can be shown that there is a 
substantive case to be made for the rationality of the normative principles 
regulating its exercise. Perhaps even more interestingly, that can be read not 
only as a move from contract-based towards substantivist liberalism, but also 
an argument for substantivism: Gaus’ critique of Rawls, in fact, shows how the 
more we strive to ground political authority in a consensus that is somehow 
close to the sources of moral motivation present in a society, the less 
satisfactory our outcomes will be, from a normative point of view. One might 
of course reply that this argument proceeds from a substantivist 
understanding of what is normatively relevant, and is thus to some degree 
circular, but that would just be a way of raising the question of whether the 
contract based or the substantivist tradition embody the most appropriate 
                                                
44 Ibid., p. 275. 
45 Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. 160.  
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conception of normativity for the purposes of grounding political authority—
a question that exudes from the remit of this chapter, but one that we shall 
return to in the next one.  
 
 
3. Concluding Observations  
 
3.1 Let us start by quickly reviewing what we have established in this chapter. 
We have considered how Gaus’ theory of legitimacy through public 
justification emerges as a critique of  Rawlsian political liberalism: in a 
nutshell, Gaus’ guiding thought is that the epistemic standards embodied by 
Rawls’ conception of public justification are too relaxed. Reliance on 
common sense modes of inference such as those envisaged in Rawls’ notion 
of reasonableness produces outcomes that do not satisfy adequate epistemic 
standards, which is a problem because normative principles that are not 
justified conclusively will be open to reasonable rejection on the part of the 
citizenry, thus failing to satisfy the liberal legitimacy principle. We have seen 
that, while this line of argument does bring out some genuine problems for 
Rawlsian political liberalism (most notably as regards the arbitrary narrowness 
of the consensus envisaged by political liberalism), it does nonetheless fail to 
qualify as a satisfactory alternative version of the liberal legitimacy view, for it 
fails to satisfy the view’s two desiderata. That is because the highly 
rationalistic conception of public justification put forward by Gaus rests on 
the rather implausible idea that epistemic rationality should trump practical 
rationality even in matters regarding the foundations of a particular kind of 
political practice such as liberalism. Moreover, we have observed how Gaus’ 
theory of legitimacy bases public normative justifiability almost exclusively on 
the intrinsic rationality of liberal political principles (rather on their being 
acceptable—i.e. not merely accessible—to citizens), thus marking a departure 
from the contract-based towards the substantivist approach to the 
foundations of liberalism.  
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3.2 Where does that leave us as far as the wider project of assessing the 
liberal legitimacy view is concerned? We may say that this analysis of 
justificatory liberalism completes our overview of the avenues that liberal 
legitimacy theorists may try to thread. As we have seen, none of the three 
theories considered so far succeeds in meeting both of the view’s desiderata: 
political liberalism strives to seek a balance between the two desiderata, but 
ends up failing to meet the pragmatic one. Modus vivendi, on the other hand, 
is very heavily weighed towards meeting the pragmatic desideratum, thus 
neglecting the moralistic desideratum altogether. Justificatory liberalism, as 
we have just seen, departs from both desiderata altogether. Moreover, as seen 
in Chapters I and II, problems with the view’s desiderata are connected with 
potential structural deficiencies of the view. At any rate, before declaring the 
view untenable it will be appropriate to provide a final general assessment of 
it, in the light of the various versions of it surveyed in Chapters III-V. That 
will indeed be the purpose of the next and final chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI 
Liberal Legitimacy and Its Discontents 
 
 
 
0. Introductory 
 
0.1 In the previous chapters I have presented an account of the liberal 
legitimacy view as a theory of the normative foundations of liberal political 
authority. We have analysed the view’s two requirements and the connections 
between them, highlighting a structural worry about the interplay of the 
requirements. We have also discussed the view’s account of hypothetical 
consent through public justification, which led to a further worry regarding the 
possibility of securing a consensus which is both appropriately inclusive and 
freely given. Further, we have seen how those worries are connected: the reason 
why there are difficulties in securing a consensus that meets the view’s 
desiderata is that the two requirements appear to have been set arbitrarily, in the 
sense that liberal legitimacy theorists are at a loss for arguments when it comes 
to accounting for why only consent to a certain kind of political framework 
confers legitimacy upon political authority. Those general worries have then 
been tested (and confirmed) at a lower level of abstraction, against the three 
main theoretical avenues that liberal legitimacy theorists might follow. From the 
vantage point afforded by the arguments considered so far, it is now time to go 
back to discussing the liberal legitimacy view in its general, more abstract form, 
in order to reach a final verdict on the view’s prospects. Thus in this chapter I 
shall discuss in some more detail the worries advanced so far, in order to see 
how they add up to a unified critique of the liberal legitimacy view. 
 As anticipated, my conclusion will be that the liberal legitimacy view is 
untenable. However, I shall not stop there. Indeed, the overview of the liberal 
legitimacy view’s difficulties I will offer here will also show us where to look to 
find an alternative, more promising normative foundation for liberal political 
authority. After concluding my critique, then, I shall take a step back and 
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consider the liberal legitimacy view in the broader context of the liberal 
tradition in normative political philosophy. As stated in the Introduction, the 
liberal legitimacy view is the most recent expression of contract-based, broadly 
deontological liberalism. Here I would like to show how the demise of the 
liberal legitimacy view is a potent blow to contract-based liberalism, for liberal 
legitimacy is indeed its most sophisticated version. But that need not coincide 
with the demise of liberalism; in fact, as I shall argue, the problems of the 
liberal legitimacy view and of contract-based liberalism, as well as their most 
positive aspects, point towards an alternative approach to the foundations of 
liberalism, namely that of the substantivist, broadly teleological tradition of 
liberal thought.  
 
0.2 This will be a relatively brief chapter, comprising just two sections. In the 
first section I shall reformulate the worries presented in the previous chapters, 
discuss their connections in some detail, and show how they add up to a 
sustained critique of the liberal legitimacy view. I also consider some objections 
to this critique, and reply to them. I then proceed to place the liberal legitimacy 
view in the broader context of the liberal tradition and move on to show how 
my critique of the liberal legitimacy view should lead us to abandon contract-
based liberalism in favour of substantivist liberalism. Finally, in the second 
section I summarise the conclusions and briefly prospect some research 
directions opened up by my results.  
 
 
1. Discontents and Beyond 
 
1.1 Before revisiting the worries about the liberal legitimacy view advanced 
before, it will perhaps be useful to bring back to mind our account of the view’s 
structure. We have established that the liberal legitimacy view is an account of 
the moral legitimacy of the exercise of liberal political authority, and that it 
consists of two normative requirements, consent and justification. The consent 
requirement prescribes that liberal political authority must enjoy the 
(hypothetical) free consent of those subject to it (the typical way to secure such 
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a consensus, then, is through the idea of public justification, i.e. the thought 
that the liberal political framework must be acceptable to its citizenry in some 
appropriate way).1 The justification requirement prescribes that the political 
framework that is consented to be a liberal political framework.2 Both 
requirements are necessary conditions for legitimacy, and their conjunction 
becomes a necessary and sufficient condition. Now we have seen that this 
account of the liberal legitimacy view exposes two serious problems, to do with 
the interplay between the two requirements and with the workings of the idea of 
public justification. In the remainder of this section I shall present those 
worries in some detail, and carry the argument advanced in the previous 
chapters to the next level by explaining how they come together.  
 Let us begin with the worry about the sort of consensus envisaged by 
the liberal legitimacy view. We have seen how the view has a distinctive strategy 
to muster the hypothetical consent of the citizenry through the idea of public 
justification, or public reason. The idea is to show that the political framework3 
is acceptable to the citizenry as it could have been arrived at through a 
procedure of public deliberation carried out in a way that ensures respect for 
the citizens’ personal autonomy. This approach carries with itself two 
desiderata: a pragmatic one, expressing the aspiration that no significant sectors 
of the citizenry will be excluded from the consensus, and a moralistic one, 
expressing the aspiration that the consensus be achieved freely, i.e. without 
violations of the consenting parties’ personal autonomy. Ensuring the safeguard 
of personal autonomy, then, will require introducing some restrictions in the 
citizens’ modus operandi in the hypothetical deliberation procedure (for 
example, the reasons used in support of one’s position must be accessible to 
everyone, threats may not be deployed in support of one’s preferred position, 
and so on). A typical way of introducing those restrictions is by stating that the 
consensus should only include reasonable citizens, where reasonable citizens are 
                                                
1 On public justification, see Chapter I, section 1.4, and Chapter II.  
2 Recall how ‘liberal’ here is to be understood as referring to the level of policies and 
institutions, and not to the level of the normative justification of policies and institutions. See 
Chapter I, section 1.3.  
3 Or, on some versions of the view, the normative principles underpinning it.  
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those who are committed to respecting their fellow citizens’ personal autonomy. 
That, however, clearly gives rise to a tension between the two desiderata: the 
tighter the restrictions (i.e. the more substantial the account of reasonableness), 
the more citizens will be excluded from the consensus.4 Now that would not be 
a problem were there a high level of ethical homogeneity within contemporary 
liberal democratic societies; but the fact of the matter is that, on the contrary, 
such societies are characterised by persistent, wide and widespread ethical 
disagreement, to the point that the very idea of public justification has been 
introduced by liberal legitimacy theorists (most notably Rawls) precisely to 
devise an account of hypothetical consent capable of overcoming the challenge 
of ethical diversity.5 So the question becomes one of how loose the restrictions 
can be (so as to make the consensus satisfactorily inclusive), compatibly with 
ensuring the safeguard of personal autonomy or, more generally, of the 
normative foundational commitments underpinning the consent requirement 
and the liberal legitimacy view at large. In the survey of the various options 
open to liberal legitimacy theorists carried out in Chapters III to V we have not 
found any account of the view that is able to meet both desiderata. Especially as 
the pragmatic desideratum is concerned, though, there are no precise targets to 
meet; so the overall target becomes that of striking an acceptable balance or 
trade-off between both desiderata. For reasons presented in the relevant 
chapters, none of the versions of the liberal legitimacy view we considered meet 
this overall target. Now, is this problem just an internal difficulty of the various 
particular approaches to meeting the liberal legitimacy view’s consent 
requirement, or is it rather connected to a structural problem of the view, and 
thus considerably more serious? 
                                                
4 Another way of formulating this issue is to say that the consent envisaged risks being too 
hypothetical, and thus it does not carry enough normative force to ground political authority. 
Consent is too hypothetical when inappropriate normative considerations have been smuggled 
into the antecedent of the conditional expressing the relation of hypothetical consent. Those 
considerations turn out to be inappropriate when they are too strong or controversial to be 
widely endorsed by the citizenry. 
5 Or, as he puts it, of reasonable pluralism. Yet we have seen that the measure of pluralism 
Rawls deems necessary to accommodate is defined in a relation of circularity with the political 
outcomes he intends to sanction (see Chapter III, section 2.2). 
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 To start answering that question, we should begin to observe how, in 
order to strike a satisfactory trade-off between the desiderata, liberal legitimacy 
theorists should be able to account for why exactly a certain type and level of 
restrictions on the deliberation procedure are called for. Moreover, that account 
has to concern just the procedure, and float free of the desired outcomes. Yet 
we have seen that, in the only version of the view that manages to at least meet 
the moralistic desideratum to a satisfactory degree (whilst still failing to 
compromise acceptably with regard to the pragmatic desideratum), the 
procedural restrictions are closely tied to the liberal outcome Rawlsian ‘political’ 
liberalism is meant to legitimate.6 That also shows how it will not do for liberal 
legitimacy theorists to simply say that they place precisely those and not other 
restrictions on the hypothetical deliberation procedure simply to safeguard 
personal autonomy by ensuring that consent is given freely, for that does not 
account for why on their view autonomously chosen illiberal outcomes do not 
come out as legitimate. If on the other hand they build liberal outcomes into the 
very notion of autonomy (e.g. by saying that consenting autonomously to a 
political framework entails a commitment to treating fellow citizens as free and 
equals), then it is clear that the consent requirement becomes mere window 
dressing, in the sense that it amounts to a roundabout restatement of the 
justification requirement7—which, however, because of that is left without any 
arguments to prop it up. That is to say that the two requirements seem to be 
paired so as support each other, yet because the sort of consensus envisaged by 
the view has a built-in bias for liberalism it loses its voluntaristic normative 
force and becomes unable to prop up the justification requirement.  
That way of looking at the problem begins to reveal to us the connection 
between the worry about public justification and the second, structural worry 
we have put forward, namely that regarding the interplay between the liberal 
                                                
6 See previous footnote.  
7 The way in which liberal legitimacy theorists build liberal outcomes into their notion of a 
suitably regulated consensus through value-laden procedural restrictions (e.g. through Rawls’s 
notions of reasonableness) is analogous to the way in which, according to Raymond Geuss, 
some liberals draw the public-private distinction in a ways that have a built-in bias for liberal 
political outcomes: “If you have the views about reasonable belief and action that liberals 
prefer, you will also endorse their policy proposals” (Public Goods, Private Goods, pp. 83-84). 
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legitimacy view’s two requirements. Roughly, the worry was that the pairing of 
the two requirements is somewhat arbitrary, or if not that the consent 
requirement is redundant. The main point (setting aside some marginal 
differences depending on the particular version of the liberal legitimacy view at 
stake8) is  that the consent requirement can only confer legitimacy upon liberal 
political arrangements, and that is problematic because it is not clear what it is 
about consent that causes it to loose its normative force when not tied to a 
liberal outcome and, conversely, it is also not clear what it is about liberalism 
that puts it in need of the legitimating force of consent. Can I be free only if I 
freely choose to be a liberal? Does a liberal political framework become less 
desirable if it does not enjoy the free consent of its citizenry? Clearly those are 
not just rhetorical questions, yet the answers are not immediately forthcoming. I 
shall try to answer them on behalf of the liberal legitimacy theorists in the next 
sub-section.  
                                                                                    
1.2 It should be quite clear by now how the connection between the two 
worries discussed above generates a strong case against the liberal legitimacy 
view, as the argument from the tension between the two desiderata of public 
justification reinforces (or at least provides a different path to) the structural 
worry we first discussed in Chapter I. Before finally dismissing the liberal 
legitimacy view, however, we need to consider whether there are any strategies 
that could explain away the arbitrariness of the pairing of the two requirements. 
Even though we have not been able to locate such arguments in the versions of 
the liberal legitimacy view we have considered, it might still be the case that 
they are more or less implicitly committed to some assumptions or arguments 
that explain away the arbitrariness. Perhaps there is an argument that can enable 
liberal legitimacy theorists to escape this stalemate by turning it into a positive 
‘Catch-22’ situation; so we need to consider what it might be.  
 As I briefly anticipated in Chapter I,9 in the light of the account of the 
liberal legitimacy view presented here, it would appear that the only way to 
                                                
8 See the distinction between strong, intermediate and weak versions of the view in Chapter I, 
section 1.5. 
9 Section 1.5. 
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fruitfully explain the pairing of the two requirements passes through an 
argument accounting for how there is something about the liberal legitimacy 
view’s normative foundational commitments (i.e. what I have been referring to 
as personal autonomy) that makes it the case that they can only be properly 
safeguarded in a political framework if such political framework enjoys the free 
consent of those subjected to its authority. I shall now briefly discuss what I 
take to be the two main candidate arguments for this task.  
 The first argument can be stated in its most general (if rather vague) 
form as follows: being free or autonomous requires wanting to live under 
institutions that allow for the exercise of such freedom and autonomy. There 
are a number of ways to make sense of that argument, as one can immediately 
recognise it as echoing rather different positions famously taken by moral and 
political thinkers such as Locke, Kant, and Rousseau, among others.  
 The Lockean position is the familiar one from the beginning of the 
Second Treatise: one cannot freely consent to give oneself up in slavery.10 
Following this lead, liberal legitimacy theorists would have to argue that 
consenting to non-liberal political arrangements is tantamount to slavery. The 
problem here, however, is that even if we take (for the sake of the argument) 
Locke’s argument to be successful, it still remains just a negative argument 
against complete slavery11 (and thus, by extension, absolutism, which was of 
course Locke’s target), and it would fail to make a positive case for liberalism. 
Unless, of course, liberal legitimacy theorists were prepared to—rather 
implausibly—argue that any non-liberal political framework is equivalent to a 
form of absolutism.   
The Kantian or Rousseauian version of the argument is also rather 
familiar: it relies on a positive understanding of the concept of freedom, and it 
roughly amounts to saying that if one is truly free, then one would choose 
liberal political institutions and practices. The problem with this approach, 
                                                
10 For a detailed discussion of Locke’s argument, see A. John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy, 
pp. 48-55. 
11 Locke is quite clear about this, as he construes the biblical example of the Jews giving 
themselves up into slavery as a case not of slavery proper, but mere ‘drudgery’, i.e. a state of 
very limited economic power, but not complete servitude. 
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however, is that it eliminates any element of genuine choice from the notion of 
consent, thus turning it into an idle wheel or, perhaps more appropriately, into a 
wheel that cannot move by itself. And if—to remain within the metaphor—the 
wheel of consent has to be propelled by the values and virtues instantiated by 
the outcome (i.e. liberalism) required to give consent its legitimating force, then 
it becomes clear that those values, and not the consent, carry the critical 
normative force that confers legitimacy upon liberal polities.12 That problem 
might also provide another way of explaining why, as Raymond Geuss reminds 
us,13 many early liberals were very suspicious of Kant and Rousseau’s heavily 
moralised approach to politics and of their notions of freedom, as they 
considered them hostile to their commitment to individuality, voluntariness and 
spontaneity. 
 So, despite the fact that it would be quite natural to find broadly 
Lockean or Kantian arguments being deployed in support of the liberal 
legitimacy view (for, as we have seen, the view is the contemporary expression 
of contract-based liberalism, of which Locke and Kant are perhaps the most 
important exponents), it turns out that those arguments cannot perform the 
task of accounting for the pairing of the view’s two requirements. We can now 
turn to the second candidate argument. The core idea here is that valuable 
things need be pursued autonomously in order to be enjoyed as such, and 
autonomy is only valuable when exercised in pursuit of valuable things.14 This 
position seems rather promising as a source of a solution to our problem: we 
could in fact deploy it to argue that autonomous consent is only valuable if 
given to something valuable (liberalism), and liberalism’s value can be 
garnered—as it were—only if those who enjoy its benefits endorse it freely and 
autonomously. Now, leaving the contentiousness of the Razian view of value 
and autonomy aside, that does seem a rather good solution to our problem, for 
                                                
12 Interestingly, a similar point concerning how consent does not have freestanding normative 
force applies to the second candidate argument, as I shall explain in the following paragraph. 
13 Geuss, ‘Liberalism and Its Discontents’, pp. 13-14 and 16-17. 
14 A position along those lines has been defended at some length and with much more 
precision and nuance by Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom, pp. 369-395. The crude version 
of the position I present here does not do justice to Raz, yet it is inspired by his view and it 
should suffice to illustrate a point about the structure of the liberal legitimacy view.  
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it provides a solid account of the pairing of the consent and justification 
requirements. Yet it is also a solution that marks a departure from the concerns 
of the liberal legitimacy view. Indeed, there is a deeper point that we should 
notice here: if we make this move, we find ourselves arguing that liberalism is to 
be upheld because it is valuable, and the fact that consent is required to uphold 
it properly is just a consequence or a by-product of the way in which it is 
valuable. In other words, the liberal polity is not legitimate because it is 
consented to (in any strong sense of ‘because’); it just needs to be consented to 
for the virtues it instantiates to become fully normatively operational, as it 
were.15 That distinction is important because it shows how this argument 
eliminates any salient role of hypothetical consent as a genuine source of 
legitimacy—consent becomes just a device through which certain substantive 
values instantiate themselves. So, while the second candidate argument may map 
out an interesting position for liberals to take, it does not free the liberal 
legitimacy view from its structural difficulties. 
 
1.3 It is now time to take a step back and consider the critique of the liberal 
legitimacy view in the broader context of the debate over the normative 
foundations of liberal political practice. As we have seen at the outset of the 
thesis, the liberal tradition can be seen as comprising two main strands of 
thought, namely substantivism and contract-based liberalism. Substantivist 
liberalism, i.e. the liberalism of Hume, Mill and Raz (among others), grounds 
political authority by making a case for the desirability of the values and goods 
instantiated by liberal political institutions and practices. “We should uphold the 
liberal state because it safeguards and promotes autonomy, which is the 
cornerstone of our well-being”, a typical (if somewhat crude) substantivist 
liberal would argue. Contract-based liberalism, on the other hand, seeks to 
ground the authority of liberal polities in an agreement (typically a hypothetical 
one) between the citizens to uphold the state and its institutions.  So the polity 
is legitimate because it is the object of such a consensus.  
                                                
15 To reinforce this point It is worth observing how Raz, the main proponent of the view that 
provides the basis for the second candidate argument, is not a liberal legitimacy theorist, but 
rather a substantivist liberal.  
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The analysis carried out throughout the thesis has shown in what way 
the liberal legitimacy view is placed firmly in the contract-based camp, the camp 
of Locke, Kant, and Rawls. Yet, as we have seen, despite deploying a rather 
novel take on the idea of hypothetical consent, namely the idea of public 
justification, the liberal legitimacy view fails to meet the desiderata of contract-
based liberalism. That is because, as I have argued, the sort of hypothetical 
consent, or justifiability, envisaged by the liberal legitimacy view cannot be used 
as ‘surrogate consent’, but the fact is that my account of the LLV shows how, 
for the view to make sense, it needs to carry some of the normative force 
carried by more voluntaristic forms of consent (otherwise the view becomes 
circular—it is also to better bring out this point that I transposed the language 
of justifiability into that of hypothetical consent in my account of the view). In 
fact, one could construe my critique of the liberal legitimacy view precisely as 
saying that Rawls and his followers have a view of legitimacy whose structure 
requires ‘proper’ consent, yet they deploy in lieu of such consent a mere notion 
of reasonable justifiability which as such is bound to prove inadequate to 
ground political authority within the framework of contract-based liberalism.  
 The next question, then, is whether the failings of the liberal legitimacy 
view are self-contained, as it were, or rather they spill out and endanger the 
whole contract-based strand of liberal thought. Naturally that question is too 
broad to be tackled exhaustively within this study; nonetheless, in the light of 
my critique of the liberal legitimacy view, it will perhaps be interesting to 
advance a very general and sketchy critical hypothesis against contract-based 
liberalism, and in defence of substantivist liberalism. The general idea is a 
familiar one. In fact, in so far as my critique of the liberal legitimacy view lends 
support to this idea, it can be seen as contributing to one of the main arguments 
in the ongoing confrontation between those two liberal traditions. In fact, the 
thought is simply that, if contract-based liberalism wants to escape the charge of  
arbitrarily setting the content of the normative commitments built into its 
account of hypothetical consent (thus reducing its appeal only to those already 
committed to liberal values, and so, in a sense, giving up one of the central tasks 
of normative political theory), it needs to resort to making a substantive case 
for those normative commitments in order to break free of the circle. And that 
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is tantamount to saying that the strongest normative case for liberalism is the 
one built through a substantivist approach. There is of course still room to 
claim that the idea of a hypothetical contract may in some cases serve as a 
useful argumentative device to model a substantive normative position; but we 
need be wary of mistaking such highly value-laden hypothetical agreements for 
the sort of freestanding agreements that are capable of generating normativity 
and reasons for action simply in virtue of their intrinsic voluntarism.  
 
 
2. Conclusion, and a Glance Ahead 
 
2.1 Let us now very briefly condense the conclusions of what has been a 
chapter largely devoted to a deepening and consolidation of points previously 
advanced here and there in the rest of the thesis. We started out by reminding 
ourselves of our structural analysis of the liberal legitimacy view, which we have 
broken down into two requirements (consent and justification) whose 
conjunction is a necessary and sufficient condition for the legitimacy of liberal 
political authority. There are however some difficulties with the view, which we 
have seen boil down to the general problem that the liberal legitimacy view’s 
two normative requirements stand in a relation of self-referentiality that makes 
the view unattractive to those not already committed to liberalism. We have 
then considered a possible way out of that impasse, which however, if 
successful, strips the liberal legitimacy view of its voluntaristic features, thus 
turning it from the contemporary instantiation of the contract-based liberal 
tradition into a rather circuitous version of teleological, substantivist liberalism. 
Finally, that observation led us to realise how the deontological, contract-based 
liberal tradition is best abandoned in favour of the substantivist tradition, as the 
latter enables liberals to defend their preferred political system (or various 
versions of it) in a way that can also appeal to those who do not already have 
broadly liberal political allegiances.  
 
2.2 I wish to conclude with a cursory overview of some of the directions of 
inquiry opened by the conclusions defended throughout this thesis. The brief 
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list that follows should of course not be taken to be exhaustive; nor are those 
lines of research listed in order of importance.  
(i) The liberal traditions. There is some historical work (of both exegetic 
and archaeological nature) to be done on the rediscovery of the substantivist 
line of liberal thought that runs from Hume to Mill to Raz (as opposed to the 
now dominant one which runs from Locke to Kant to Rawls), and on why the 
contract-based approach became predominant. A working hypothesis to answer 
the latter question could be that perhaps it was facilitated by the wider appeal of 
Kantianism in American moral philosophy, which in turn might be a product of 
the friendliness to Kantian-style rigorism found in some of the forms of 
Protestantism that are prevalent in the United States.16 
 (ii) The accommodation of diversity. The liberal legitimacy view aims to show 
that it is possible for a diverse group of citizens to recognise the same basic 
structure as just (in turn, recognition of justice would produce a political 
obligation, and hence legitimacy). In a way the liberal legitimacy view spells out 
how diverse that group can possibly be, and (as seen especially in Chapter III), 
and it turns out that (given the liberal legitimacy view’s structure and 
assumptions) it has to be disappointingly homogeneous. However if we 
abandon the liberal legitimacy view in favour of a different account of liberal 
political authority we might very well find that different levels of 
accommodation of diversity are possible and/or desirable. 
(iii) The value and function of democracy. Within the framework of the liberal 
legitimacy view the democratic process of contemporary liberal democracies 
takes a very peculiar role, as contract-based liberals try to lay down rules for its 
conduct that ensure that the citizenry’s consent will be conveyed in the 
appropriate ways (hence, for example, the public reason-type restrictions on the 
conduct of democratic deliberation). Yet if we abandon the liberal legitimacy 
                                                
16 A related question would compare the prevalence of the contract-based view in academic 
circles to the general public’s views on what justifies liberal democracy—any discrepancies, 
besides being interesting and revealing in their own right, might cast some light on the issue of 
the intellectual cross-fertilisation (or lack thereof) between the general public and academic 
circles (thus, for example, confirming or falsifying the above hypothesis about the connection 
between Kantian ethics and Protestant rigorism).  
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view the function of democratic political institutions and practices becomes no 
longer that of conveying consent, but rather we should look at the virtues 
instantiated by democracy and at the consequences  it produces. And those new 
axiological priorities, in turn, raise new and different challenges when it comes 
to producing a normative theory of liberal democracy. 
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APPENDIX 
Some Definitions 
 
 
 
Political power:  
The ability, on the part of individuals or organisations, to use threats and rewards 
to motivate a state’s residents to act or not act in certain ways. 
 
Political authority: 
Political authority obtains when some agents and/or agencies as a matter of fact 
exercise political power reliably in a state, and the residents of that state as a matter 
of fact regard those who exercise political power as being entitled to do so. 
 
De facto political authority: 
De facto political authority obtains if and only if, as a matter of fact, individuals or 
organisations reliably exercise political power in a way that is generally endorsed or 
at least recognised by those subject to it.  
 
Legitimate political authority: 
Political authority is legitimate (as opposed to being just de facto) when some sort of 
normatively satisfactory relationship (in a broad sense of the term) exists between 
those in authority and those subject to the authority. For example, political 
authority might be legitimate if a consent relationship obtains between the state and 
its subjects, or if the state satisfactorily protects certain rights and interests of its 
subjects, and so on. 
 
Proper exercise of political authority: 
Political authority is properly exercised if and only if, at a given point in time or 
during a given period, a sufficient number of the acts ascribed to individuals and 
institutions invested with political authority satisfy some normative requirement or 
other. Thus the relevant question is: ‘Are those with political authority doing their 
job properly?’.  
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Proper grounding of political authority: 
Political authority is properly grounded if and only if a sufficient number of the 
agents and agencies invested with political authority at a given point in time or 
during a given period came to hold such authority in a normatively sound way. Thus 
the relevant question is: ‘Were those with political authority entitled to occupy that 
position in the first place?’. 
 
Liberalism:  
Political tradition characterised by policies and institutions affording maximal 
individual equal liberty. Liberals disagree widely as to what are the best normative 
foundations for such policies and institutions.  
 
Justification (technical sense):  
Normative considerations adduced in support of a polity’s authority, and 
concerning particular virtues instantiated by the polity (e.g. its promotion of well-
being or excellence, etc.). 
 
Legitimacy (technical sense):  
Normative relationship (e.g. of consent) between a polity and those subjected to its 
authority. This relationships confers to the polity a right to the exercise of  its 
authority.  
 
Political framework:  
A polity’s fundamental norms (i.e. the constitution or its functional equivalents) and 
institutions. 
 
Liberal legitimacy view:  
A theory of the proper exercise of legitimate political authority. According  to the 
view, political authority is properly exercised if and only if (i) in some sense (even if 
only a hypothetical one) the citizenry of the polity at stake consent to its political 
framework (consent requirement), and (ii) the political framework at stake is liberal 
(justification requirement).  
On a weak version of the view, the theory only applies to liberal polities 
(particularist variant), or only applies in full (universalist variant) to liberal polities 
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(i.e. non-liberal polities are subject to altogether different legitimacy criteria. This 
position still allows—but does not require—liberal legitimacy theorists to claim that 
their view of legitimacy is preferable, even though polities that do not satisfy its 
requirements may nonetheless be considered legitimate). On an intermediate version 
of the view, the theory applies to both liberal and non-liberal polities, but not to 
any polity (i.e. only some non-liberal polities are subject to the view’s legitimacy 
criteria). On a strong version, it applies to any polity (i.e. only liberal polities can be 
legitimate).  
 
Public justification/Public reason: 
Account of hypothetical consent featured in the liberal legitimacy view. A political 
framework is consented to through public reason, i.e. it is publicly justified, if and 
only if it could have been arrived at had certain rules for the conduct of 
deliberation been followed.  
 
Public deliberation: 
Account of hypothetical consent that may feature in the liberal legitimacy view 
(typically just for assessing the legitimacy of changes to the political framework). 
According to this account the political framework may be understood as consented 
to in the sense that it is arrived at through a process of deliberation conducted 
according to rules that guarantee the preservation of the citizens’ free consent. That 
is to say, the rules are such that the foundational commitment generating the 
consent requirement (e.g. personal autonomy) will be safeguarded throughout the 
deliberation process. 
 
Idealistic public justification/reason (or public deliberation): 
Account of public justification characterised by norms for the (hypothetical or 
actual) conduct of deliberation on the structure of the political framework that 
require the citizens to only make use of reasons that satisfy certain moral and/or 
epistemological standards, regardless of whether those reasons are actually available 
to them or to a relevant subset of them.  
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Realistic public justification/reason (or public deliberation): 
Account of public justification characterised by norms for the (hypothetical or 
actual) conduct of deliberation on the structure of the political framework that 
require the citizens to only make use of reasons that are actually available to them. 
 
Moralistic desideratum of public justification (or public deliberation): 
Desideratum of public justification according to which deliberation (hypothetical or 
actual) need be conducted in a way that safeguards the participants’ personal 
autonomy, or indeed any normative foundational commitment that required the 
introduction of the consent requirement in the first place.  
 
Pragmatic desideratum of public justification (or public deliberation): 
Desideratum of public justification according to which the rules regulating 
(hypothetical or actual) public deliberation should be characterised in such a way as 
not to exclude sizeable sectors of the citizenry from the deliberation process.  
 
Substantivist liberalism: 
Tradition in normative political theory according to which liberalism is best 
grounded in an account of the values and virtues (e.g. well-being, autonomy, 
excellence, etc.) embodied and/or promoted by liberal polities. The main exponents 
of this tradition are David Hume, J.S. Mill, and Joseph Raz. 
 
Contract-based liberalism: 
Tradition in normative political philosophy according to which liberalism is best 
grounded as the object of hypothetical consent on the part of those subjected to its 
authority. The main exponents of this tradition are John Locke, Immanuel Kant, 
and John Rawls. 
 
Achievability (of a normative political theory): 
A normative political theory is achievable if and only if its prescriptions can be 
instantiated in political practice. 
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Viability (of a normative political theory): 
A normative political theory is viable if and only if, once achieved, its prescriptions 
can be sustained over time.  
 
Desirability (of a normative political theory): 
A normative political theory is desirable if and only if its prescriptions satisfy 
certain normative requirements and standards. 
 
Feasibility (of a normative political theory): 
A normative political theory is feasible if and only if it is both achievable and 
viable.  
 
Active normative political theory: 
A normative political theory is active if and only if its prescriptions are likely to be 
fully instantiated in political practice. In a strong sense of ‘active’ a theory is 
feasible (i.e. achievable and viable); in a weaker sense it is either just viable or just 
achievable.   
 
Passive normative political theory:  
A normative political theory is passive if and only if it can only be used as a 
regulative ideal for institutional evaluation, i.e. if and only if it is not likely to be 
feasible (strong sense of ‘passive’), or if and only it is not likely to be either viable 
or achievable (weak sense).  
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